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It has been well-observed in the literature that not every individual who experiences a 
traumatic event will go on to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Given this, a 
key focus within the field has been the examination of those factors which might serve to 
maintain PTSD symptomatology. In recent years, the potential role of rumination within 
disorder maintenance has been afforded greater attention, with accumulating evidence from 
clinical and non-clinical (analogue) studies to suggest its involvement. The evidence-base in 
this area thus far is outlined, with particular consideration given to the trauma-film 
paradigm, and the experimental induction of post-event rumination in consideration of 
symptom development and maintenance.  It is noted that the few analogue studies to date 
utilising this paradigm have yielded mixed findings, and it is proposed that the one-off, brief 
periods of state rumination typically induced may have been insufficient to adequately 
parallel clinical rumination. 
 
As such, this study sought to make a key adaptation to previous methodological approaches 
by extending the duration of the experimental manipulation to a one-week period, with 
repeated daily task completion between two testing sessions. The impact of induced 
rumination (compared to distraction) on selected PTSD-type symptoms was considered, both 
following the initial in-session experimental induction and after the extended week-long 
manipulation: specifically, the impact upon negative affect, intrusive images and 
physiological arousal (heart-rate response) was assessed. Physiological response to trauma-
reminders was also examined as an index of stimulus generalisation. 
 
As in previous analogue studies, results were mixed: contrary to hypotheses, a main effect of 
induced rumination on intrusive memories, affective change, or in-session physiological 
arousal was not indicated (with the exception of non-significant trend-level increases 
specific to anxious and fearful mood). However, an association was observed between trait 
rumination and intrusive memory maintenance over the extended rumination induction; the 
potential contribution of trait factors is explored and discussed. Additionally, the prolonged 
rumination engendered by the extended induction did appear to prime participants towards 
increased physiological responses to reminders of trauma (when previous medical 
experience was controlled for). Limitations regarding the interpretation and generalisability 
of the presented findings are outlined, and tentative indications as to the way in which these 
results may fit with current theoretical understanding are considered. Finally, the potential 
implications for clinical practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.  
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1.1 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter reviews the literature on symptom-maintenance within post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), with particular attention to the role of rumination. First, diagnostic criteria 
and the phenomenological features of PTSD (including intrusive memories, low mood, 
physiological arousal, and associated cognitive factors) are highlighted and two dominant 
cognitive models of PTSD discussed. Within this, the hypothesised peri- and post-traumatic 
mechanisms by which symptoms develop and are maintained are also briefly considered. As 
this study specifically seeks to explore the potential contribution of post-event rumination to 
this process within a trauma-context, definitions of rumination are reviewed and the 
emerging evidence-base on the potential relationship between rumination, intrusive 
memories, mood and physiological arousal is outlined, with respect to both clinical and non-
clinical samples. Specifically, the methodological approach of replicative analogue studies 
within the trauma-film paradigm is detailed. The evidence for differential patterns of 
physiological responding to reminders of trauma (compared to neutral stimuli) is also 
considered. Finally, the rationale and aims of the present study are presented along with the 
key hypotheses for examination. The following literature was obtained through a search 
strategy whereby relevant keywords, including “rumination”, “PTSD”, “trauma” and 
“analogue”, were input into scholarly online journal databases: predominantly PubMed, 
Ovid and Science Direct. References of key articles were consulted in order to access further 
specific relevant articles. 
 
1.2 Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): diagnostic criteria, clinical 
characteristics & prevalence 
 
PTSD is generally conceptualised as a clinical reaction which develops following exposure 
to a traumatic event, and is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the Mental 
Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994) as 
„actual or threatened death or serious injury‟ to self or others, with feelings of intense fear, 
helplessness or horror. Classified as an anxiety disorder in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), 
diagnostic criteria include: the persistent re-experiencing of the event (through intrusive 
memories, dreams, or „flashback‟ experiences); avoidance of stimuli associated with the 
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trauma; and persistent increased physiological arousal. Symptoms must be present for 
greater than one-month duration and represent significant distress or impairment of 
functioning in order to receive diagnosis; greater than 3-month duration meets criteria for 
chronic PTSD.  
 
The „re-experiencing‟ symptoms observed in PTSD can manifest in multiple ways. 
Recurrent, intrusive recollections of the event, including thoughts, images, and vivid sensory 
experiences, are commonly reported to be one of the hallmark characteristics of the 
diagnosis. Evidence has shown intrusive memories of the trauma to qualitatively differ from 
other forms of autobiographical memories, with visual intrusions being most common 
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Ehlers et al., 2002) and typically consisting of more vivid 
recollections which have a greater impact on mood state (Berntsen, 2001). The persistent 
avoidance of factors associated with the trauma reflects attempts by the individual to avoid 
external (e.g. situations, activities) or internal (e.g. thoughts or feelings) prompts that may 
trigger recollections of it. A sense of detachment from others, numbing, a reduced ability to 
feel emotions, and diminished interest in previously valued activities may also prevail. 
Increased physiological arousal to cues that act as trauma reminders are commonly reported; 
additionally, however, this may be accompanied by a more general hyperarousal which 
manifests as sleep disturbance, irritability/ anger outbursts, impaired concentration, 
hypervigilance and an exaggerated startle response.  
 
Life-time and point prevalence rates of exposure to traumatic events and/ or risk of 
developing PTSD are subject to some variability across epidemiological studies, primarily 
due to differences in „stressor‟ definitions and selection of diagnostic criteria (Breslau & 
Kessler, 2001). In the Detroit Area Survey of Trauma, Breslau et al. (1998) sought to 
examine lifetime history of traumatic events and PTSD within the community (as opposed to 
within specific high-risk samples typically studied e.g. war, natural disaster, rape). It was 
found that the risk of developing PTSD following exposure to trauma was 9.2%, with the 
highest risk associated with assaultive violence (at 20.9%). Similarly, the US National Co-
morbidity Survey (NCS, Kessler et al., 1995) estimated a 7.8% lifetime prevalence of PTSD 
for the US population aged 15–55 years, using DSM-III-R criteria. According to NICE 
Guidelines for PTSD (Guideline 26, 2005), around 25-30% of individuals who experience a 
traumatic event go on to develop PTSD.  
 
Therefore, whilst evidence suggests that post-traumatic stress symptoms may be commonly 
experienced in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event (Rothbaum et al., 1992; Kleim, 
Ehlers & Glucksman, 2007), and may in fact be a sign of normal adaption (Ehlers & Steil, 
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1995), only a minority of trauma survivors proceed to develop chronic psychological 
difficulties sufficient to warrant diagnosis (Breslau et al., 1998; Perkonigg et al., 2000; 
McFarlane, 2000). The importance of identifying the key maintaining factors within the 
disorder is therefore evident, and recent cognitive models of trauma have sought to elucidate 
these mechanisms.  
 
1.3 Cognitive models of PTSD 
 
A variety of theoretical approaches have historically sought to conceptualise PTSD 
symptomatology. These have ranged from psychodynamically informed theories, such as 
Horowitz‟s (1976; 1986) stress response theory - in which traditional psychological defense 
mechanisms (promoting avoidance of the trauma memory) compete with opposing processes 
seeking memory integration, ultimately resulting in a psychic conflict to which the 
maintenance and persistence of intrusive recollections is attributed - to behavioural models 
rooted in conditioning theory (e.g. Keane, Zimering & Caddell, 1985). Within behavioural 
accounts, the adaptive process of extinction to the trauma memory is seen to be disrupted by 
avoidance strategies, thus compromising the effectiveness of exposure. Nevertheless, more 
recent methods of conceptualisation within clinical applications have been predominantly 
cognitive, particularly with respect to approaches seeking to account for the influence of 
rumination as a maintenance factor. As such, two contemporary cognitive models will be 
reviewed below; the revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010; based on the 
original model by Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996) and Ehlers & Clark‟s (2000) cognitive 
model. Both theories present intrusive recollections as instances of „faulty information-
processing‟, with similar mechanisms of intrusion formation in which memory and encoding 
processes lie at the centre of aetiology and treatment (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). 
 
1.3.1 Dual-representation theory (DRT; Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 
2001; 2003; Brewin et al., 2010) 
Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph (1996)‟s original dual representation model of response to 
trauma proposed two distinct memory forms: “verbally accessible memories” (VAMs), in 
which oral or written narratives of the trauma are adequately integrated with other 
autobiographical memories, and “situationally accessible memories” (SAMs), representing 
lower-level perceptual processing experienced at point of trauma (often sensory cues, such 
as sights, sounds or smells, or „primary‟ emotions arising during the trauma event, such as 
anger or shame). It was posited that as the SAM system does not rely on verbal encoding, 
these memory forms are less likely to integrate with other autobiographical memories, and 
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are more likely to be activated by similar situational cues; as observed within the „flashback‟ 
experiences of PTSD.  
 
Within the updated version of the model (Brewin et al., 2010), the authors have sought to 
further develop these original theorized ideas, as well as to anchor the model more firmly in 
cognitive neuroscience, utilising evidence from this field regarding the role of specific 
memory systems. Accordingly, the authors have further clarified the concepts of the VAM 
and SAM systems, most notably re-terming VAMs as “contextual memory representations” 
(or C-reps), to better highlight the integrated and contextually-bound nature of this memory 
form rather than the „verbal‟ accessibility emphasis previously given; and SAMs as 
“sensation-based memory representations” (or S-reps), to more fully emphasise their role 
within healthy memory in addition to the more pathological flashback experiences of PTSD. 
The authors provide evidence to suggest that C-reps are supported by the medial temporal 
lobe systems for declarative memory (hence the ease of voluntary recall consistent with 
other autobiographical memories), in contrast to the involuntary recall characteristics of the 
S-rep (supported by cortical and sub-cortical areas).  
 
While transdiagnostic in its applicability to explaining intrusive memory experiences across 
diagnoses (including within depression), a central tenet of the model is that the intrusive re-
experiencing characteristic of PTSD reflects an impaired association between the two forms 
of memory representation, in which comparably strong S-reps, and weaker C-reps, are laid 
down at point of trauma. Successful emotional processing and adaption is indicated when S-
reps relating to the trauma have been adequately contextualised with pre-existing memories 
of the self/ world. Two key maladaptive emotional processing strategies prevent satisfactory 
integration, via preoccupation strategies or avoidance mechanisms. „Chronic emotional 
processing‟ results when the discrepancy between prior assumptions and violation of these 
by the trauma is too great; as such timely resolution cannot be reached, leading to 
preoccupation with the memory. This form of processing is often associated with severe 
trauma experiences. „Inhibited emotional processing‟ manifests when continued attempts to 
avoid reactivation of unwanted memories in turn prevents further emotional processing, 
maintaining patterns of cognitive, behavioural and affective avoidance. 
 
Within this theory, a key implication for therapeutic intervention is the emphasis on aiding 
greater contextualization of the S-reps with C-reps, as well as the creation of alternative 
memories that can be preferentially retrieved: the key criterion for these competing 
representations simply being that they are more memorable, not necessarily more accurate or 
corrective in nature. As such, the model does not indicate a reliance on fundamentally 
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altering the existing encoded memories, and memories may be re-triggered by the right 
combination of cues in the future. The authors specifically highlight the potential benefits of 
therapies such as exposure, eye-movement desensitization therapy (EMDR), and imaginal 
reliving within this as tools towards aiding this memory integration. The DRT model 
(Brewin et al. 2010) presents a greater focus on the memory representations themselves, 
rather than on memory processes (Ehlers, Ehring & Kleim, in preparation), and outline less 
of role for cognitive appraisals, either at the time of trauma or subsequently.  
 
1.3.2 Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) cognitive model 
Ehlers & Clark‟s (2000) model similarly proposes a cognitive shift in processing during the 
trauma, away from a conceptual processing of events (focused on the contextual meaning 
attributed to any given situation) in favour of a perceptual processing style (with a 
predominant focus on sensory information). However, within this model, a greater emphasis 
is given to the key maintaining factors which serve to perpetuate a sense of external (e.g. 
world as unsafe) or internal (e.g. self as incapable) current threat. Two key mechanisms for 
the development of a persistent anxiety state are proposed: firstly, negative appraisal of the 
trauma and/ or trauma sequelae, and secondly, the way the trauma is encoded in memory (a 
poorly elaborated autobiographical memory which remains poorly integrated with other 
autobiographical information and memories, strong perceptual priming and strong 
associative learning). The appraisals and memory characteristics give rise to intrusive 
memories, arousal, and other emotional states. Individuals typically engage in a series of 
cognitive and behavioural responses intended to reduce distress, but which ultimately have 
the consequence of preventing cognitive change. 
 
Negative appraisals of the trauma and its consequences may manifest as a result of 
misinterpretation of initial symptoms as catastrophic (e.g. intrusive recollections, mood 
swings, emotional numbing) rather than as a normal reaction to a stressful event and part of 
the recovery process. Idiosyncratic appraisals may also concern the impact of the trauma on 
other life domains (e.g. occupational, financial, interpersonal), and negative interpretation of 
others‟ reactions following the event. In sum, negative appraisals have the effect of creating 
an ongoing sense of serious current threat, with individuals with persistent PTSD unable to 
see the trauma as a time-limited event without global negative implications for the future. In 
addition, the type of appraisal predicts emotional response; perceived ongoing danger 
leading to fear, or perceived loss leading to sadness, for example. 
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Ehlers & Clark (2000) propose that during trauma, events are not encoded into 
autobiographical memory in the normal way, leading to poorly elaborated, data-driven 
memories which can be involuntarily reactivated by stimuli temporally-associated with the 
event. As such, in PTSD the trauma memory remains decontextualised and poorly 
elaborated, with memory fragments susceptible to being triggered by a range of sensory-
similar cues. On these occasions, parts of the trauma are often re-experienced as if it is 
occurring right now (a quality termed „nowness‟). 
 
The model stipulates that in order to cope with these negative appraisals and trauma 
memories, individuals may engage in a series of maladaptive strategies to control their 
symptoms. Strategies selected are directly related to the individual‟s negative appraisals, and 
may include cognitive strategies (e.g. thought suppression, where the person attempts to 
push trauma-related thoughts from their mind, or rumination about the event, where the 
individual tries to „make sense‟ of the events that have happened) or behavioural responses 
(e.g. avoidance of situations in which reminders of the trauma may be generated, or 
engaging in preventative action). As such, the model has clear implications for treatment, 
















Figure 1: Ehlers & Clark’s (2000) Cognitive model of PTSD 
 
 
Both models provide a clear account of intrusion formation and rationale for the role of 
preoccupation with trauma-related thoughts in symptom maintenance. Brewin (2001; 2003) 
conceptualises preoccupation with respect to the delays generated as part of „chronic 
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emotional processing‟; Ehlers & Clark (2000) specifically highlight the role of rumination as 
a cognitive maintaining factor. The authors suggest that while it is unclear how rumination 
maintains problematic appraisals of the trauma, it may serve to strengthen the negative 
appraisals via repetition, or serve a cognitive avoidance role similar to that suggested in 
worry (e.g. Borkovec, 1994). It is also hypothesised that through the provision of internal 
retrieval cues, rumination may directly increase the number of intrusive images of the event, 
as well as feelings of low mood, anxiety and hopelessness. Therefore, the cognitive models 
indicate distinct processes underlying rumination and re-experiencing symptoms (unlike the 
DSM-IV [APA, 1994] criteria, which fail to distinguish between such intrusive ruminative 
thoughts and memories); as such, the importance of examining them separately has been 
highlighted (Joseph, Williams & Yule, 1997; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Holmes & Bourne, 2008; DSM-V draft). 
 
1.4 Intrusive memories and rumination: definitions and phenomenology 
1.4.1 Intrusive memories 
Intrusive memories have been defined as “involuntary recollections relating to events that 
appear, apparently spontaneously, in consciousness” (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), as opposed 
to the deliberate retrieval of other types of autobiographical memories. Intrusions may take 
the form of mental images, sounds, smells or verbal thoughts (Speckens et al., 2007), and it 
has been suggested that emotional memories typically take the form of mental images, 
regardless of whether these are intrusive or deliberately recalled (Arntz, de Goot & Kindt, 
2005). 
 
Although less frequent than verbal thoughts, the experiencing of intrusive memories has 
been observed to occur with some frequency within the general population (Brewin, 
Christodoulides & Hutchinson, 1996). Through a series of studies within an undergraduate 
population, Berntsen (1996; 1999; 2001) demonstrated intrusions to occur several times a 
day using a structured diary methodology; similarly, Mace (2005) estimated prevalence at 1 - 
5 intrusions per day in a healthy sample, with priming effects playing a substantial role in 
recollection. These common, everyday intrusions can therefore be associated with both 
positive and negative mood, and have been typically argued to present no concern for/ 
distress to the experiencer (Holmes & Bourne, 2008) although this may not always be the 
case (Berntsen & Hall, 2004). A comparison of involuntarily vs. voluntarily cued 
recollections of personal experience conducted by Berntsen & Hall (2004) suggested 
unintended memories to refer most often to specific episodes of more unusual and less 
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positive events, with a greater impact on mood and accompanied by increased physiological 
arousal. Evidence suggests that most individuals do have conscious awareness of intrusion 
occurrence: Berntsen & Rubin‟s (2002) survey of a large sample of the Danish population 
indicated involuntary recollections to be well-known, with 58% respondents able to identify 
the last experience of an intrusive memory, lending support to the diary methodology often 
utilised in intrusion monitoring.  
 
It has been suggested that experiences of intrusive recollection may occur along a 
continuum, ranging from these types of everyday intrusions to the highly distressing 
psychopathological intrusions witnessed in disorders such as PTSD (Holmes, 2004). In 
support of a continuum conceptualisation, intrusive memories (often in imagery form) can be 
seen to arise within a range of other clinical disorders, including social phobia (Hirsch et al., 
2003), psychosis (Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005) and depression (Patel et al., 2007); as a 
consequence, it has been suggested that the same mechanisms may be implicated in intrusion 
development, irrespective of disorder, indicating the possibility of a transdiagnostic process 
(Harvey et al., 2004; Steel, Fowler & Holmes, 2005).  
 
Yet while intrusion experiences appear to be relatively common across both clinical and 
non-clinical samples, the intrusive memories typically experienced in PTSD have a number 
of delineating characteristics, and are among the most commonly endorsed symptoms of the 
diagnosis (Regambal & Alden, 2009). Additionally, it has been noted that intrusive 
memories are more frequently visual, rather than verbally-mediated thought-based intrusions 
(Ehlers et al., 2002), with a notable vivid perceptual content, and often consisting of 
emotional impressions (Berntsen, Willert & Rubin, 2003). As such, experiencers often 
describe a sense that the recalled event is happening „right now‟ (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Ehlers, 2002). 
 
Using both cross-sectional and prospective comparative studies, Michael, Ehlers & Halligan 
(2005) sought to examine the nature of intrusive memories in previously traumatized 
samples, with and without PTSD. In both studies, it was highlighted that the presence of 
intrusive memories was not unique to the PTSD group; furthermore, there existed little 
difference between the groups regarding the likelihood that these consisted of sensory 
impressions. Visual sensations were most common across both groups, with smell and taste 
sensations least common. In the prospective study, while presence of intrusive memories at 
initial assessment predicted only 9% of variance in PTSD severity, and frequency only 8% 
of variance at 6-months post-trauma, symptom severity was more accurately predicted by the 
distress generated by the images; decontextualisation; and a sense that memories were being 
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re-lived in the present (an additional 37-43% of the variance). As such, given that neither the 
presence nor frequency of intrusive memories themselves are sufficient to predict PTSD 
persistence (see also McFarlane, 1988; Shalev, 1992) - and particularly considering the 
prevalence of intrusions within other clinical as well as non-clinical groups - it instead 
appears that it is this specificity in the quality of the intrusion that best predicts outcome. 
Although the exact relationship between intrusive memories and associated symptoms is 
unclear, it has been suggested that intrusions may play a pivotal role in driving other post-
traumatic stress symptoms, therefore serving to maintain persistence of the disorder 
(Michael, Ehlers & Halligan, 2005). 
 
The distinction between intrusive memories and other forms of intrusive thought have also 
been considered within the literature. Speckens et al. (2007) compared the phenomenological 
nature of intrusive memories in individuals with PTSD with the qualities of intrusive 
ruminative thought; again, findings suggested intrusive memories to be primarily sensory 
experiences rather than verbal, and of shorter duration (typically less than a minute) than 
ruminative experiences. However, it was also highlighted that the two phenomena may co-
exist, with a high number of sensory experiences reported by participants while ruminating 
(Speckens et al., 2007). The concept of rumination is considered in more detail below. 
 
1.4.2 Rumination 
Rumination has commonly been defined as a repetitive and recurrent style of thinking, with 
a particular focus on past negative events and/ or consequential negative mood (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). With respect to its repetitive pattern, the 
concept of rumination is closely related to that of worry with the primary distinction being 
the time-orientation of each: whilst worry is predominantly concerned with future events, 
rumination is largely retrospective in nature. In a phenomenological study of rumination, 
Speckens et al. (2007) reported PTSD patients to ruminate most often about events in the 
past (73%) compared to the present (50%) or future (60%). It is well established that 
rumination plays a central role in maintaining symptoms of depression, with a narrowed 
focus of attention on one‟s symptoms and their implications (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Whilst potentially similar to negative automatic 
thoughts (NATs) in valence-related content, the two are not equitable, with longer periods of 
ruminative thought likely to be functionally different from short NATs (Michael et al., 
2007). Rumination has also been shown to play a significant - and distinct - role to that of 
worry within the anxiety disorders (Fresco et al., 2002).  
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It appears important to specify the way in which rumination differs from other forms of 
repetitive, negative thinking about a trauma, which may, under certain circumstances, 
promote recovery from the event (for example, the repeated and detailed writing about a 
trauma experience and its consequences [Van Emmerik, Kamphuis & Emmelkamp, 2008], 
or the imaginal reliving techniques advocated within cognitive therapy [Ehlers et al., 2005]). 
As such, a distinction has been made by some authors between functional and dysfunctional 
forms of repetitive thought (Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009). Stöber‟s (1998) „reduced 
concreteness‟ theory of excessive worry, originally developed to account for the 
characteristic thought processes observed in Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), suggests 
a dominant role of abstract, verbal thoughts leading to indistinct and poorly delineated event 
processing. As a consequence, the individual avoids immediate distress, as fewer negative 
emotions and instances of imagery are triggered than would arise within a more concrete 
mode of thinking (similar to ideas proposed in Borkovec‟s (1994) cognitive avoidance 
theory of worry). The emotional processing of worry-related information is thus inhibited, as 
this would require activation of the emotional memory; additionally, the process interferes 
with successful problem-solving, which requires processing on a concrete level. Similarly, 
with respect to observations in depression, Watkins (2008) highlighted an abstract, 
generalised and evaluative form of thinking to be more problematic than a concrete, process-
focused style. For the purposes of the current study therefore, rumination has been 
conceptualised as a generalised, abstract mode of thinking, characterised by the particularly 
maladaptive evaluative thoughts (such as „why...?‟, „what if...?‟) often observed clinically 
within PTSD (Michael et al., 2007). 
 
1.5 Trauma film paradigm: investigating symptoms using non-clinical 
analogue samples 
 
Since its introduction in the 1960‟s, the trauma film paradigm has proved a useful alternative 
to the retrospective research approach typically undertaken within PTSD samples. The 
majority of studies using clinical samples to examine the potential peri- traumatic factors 
implicated in PTSD (that is, the processes involved during the initial encoding of the trauma 
memory) has necessarily relied on individuals‟ retrospective reports of emotional response 
during the event. As such, the difficulties in obtaining accurate information and/ or 
descriptions regarding past emotional states has been highlighted, potentially due to factors 
associated with problematic memory recall, including cognitive avoidance of reminders of 
trauma (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). In order to circumvent some of the difficulties associated 
with historical self-report, researchers have sought to utilise an alternative prospective 
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methodology in which non-clinical healthy controls are exposed to a trauma analogue, with 
an aim of replicating PTSD-type symptoms. The laboratory control offered by this approach 
enables further examination of the underlying mechanisms involved in symptom 
development and maintenance. 
 
Early research using the trauma film paradigm focused primarily on demonstrating that 
physiological stress responses could be reliably induced within the laboratory setting, via the 
viewing of traumatic stimuli (Lazarus & Opton, 1964; Lazarus et al., 1965). Although 
trauma films can not necessarily induce the intensity of emotional response akin to a 
personal experience of a traumatic event, this research indicated the use of such an approach 
to hold some validity in enabling the replication of post-traumatic stress symptoms (Holmes 
& Bourne, 2008). Early evidence also suggested that the manipulation of instructional 
orientation, such as those instructions promoting emotional detachment, could play a role in 
participants‟ initial processing of events, affecting subsequent appraisals of the footage 
(Lazarus et al., 1965). This has important implications for methodological design, as it 
suggests that the instructions presented prior to viewing could potentially have as great an 
impact on the emotional appraisal of the film as the content itself (Lazarus et al., 1965).  
 
The trauma film methodology typically follows a standardised structure, adapted according 
to the specific research aims, with correlational or between-group experimental approaches 
most widely utilised (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). First of all, participants are asked to 
complete a series of baseline questionnaires in order to highlight existing trait vulnerabilities 
or biases, or to exclude a clinical presentation. Immediately prior to exposure to the trauma 
film itself, participants complete state measures on variables of interest (typically affect or 
arousal ratings). Orientation during viewing of the trauma film may be manipulated 
according to the study‟s aims and design: participants may be asked to view the footage 
naturalistically, by simply witnessing the scenes presented; be instructed to adopt a specific 
processing style, such as a conceptual or perceptual approach (Halligan, Clark & Ehlers, 
2002); or to engage in a concurrent task designed to mimic peri-traumatic processing (cf. 
Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy 2004). Alternatively, if post-event processing or coping is a 
focus area, participants may be asked to view the film naturally but to undertake certain tasks 
on its completion (e.g. Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009; Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 
2009). Following exposure to the film‟s contents, repeated state measures are taken to 
examine the impact of the film/ processing manipulations on critical dependent variables 
(typically intrusive memories, mood, and/or physiological arousal). A diary methodology is 
typically used over the week to assess the impact of the film/ manipulation on those 
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variables of interest, particularly intrusions, and is often seen as a critical component of the 
paradigm (Holmes & Bourne, 2008).  
 
Whilst the peri-traumatic factors associated with the development of PTSD symptoms have 
been a focus of much of the work within the trauma film paradigm - particularly with respect 
to the role of dissociation in fragmented memory recall (Murray, 1997; Holmes et al., 2005; 
Ozer et al., 2003); the role of perceptual vs. conceptual peri-processing of events (Halligan, 
Clark & Ehlers, 2002; Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy, 2004); and in-film intervention 
strategies such as relaxation (Folkins et al., 1968) - more recent research has focused on 
those factors critical to the maintenance of such symptoms. Considering the relative minority 
of individuals presenting with persistent symptoms at the one-month mark, in comparison to 
a majority who demonstrate symptoms in the immediate aftermath of trauma  (McFarlane, 
2000), it appears increasingly important to achieve greater clarity in our understanding of the 
post-event factors contributing to this discrepancy. Furthermore, the fact that traumatic 
events cannot, for the most part, be anticipated, provides a strong rationale for the 
examination of post-traumatic cognitive factors - as these are the areas which can potentially 
be addressed in clinical intervention.  
 
In particular, the literature on post-traumatic event processing has focused on the role of 
processes such as worry (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995; Butler, Wells & Dewick, 1995), 
thought suppression (Davies & Clark, 1998), and rumination. A study by Butler, Wells & 
Dewick (1995), in which participants were randomised to either a “worry” or “imagery” 
group immediately following exposure to trauma footage, indicated participants in the 
“worry” group to experience a greater number of intrusions over the following three days 
(although no group difference was observed when a full week‟s diary data was considered). 
Similarly, Davies & Clark (1998) provided evidence for the maladaptive role of thought 
suppression in maintaining intrusions: whilst participants who were asked to deliberately 
suppress film-related thoughts in a 2-minute period post-film reported fewer intrusions 
during this time compared to a control condition (instructed to “think freely”); they 
subsequently reported a greater number than controls in a further 2-minute period, once both 
groups were permitted to “think freely”.  
 
In recent times, a number of authors have sought to examine the role of post-event 
rumination with regards to symptom maintenance, both within clinical samples and utilising 
the analogue paradigm. This is commensurate with a considerable body of evidence within 
other clinical arenas, most notably depression, indicating the substantial contributions of 
ruminative thought to disorder development and persistence (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 2000) including depression arising as a consequence of trauma (e.g. Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  
 
Within PTSD samples, rumination has been indicated to play a significant role in the 
severity and persistence of PTSD-related symptoms, emerging as one of the most powerful 
predictors (Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Murray, Ehlers & 
Mayou, 2002). Michael et al. (2007) undertook a comparison of individuals with a history of 
trauma experiences with and without current PTSD diagnosis. Although rumination occurred 
in both groups, ruminative thinking was more commonly observed in participants with 
PTSD; with these participants additionally spending a greater proportion of time ruminating. 
Presence of rumination in the PTSD group explained between 23% and 28% of variance in 
disorder severity, both concurrently and prospectively at 6-month follow-up. Similar results 
have been indicated by Ehring, Frank & Ehlers (2008) who found rumination in road traffic 
accident (RTA) survivors to account for between 36% and 50% of the variance in PTSD 
symptom severity at 6-months. Further consideration of the evidence-base for the role of 
rumination in post-traumatic stress symptoms - including experimental evidence from the 
trauma-analogue paradigm - is outlined below. 
 
1.6 Role of rumination in maintaining post-traumatic stress symptoms  
1.6.1 Association between rumination and negative affect  
In experimental studies, depressive rumination has long been implicated in the 
intensification of dysphoria and perpetuation of negative thinking (Watkins & Baracaia, 
2002; Moberly & Watkins, 2006); additionally, within the PTSD literature, there is emerging 
evidence to suggest rumination plays a role in the presentation of negative affect (Michael et 
al., 2007; Speckens et al., 2007).  
 
Although only a small number of trauma analogue studies have sought to establish the 
impact of induced post-event rumination upon symptom maintenance, the findings have 
consistently indicated even brief periods of induced state rumination to engender mood 
change. Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick (2009) conducted a study of 83 healthy 
undergraduate students, exposing them to an analogue stressor comprising footage of road 
traffic accidents (RTAs), before assigning participants to an abstract ruminative thinking, 
concrete thinking or distraction (control) condition. In the abstract condition, participants 
were asked to read a transcript of a RTA- survivor‟s rumination episode, thinking about their 
experience in a particularly abstract way. Participants were then presented with a series of 
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abstract ruminative sentences, and asked to spend some time dwelling on each of these. In 
contrast, participants in the concrete condition were asked to read transcripts detailing the 
thoughts of an RTA-survivor, modified to represent a more concrete style of thinking, before 
being presented with concrete-thinking style sentences to think over. Both abstract and 
concrete conditions contained similar content; the distinction in thought process being the 
critical differentiating factor. Participants in a distraction condition were asked to read a 
transcript of thoughts completely unrelated to the RTA- video, and following this, to read 
and answer a series of factual questions.  
 
While participants in the distraction (control) and concrete thinking conditions experienced a 
decrease in negative mood and arousal (pre- to post- manipulation), participants in the 
abstract thinking condition demonstrated maintenance of negative affect. This provided 
support for the view the detrimental effects of trauma-related rumination are attributable to 
specific styles or modes of thinking (given the similarities in content of the abstract vs. 
concrete manipulations). Similarly, negative mood was also maintained for a rumination 
condition only (compared to distraction controls), when personal, past events were used as 
an alternative analogue (Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, 2009). 
 
The dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 2001; 
2003) distinguishes between specific emotions likely to arise at different stages. For 
example, primary emotions most strongly experienced during the course of trauma, such as 
fear, arising initially; with secondary emotions such as sadness or anger, emerging with 
greater intensity following the trauma. Ehlers & Clark‟s (2000) model of PTSD suggests 
rumination may strengthen negative appraisals of the trauma event through repeated 
rehearsal (hence giving rise to such cognitively complex emotions as sadness or guilt), in 
addition to serving as a direct trigger for previous negative emotions and arousal. In a 
comparison of the impact of rumination and intrusive memories on the reported emotional 
reactions of patients with PTSD, Speckens et al. (2007) found rumination (and not intrusive 
memories) to be significantly associated with feelings of shame, with an emerging trend 
towards sadness and guilt also observed. In support of the cognitive model, the authors 
propose that rumination may be an important mechanism by which emotions such as 
sadness, shame and anger are maintained following a traumatic event. 
 
In considering specific differences within negative mood, an experimental study by Zetsche, 
Ehring & Ehlers (2009) found induced state rumination following exposure to a trauma 
analogue to hamper recovery from sad mood specifically, compared to either distraction 
controls or a second experimental (memory integration) condition. Although presentation of 
 23 
the trauma analogue led to significant increases in both sadness and fear, only an effect for 
sadness emerged following the manipulation. The authors suggest this finding may relate to 
the initial emotional impact of the trauma video: particularly, that fear responses may have 
been inhibited by the degree of personal distance created in third-party observation of events 
in the video (Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009). Alternatively, this may reflect differences in 
the impact of rumination of the maintenance of primary (fear) vs. secondary (sadness) 
emotions, as theorised within the dual representation theory of trauma. 
 
It has been proposed that the process of rumination may serve a cognitive avoidance 
function, similar to that suggested within worry (Borkovec, Shadick & Hopkins, 1990), with 
prolonged periods of engagement in verbal activity serving to distract from more specific 
and distressing trauma-related cognitions. This may include avoidance of experiencing 
visual memories of the worst moments of the trauma (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). In spite of its 
protective intent, rumination appears to have a continued impact on negative mood, as 
outlined above. Speckens et al. (2007) explains this apparent discrepancy by highlighting 
that even if rumination does serve as a temporary distraction from the most emotionally 
laden aspects of the trauma, the content of ruminative thought is still highly negative in 
nature, thus maintaining low mood. The impact of rumination on the re-experiencing of 
intrusive memories, including imagery, is considered below. 
 
1.6.2 Association between rumination and intrusive memories 
Given evidence suggesting the influential role of ruminative thinking in maintaining 
symptoms of PTSD, a number of clinical and analogue studies have sought to examine the 
impact upon frequency, and to a lesser extent, quality of intrusions. Within the worry and 
depression literature, rumination around a particular event has been well documented to 
increase numbers of intrusions (Watkins, 2004; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995; Butler, Wells 
& Dewick, 1995). However, despite the solid evidence-base indicating rumination to prolong 
experiences of negative mood, the association between rumination and intrusive memories is 
less clear. 
 
A number of analogue studies have hypothesised that periods of induced state rumination 
would lead to increased numbers of intrusive memory experiences, following exposure to a 
trauma analogue. In support of this, Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener (2009) observed a 
maintenance in the number of intrusive memories (pre- and post- exposure to an analogue 
trauma stressor) following a brief rumination induction, compared to the decrease in 
intrusions reported by controls. Specifically, the selected analogue-stressor required 
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participants to present a detailed narrative of a past distressing life event: recall of the 
narrative in the testing session was associated with an increase in negative mood, and gave 
rise to a number of intrusive memories. Consideration of condition indicated that participants 
who were subsequently asked to ruminate on previously narrated events experienced 
intrusive memories at a similar frequency - and with similar levels of distress - as 
experienced immediately following the analogue. In contrast, control participants completing 
a distraction task reported significantly fewer intrusions compared to baseline (post-
narration). 
 
Subsequent studies, however, have not fully replicated these findings (Zetsche, Ehring & 
Ehlers, 2009; Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009), with no consistent differences observed 
with regard to experimental manipulations. In a study by Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers (2009), 
using a RTA-film stressor, participants were assigned to one of three post-video processing 
conditions: either a rumination, memory integration or distraction condition. Triggered 
intrusive memories (in response to probes) and spontaneous intrusive memories (sampled 
during 2-minute rest periods) were assessed. To maximise the personal relevance of the 
rumination sentences presented, participants were only given sentences previously identified 
as consistent with naturalistic thoughts arising during viewing of the trauma film. 
Ruminative thoughts (resembling the „why‟ and „what if‟ form clinically observed) were 
presented to participants on screen, and individuals were asked to dwell on each question 
and its implications for as long as possible, allowing their thoughts to drift to related topics 
as is characteristic of the ruminative process. In contrast, participants in the memory 
integration condition were instructed to process the film material in a way designed to 
enhance memory coherence; in particular, being encouraged to consider the likely 
chronological sequence of events depicted in the video, and to adopt a self-referential 
perspective in doing so, distinguishing those experiences of road-traffic from their own non-
trauma related experiences. Participants in the control condition completed a verbal 
distraction task, paralleling the verbal tasks of the two experimental conditions.  
 
Despite the video being rated as sufficiently distressing (and those in the control condition 
reporting less rumination, less memory integration and less distress), this main effect of 
manipulation was not found for all participants (Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009). Yet 
interestingly, when gender was considered as an additional factor, differences between the 
groups emerged. While men in the rumination condition experienced significantly more 
intrusive memories - both triggered and spontaneous - than those in the distraction condition, 
with memory integration-subjects reporting the fewest number of intrusions (in line with the 
hypotheses), a different picture emerged for female participants. With regards to triggered 
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memories, women in the memory integration condition reported a significantly greater 
number of intrusions compared to the rumination or distraction (control) condition, with no 
effect of condition found for spontaneous memories. This gender difference was interpreted 
with some caution by the authors, given the relatively small number of male participants 
included in the study. However, the possibility that the induced processing styles may have 
had differing effects on men and women was considered; particularly that the memory 
integration task may have unintentionally induced rumination. Despite the complex picture 
emerging in relation to condition, a clearer association between degree of state rumination 
(regardless of condition) and the number of intrusive memories was highlighted in 
correlational analysis. As such, although the effects of the manipulation may have proved 
insufficient in elucidating clear associations, this correlational support appears consistent 
with results from prospective clinical studies, in which rumination has been indicated to 
predict PTSD symptomatology.  
 
Similarly, a third analogue study of note was conducted by Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick 
(2009) with the aim of examining the reduced concreteness hypothesis of rumination. 
Participants were assigned to either an abstract thinking condition (designed to replicate 
ruminative thinking), a concrete processing condition, or a distraction control. Frequency of 
intrusive memories were assessed post-manipulation as well as in response to trauma 
reminders. Participants in the concrete (but not abstract) condition reported significantly 
fewer intrusions than controls, which the authors interpret as indirect evidence in support of 
the view that a concrete-processing style promotes greater emotional adaptation than an 
abstract ruminative approach. However, contrary to expectations, participants in the 
distraction condition reported the highest number of intrusive images in response to 
reminders. Whilst potentially attributable to unintended effects of thought suppression, an 
alternative explanation is that participants here were not provided with further opportunities 
for post-event processing (unlike the opportunity afforded in both abstract and concrete 
conditions). 
 
In summary, within the small evidence-base that does exists, the nature of proposed 
associations between rumination and the maintenance of intrusive memories remains 
inconclusive; with only one study tentatively indicating rumination as actively influential in 
intrusion maintenance (Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, 2009). The absence of consistent effects 
in the hypothesised direction could be interpreted as consistent with the cognitive avoidance 
theory of rumination, in which abstract rumination functions as a means of escaping 
intrusive memories (Michael et al., 2007). As an additional consequence of this research, 
supplementary findings regarding the potential impact of concrete thinking (Ehring, 
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Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009) and distraction mechanisms (Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 
2009; Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, 2009), including possible gender effects has emerged 
(Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009), providing a complex picture of post-event processing 
mechanisms. An important consideration when reviewing the studies above, is the extent to 
which one-off rumination inductions are able to capture the persistent ruminative style 
characteristic of PTSD. It is conceivable that current methodological designs utilising a brief 
rumination induction have failed to adequately mirror „real life‟ ruminative processes. As 
such, the relationship between rumination and the maintenance of intrusive memory 
experiences warrants further investigation, and the direction and phenomenology of any such 
association remains to be established.   
 
1.6.3 The role of state vs. trait rumination 
The degree to which rumination can be conceptualised as a stable, trait-like quality, as 
opposed to a transient state process has been debated in the literature (Smith & Alloy, 2009). 
In particular, stability of rumination has been defined as an individual‟s tendency to ruminate 
when presented with a trigger; it does not assume that an individual will engage in constant 
ruminative thought. Whilst trauma analogue studies have typically sought to randomise 
participants across conditions in order to minimise trait differences between groups 
(including repetitive thought, amongst other variables), the direct role of trait rumination has 
received less attention, potentially due to this theoretical overlap in concepts. It is, however, 
possible that the stronger results emerging for correlational analyses between state 
rumination and intrusive memories (e.g. Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009) may in part be 
attributable to trait factors; that is, it appears likely that participants with levels of high trait 
rumination will engage with greater ease in periods of induced state rumination than 
participants with lower trait levels. As such, the potential contribution of trait rumination, 
particularly in relation to intrusive memories, might be an important factor for consideration.  
 
Within the depression literature, trait rumination has long been posited to maintain negative 
mood states (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Thomsen, 2006); however, more recently the 
interaction of trait rumination with an abstract, evaluative processing mode (as occurs within 
state rumination) has been shown to influence emotional vulnerability. Moberly & Watkins 
(2006) found that for participants assigned to an abstract, evaluative processing mode, only 
those with high levels of trait rumination experienced increases in negative mood following 
a failure task. As a result, trait rumination may have a more dominant impact on affect than 
posed by state rumination. In particular, the authors suggest that heightened levels of trait 
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rumination might exacerbate an individual‟s emotional vulnerability, hence providing 
increased opportunities for the training condition to take effect. 
 
1.7 Physiological responses to trauma-reminders 
1.7.1 Physiological arousal and stimulus generalisation in PTSD 
As outlined previously, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) places heightened physiological arousal, 
in response to both external and internal cues, as among the core diagnostic features of 
PTSD. In line with this, associative learning models of PTSD suggest that during trauma, 
fear responses become associated with stimuli present at the time, as well as generalising 
more broadly to related stimuli (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Keane et al., 1985). 
Ehlers & Clark‟s (2000) cognitive model outlines this process in greater detail, also 
proposing that a strong perceptual priming (a form of implicit memory) effect typically 
occurs for stimuli temporally associated with the traumatic event. It is suggested that the 
switch to a more prominently data-driven mode of processing during the course of trauma 
leads to a reduced threshold for encoding sensory features (potentially as a result of 
heightened emotional states); it is the most salient perceptual aspects of the trauma 
environment that are likely to be noticed and encoded into memory. However, given the 
diminished resources for encoding at this time, such data-driven memory cues may be 
insufficiently differentiated from other memory traces (Baddeley, 1997) and are liable to 
being involuntarily triggered by other benign, albeit perceptually (often visually) similar 
stimuli. As such, a variety of idiosyncratic cues may give rise to re-experiencing symptoms, 
including heightened physiological arousal. The phenomenon of re-experiencing as a 
consequence of poor discrimination between stimuli has been widely termed „stimulus 
generalisation‟ in the literature. 
 
In line with this theoretical stance, evidence that PTSD sufferers demonstrate heightened 
reactivity in the context of trauma-reminders has been consistently demonstrated in the 
literature (e.g. Orr, 1994; Orr 1997). This effect has been illustrated through examination of 
heart-rate response, as well as measurements of skin conductance, blood pressure and facial 
electromyogram (Orr & Roth, 2000). Of these, the most sensitive measure of discrimination 
between PTSD and non-PTSD samples has been indicated to be heart-rate response (Pole, 
2007).  
 
Studies examining physiological responses to reminders of trauma have implemented one of 
two methodological approaches: the presentation of individually-tailored trauma reminders, 
 28 
such as idiosyncratic stories or trauma imagery (e.g. Orr et al., 2002; Elsesser, Sartory & 
Tackenberg, 2004), or alternatively, presentation of standardised trauma cues, such as 
trauma-relevant pictures (e.g. Ehlers et al., 2010; Suendermann et al., 2010). Arguably, 
findings arising from the presentation of standardised cues provide greater evidence for a 
stimulus generalisation response, indicating a lack of specificity in discrimination between 
situationally-similar stimuli (such as accident- related pictures presented to RTA survivors). 
Additionally, this approach would provide greater clinical utility in that it potentially 
facilitates the ease with which physiological screening after trauma might be used. The 
benefit afforded by this is the potential identification of those individuals displaying stimulus 
generalisation at an early stage, and therefore, at greater risk of developing acute PTSD.  
 
Although the findings of early studies using the standardised cues approach did not indicate 
clear physiological differences between survivors with and without PTSD (e.g. Blanchard et 
al., 1994; 1996), subsequent findings have been more promising. Rabe et al. (2006) 
measured heart-rates both at baseline, and during exposure to a series of neutral, positive, 
negative and trauma-related pictures. Participants with diagnoses of PTSD and 
subsyndromal PTSD showed increased heart-rate reactivity (as well as elevated heart-rate at 
baseline) to trauma-relevant cues only, when compared to non-traumatised survivors and 
healthy controls. Similarly, Ehlers et al. (2010) found patients diagnosed with acute PTSD at 
one-month post-trauma to show greater heart-rate response to pictures of personally salient 
(matched to trauma-type) than non-traumatised survivors (see also Suendermann et al., 
2010). Specifically, a more substantial proportion of the acute PTSD group showed heart-
rate acceleration of greater than 1 beat per minute, and a lower level of mean deceleration 
when compared to non-traumatised controls - in response to trauma-relevant pictures only. 
No between-group differences in physiological arousal were observed in response to either 
generally threatening or neutral pictures. This is in support of previous findings indicating 
that the increased reactivity observed within PTSD patients remains specific to trauma-
related stimuli, rather than stimuli of high emotional valence, or distressing content more 
generally (Orr & Roth, 2000; Elsesser, Sartory & Tackenberg, 2004).  
 
1.7.2 Differential heart-rate responses to trauma-relevant vs. neutral visual stimuli  
A number of researchers examining the nature of physiological arousal have considered 
patterns of heart-rate response to different types of pictorial stimuli. In PTSD samples, 
increases in heart-rate to trauma-reminders appear largely consistent with a stress-arousal 
response style, in which cardiac acceleration - generally associated with a fear response - has 
been interpreted as a defensive reaction (Bradley, Cuthbert & Lang, 1996). This initial 
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cardiac acceleration has also been observed within other clinical contexts; for example, 
within specific phobia patients on presentation of their phobic object (Lang et al., 1998). In 
contrast, within non-clinical samples (or control participants), a deceleration in heart-rates 
has typically been observed on presentation of the same pictures (e.g. Lang et al., 1993; 
Ehlers et al., 2010). A similar pattern of results was found by Adenauer et al. (2010), in 
which trauma-exposed participants without PTSD showed an initial decline in heart-rate on 
presentation of aversive stimuli, in contrast to the immediate increases observed within the 
PTSD group.  
 
Within the non-clinical arena, the impact of pictures of different emotional valence has been 
examined. Bradley et al. (2001) compared physiological responses to „unpleasant‟, „pleasant‟ 
and „neutral‟ pictures. „Unpleasant‟ pictures, which included highly aversive and threatening 
content, prompted a significantly greater deceleration in heart-rate than either „pleasant‟ or 
„neutral‟ pictures, followed by a subsequent acceleration effect. Findings were interpreted as 
supportive of the „defense cascade‟ model outlined by Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert (1997), in 
which a two-stage theory of the mechanisms behind defense activation is proposed. In 
contrast to the stress arousal model, in which cardiac acceleration arises as an immediate 
consequence of threat, the defense cascade model posits that an initial sustained deceleration 
in heart-rate reflects a freezing or „orienting‟ response (Lang et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 
2001), in which the individual aims to orient their attention in acknowledgement of distal 
threat. This is closely followed by acceleration in heart-rate, reflecting the need for an active 
defensive response (representing response to imminent attack). While this model is in 
contrast to the evidence arising from cardiac reactivity within PTSD, it does indicates that 
even within healthy controls, aversive stimuli may generate differential heart-rate reactions 
to those evoked by less emotive stimuli. Adenauer et al. (2010) propose that the almost 
immediate cardiac acceleration towards unpleasant pictures observed by PTSD patients is 
suggestive of alternative defensive reactions in these individuals - and thus a faster „fight or 
flight‟ response. This may, in part, be due to the exaggerated startle response exhibited in 
PTSD (Adenauer et al., 2010). 
 
1.7.3 Association between rumination and physiological arousal 
Symptoms of arousal in PTSD have been suggested to arise in response to internal (as well 
as external) reminders of the trauma (DSM-IV [APA], 1994). Trauma-related rumination 
about the event may serve as one such internal cue. Preliminary evidence emerging from the 
trauma-film paradigm has indicated that induced rumination may be associated with 
increases in physiological arousal, as determined by heart-rate response. Specifically, post-
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event abstract ruminative thinking (following exposure to a trauma film) led to the 
persistence of raised heart-rate, compared to a decrease in arousal found in both distraction 
controls and concrete processing conditions (Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009). An 
objective measure of physiological arousal was also considered by Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener 
(2009). Whilst all participants did in fact display increases in arousal during the self-
referential trauma analogue, a main effect of post-event processing was not found indicating 
no difference in heart-rate response to rumination compared to a distraction task. As such, 
the nature of the link between heart-rate responses to ruminative processing remains to be 
established. 
 
1.8 Summary and rationale 
 
The literature presented conceptualises the emergence of post-traumatic stress symptoms as 
relatively common reactions to a high stress or traumatic event. Whilst symptom 
development may be primarily influenced by peri-traumatic factors, it has been argued that 
the continuation of such experiences is likely to reflect the involvement of alternative post-
event processes. An emerging evidence-base within clinical samples has demonstrated 
trauma-related rumination to explain significant proportions of the variance with respect to 
the persistence and severity of PTSD.  
 
Similarly, early indications from experimental studies (using non-clinical populations) 
highlight ruminative thought to be influential in the maintenance of certain key symptoms 
associated with the disorder: most notably, the continuation of negative affect. However, 
there exists mixed evidence as to the prominence of rumination within the maintenance of 
intrusive memories and physiological arousal. Owing to ethical constraints in research 
conducted using clinical samples, the trauma-analogue paradigm has enabled greater 
examination of the mechanisms involved in symptom development and/or maintenance. As 
such, this approach now been widely accepted as a valid and highly useful methodological 
tool (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). However, to date, the literature in this area remains sparse, 
with (to the author‟s knowledge) only three analogue studies specifically investigating the 
role of rumination in PTSD symptom maintenance. 
 
 Additionally, it has been suggested that the mixed findings may reflect a methodological 
limitation of these studies; that is, that the brief one-off rumination inductions conducted 
may not sufficiently resemble the more persistent rumination clinically experienced in 
PTSD. The implication here is that as such, these experimental manipulations have not been 
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able to maintain either intrusive memory experiences or physiological symptoms. 
Furthermore, no analogue studies have yet examined the potential role of rumination with 
regards to its involvement in the generalisation of physiological responses to trauma-related 
stimuli, compared to emotionally neutral pictures.  
 
Accordingly, this study seeks to further elucidate the nature of the association between 
ruminative thought and key post-traumatic stress symptoms, in the context of the trauma film 
paradigm. In particular, it aims to address a potential methodological limitation of the 
previous research detailed via an extension of the experimental rumination induction to 
cover a one-week period. The clinical implications of any such associations would pertain to 
a greater emphasis on rumination-focused intervention within current PTSD treatment 
protocols. This study aims to serve as a first, exploratory step in this direction.   
 
1.9 Aims of the present study 
 
Specifically, this study aims to provide further evidence for the role of rumination upon the 
maintenance of selected key symptoms consistently associated with PTSD: negative affect, 
intrusive memories and physiological arousal; and within the context of an analogue design. 
In particular, given the evidence that visual intrusions are especially common in this context 
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995), intrusive images were selected as a 
focus for examination. In addition to consideration of a brief in-session experimental 
induction, this research aims to implement a key change to previous methodology by 
extending the course of the experimental condition to incorporate a repeated, daily 
rumination/ control (distraction) induction over a one-week period. It was hoped that this 
methodological adaptation would more closely parallel the persistence and phenomenology 
of „real life‟ rumination observed clinically, as a means of providing further evidence for the 
association between rumination and our specified dependent variables. Additionally, this 
study aimed to provide a preliminary exploration of whether rumination might play a role in 
the phenomenon of stimulus generalisation, by investigation of heart-rate responses to 







1.10 Experimental Hypotheses 
 
In summary, the study aimed to address the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the rumination condition will report greater increases in low 
mood and anxiety at Session 2 than participants in the control condition 
 
Hypothesis 2: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, participants 
in the rumination condition will report a greater increase in negative affect and a greater 
decrease in positive affect than participants in the control condition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the rumination condition will experience a greater number of 
intrusive images over the week than participants in the control condition. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, participants 
in the rumination condition will report a greater number of intrusive images than the control 
condition. 
 
Hypothesis 5: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, participants 
in the rumination condition will report greater spontaneously occurring rumination (on the 
PTQ-S) than participants in the control group. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Participants in the rumination condition will show a greater increase in 
physiological arousal (heart-rate response) during the experimental manipulation compared 
to baseline than controls. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Participants in the rumination condition will show greater physiological 
arousal (heart-rate response) to trauma-related pictures than controls. Participants in control 














2.1 Experimental Design 
  
This experimental analogue study aimed to replicate and examine the effects of rumination 
using a non-clinical sample. The study primarily used a between-subjects design, involving 
two main phases across two testing sessions. Following exposure to a trauma analogue, 
participants were randomly allocated to either an experimental (rumination training) or 
control (distraction) condition. An extended week-long manipulation was conducted. For the 
primary hypothesis, changes in low and anxious mood over the one-week period constituted 
the principal dependent variable, given the established evidence-base of the impact of 
rumination on mood. The number of intrusive images experienced over the week were also 
assessed, using a mixed between-groups repeated measures design. Secondly, the impact of 
the trauma film on a number of dependent variables immediately following the experimental 
manipulation (Session 1) was investigated across conditions. Dependent variables included: 
(a) number of intrusive images experienced post-manipulation; (b) pre- and post- 
manipulation measures of mood; (c) changes in heart-rate response. Thirdly, at Session 2, all 
participants completed a picture-task in which they were exposed to (a) trauma (RTA)-
related, (b) generally threatening or (c) neutral pictures. Between-group differences in heart-
rate responses were considered as an index of stimulus generalization. The relationship 
between trait measures of trait rumination and the number of intrusive images experienced 
over the week was also investigated. 
 
2.2 Power Analysis 
 
In order to calculate the necessary sample size, a power calculation was conducted utilizing 
the effect sizes of prior research. As previous studies within the analogue PTSD literature 
have not consistently found effects for state-induced rumination in producing intrusive 
memories, an estimate for power analysis was based on one study in which a difference 
between groups (ruminators and distraction controls) was found (Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, 
2009). In this case, rumination was found to maintain the number of intrusive memories, 
compared to the decrease observed in controls, with an effect size of d = 0.933. Using this 
effect size, it was calculated that setting power at 80% with an alpha level of 0.05 would 
indicate a total sample size of 40 (20 in each group). 
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However, given that other studies have not yet replicated this effect, finding no difference 
between ruminators and controls on intrusive memories (e.g. Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 
2009; Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009), use of a more conservative effect size was 
indicated. It was calculated that an effect size of 0.65, setting power at 80%, with an alpha 
level of 0.05 would indicate a sample size of 78 total (39 in each group) using an 
independent two group t-test for the primary hypothesis. It was hoped that utilising this 
moderate effect size to calculate power would serve to balance the feasibility of recruitment 




All subjects were recruited via circular emails sent to both students and staff at Kings 
College London (KCL). On response to the initial email, participants were sent the 
Information Sheet (Appendix A) and asked to provide a telephone number and convenient 
times to be contacted by the researcher. A screening telephone call was conducted with all 
participants who provided the necessary contact details. Screening questions aimed to 
identify: any history of trauma experiences, including road traffic accidents (RTAs); any 
history of family members‟ or close friends‟ involvement in RTAs; current and/or previous 
mental health diagnoses; and previous involvement in similar research studies. Following 
this screen, if participants met criteria and were eligible for inclusion, times for both testing 
sessions were arranged. 
 
2.4 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
Adults 18 years of age or above were eligible for inclusion in the study. Exclusion criteria 
included: any personal history of trauma experiences (including personal involvement in a 
severe RTA); current mental health diagnoses (including blood injury phobia) or current 
service involvement; current medical conditions affecting heart rate. One participant was 
excluded on screening due to personal history of a severe RTA. Participants were required to 
be English-speaking as a first language (defined as having learnt before the age of 3 years of 
age). If a participant disclosed previous mental health diagnoses or treatment, this was 
explored as part of the screening telephone call and a judgment about inclusion made on an 
individual basis, in consultation with supervisors. None of the participants screened were 
excluded on the basis of previous mental health diagnoses or treatment. All participants were 
also considered according to additional exclusion criteria relevant to an associated research 
project (notably, a history of neurological disorders).   
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Participants with experience of minor road traffic accidents were not excluded, if they chose 
to participate with informed consent. As part of the telephone screen, subjects were also 
asked about any other research studies they had participated in at the IOP. Those who 
recalled taking part in research examining intrusions, or research which had required 
exposure to a similar analogue stressor, were not chosen to participate. This was due to the 
likely similarity in tasks to be administered, as well as having previously received a full 




In total, 83 participants completed session one: 41 in the rumination group and 42 in the 
control group. One further participant did not have data included in this study due to falling 
asleep during the trauma film, and as such did not complete Session 1. All 83 participants 
that completed the first session returned for Session 2 one week later. Of these, an additional 
participant was excluded from all analysis due to failing to disclose prior participation in 
similar research until after Session 1. Of the 82 participants whose data was considered in 
analyses, 64 were female and 18 were male. A simple randomization procedure was used to 
allocate participants to each condition, stratified by gender to allow for post-hoc examination 
of any sex differences. The randomization strategy utilized two identical, closed envelopes 
containing instruction for allocation to either the „control‟ or „rumination‟ condition, which 
the researchers blindly selected on the participant‟s arrival at the first testing session. Once 
the maximum required number of female/ male participants had been reached for one 
condition - based on numbers of total participants booked in - any remaining participants 
were allocated, by default, to the other condition. Subsequently, there were 32 females and 9 
males in each condition (given a lower male response rate to the initial recruitment emails). 
The mean age of participants was 23.8 years (S.D = 5.19, range 18 – 49), with the majority 
being undergraduate students (n = 63, 76%) affiliated with Kings‟ College London.  
 




































Figure 2: Participant response rates throughout the recruitment process 
 
 
2.6 Measures  
 
Throughout both sessions, participants were asked to complete a number of measures 
documenting their mood, intrusions, and subjective levels of physiological arousal. Trait 
measures of rumination and anxiety were also given prior to the first testing session. These 
measures are described in more detail below. A copy of all questionnaires administered can 
be found in Appendix D. 
  
2.6.1 Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring, 2007; 2011) 
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire is a 15-item self-report measure which provides a 
content-independent measure of rumination, assessing different styles of thinking (including 
repetitiveness, intrusiveness, and uncontrollability of thoughts). The PTQ has two forms, 
34 had prior participation in 
similar research 
 
383 responded to recruitment 
emails 
304 sent information sheet  
 
210 provided details for 
telephone screening 
 
147 contactable and screened 
 
101 eligible, scheduled for 
study participation 
 
84 participated in first 
session 
 
11 ineligible (non-English 
speaking as first language) 
68 responded after study 
capacity reached: not sent 
information sheet 
18 did not attend/ cancelled 
82 participants‟ data 





1 had history of personal 
trauma 
8 non-English speaking as 
first language 
3 had history of neurological 
disorders (criteria relevant to 
associated study) 
1 excluded for prior 
participation in similar 
research (undisclosed at 
screening) 
1 excluded for insufficient 
attention to trauma video 
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examining both long-standing trait rumination (PTQ-T) as well as transient state rumination 
(PTQ-S). The trait version was adapted from the original state form of the questionnaire. The 
PTQ has been reported to have good internal consistency (α = .95), as well as good 
reliability and convergent validity with other measures of repetitive negative thinking, in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples (Ehring et al., 2011). In both forms, participants are 
asked to rate each item on a scale ranging from „0‟ („never‟) to „4‟ („almost always‟), with a 
total score ranging from 0-60. 
 
In this study, the PTQ-T was administered prior to Session 1 to assess participants‟ general 
tendency towards rumination. The PTQ-S was given at particular points of interest within the 
testing session, to examine the extent to which participants engaged in temporary periods of 
rumination. 
 
2.6.2 Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS): subscale of the Response Style 
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) is a 12-item questionnaire forming part of the RSQ, 
specifically assessing the tendency of participants to engage in a series of ruminative 
responses at times of feeling sad or depressed. The RRS has been extensively used in 
research assessing the role of ruminative coping in depression (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker 
& Larson, 1994; Kasch, Klein & Lara, 2001), and within analogue PTSD studies (e.g. 
Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009). Responses are scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from „1‟ („never‟) to „4‟ („always‟). The RRS subscale has been shown to have good internal 
consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
 
In this study, the RRS was administered along with the PTQ-T prior to the first testing 
session, as an additional measure of trait rumination.  
 
2.6.3 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) 
The PSWQ is a 16-item instrument designed to measure the trait characteristic of worry. 
Each item requires a response on a five-point scale ranging from „1‟ („not at all typical of 
me‟) to „5‟ („very typical of me‟), indicating the perceived pervasiveness, excessiveness and 
uncontrollability of worry. Total scores range from 16 – 80, with higher scores indicative of 
greater trait or pathological worry (Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Startup & Erickson, 2006). 
The measure has been found to demonstrate high internal consistency in college samples 
(e.g. α = .92; Davey, 1993; α = .91-.95; Meyer et al., 1990) and good test re-test reliability 
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among non-clinical student populations (e.g. r=.92 over an 8-10 week interval; Meyer et al., 
1990).  
 
The PSWQ was administered prior to Session 1 as a further trait measure of repetitive 
negative thinking; on this occasion, namely worry.   
 
2.6.4 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983) 
There are three forms of the STAI in existence: the revised STAI Form Y was selected for 
use in this study due to its differentiation between temporarily induced state anxiety versus 
enduring personality trait anxiety in adults. Both the trait (STAI-T) and state (STAI-S) form 
contain 20 items with four option responses. Total scores range from 20-80 with higher 
scores suggestive of greater anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsach & Lushere, 1970). High 
concurrent validity between the STAI-T and other anxiety scales has been reported 
(Spielberger & Vagg., 1995), with good test-retest reliability for correlations of trait and 
state anxiety (r = .86 and .54 respectively) (Spielberger, Gorsach & Lushere, 1970). Rule & 
Traver (1983) evaluated the test-retest reliability of state and trait anxiety in a non-clinical 
sample, before and after participants‟ exposure to an analogue stressor. The authors‟ findings 
supported results of previous studies in which state anxiety increased from test to retest, 
whilst trait anxiety remained at similar levels (Rule & Traver, 1983; Tilton, 2008).  
 
The STAI-T was given prior to the first testing session to assess the extent to which each 
participant reported generally experiencing anxious responses. The STAI-S was 
administered at the start of both testing sessions and adapted to ask specifically about 
feelings of anxiety over the last week, paralleling the instructions of the CES-D Scale. This 
was to allow exploration of pre- and post- between-group differences following the extended 
week-long manipulation. 
 
2.6.5 Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D Scale; Radloff, 
1977) 
The CES-D is a 20-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess depressive symptoms in 
the general population. Participants are required to answer each item according to frequency 
of occurrence over the past week, ranging from „Rarely or None of the time (Less than 1 
Day)‟ to „Most or All of the time (5-7 Days)‟. Scoring ranges from 0-60, with higher scores 
indicative of a greater degree of depressive mood. In the general population, the CES-D has 
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been found to have high internal consistency (α = .85) and test-retest reliability around r=.51 
following a two-week interval, as would be expected given its emphasis on current 
symptomatology (Radloff, 1977). As with the STAI-S, the CES-D was given at the start of 
Session 1 and 2 to assess low mood over the preceding week.  
 
2.6.6 General Information Questionnaire [unpublished] 
This questionnaire was designed to obtain key demographic information about participants. 
Participants were asked to provide information about their age, gender, ethnic background, 
first language, marital status, educational background and employment status. Additionally, 
further items assessing previous and/or current medical experience; average time per month 
spent watching medical television programs; and driving frequency were included. Any 
history of traumatic experiences, including road traffic accidents, had been previously 
identified during the screening telephone call.  
 
2.6.7 Psychoactive Screen [unpublished] 
Due to the reliance on heart-rate data in this study, participants were asked to record any 
consumption of caffeine, cigarettes and prescribed medication over the two hours prior to 
each testing session. The consumption and quantity of alcohol and drugs (illicit or 
prescribed) in the 24-hours prior to each session was also assessed.  
 
2.6.8 Positive and Negative Affect Scale-Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & 
Clark, 1994) 
The PANAS-X is a 60-item measure of self-rated affect assessing 11 specific mood states: 
Fear, Sadness, Guilt, Hostility, Shyness, Fatigue, Surprise, Joviality, Self-Assurance, 
Attentiveness, and Serenity. For research purposes, or where time constraints may apply, 
relevant subscales can be administered independently (Watson & Clark, 1994). Four 
subscales of the PANAS-X were selected for consistent administration in this study: Fear, 
Sadness (as indicators of negative affect), Joviality and Serenity (as indicators of positive 
affect and/or arousal). This comprised a total of 22 items. During the course of sessions, 
participants were asked to rate each item on a 5-point scale according to how they felt at that 
particular point (instruction: „right now‟).  
 
In an undergraduate population, the two higher order scales Positive Affect and Negative 
Affect have been found to have high internal reliability (α = .87 to .89 for Positive Affect; 
α = .84 to .89 for Negative Affect; Watson & Clark, 1994) and high validity (Krohne et al., 
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1996). Additionally, each of the four subscales selected for administration in this study have 
been found to have high internal reliability (Fear: median internal consistency estimate of 
.87; Sadness: median α = .87; Joviality: median α = .93; Serenity: median α = .76), and did 
not vary systematically with the rated time-frame given (Watson & Clark, 1994). It was 
reported by the authors that the lower internal consistency observed in the Serenity scale is 
likely to be a reflection of the fact that it has relatively few items. The PANAS-X scales have 
also shown high convergent correlations with other measures of short-term state affect, such 
as the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971), yet with better 
discriminant validity (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
 
2.6.9 Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980) 
The SAM affective rating system uses non-verbal graphic representations to assess the three 
dimensions of valence, arousal and dominance. The graphic figures depict variations in 
emotional reactions on each dimension using a 9-point scale. Participants are instructed to 
rate their mood at that particular moment by placing a cross either in or between the 
corresponding figure(s). Ratings are scored such that „9‟ represents a high rating on each 
dimension (i.e. high pleasure, high arousal, high dominance) with „1‟ representing a low 
rating. In this study, only the valence and arousal dimensions were selected as relevant for 
inclusion, and were administered in the pencil-and-paper format of this instrument to remain 
consistent with other measures given. The SAM instrument has shown good reliability and 
validity when used in the development of the International Affective Picture Scale (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005). 
 
The SAM system was used in addition to the PANAS-X, due to the need for a brief mood 
and subjective arousal measure at points when the PANAS-X might have proved too lengthy 
and/or disruptive to the experimental procedure (for example, immediately post-
manipulation, yet prior to the two-minute break where intrusions were to be monitored).  
 
2.6.10 Intrusions Questionnaire [unpublished] 
Intrusive memories of the video were assessed with an adapted version of the Intrusive 
Memory Questionnaire (IMQ; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). With reference to the prior 2-minute 
interval, participants were asked to rate the proportion of time spent dwelling on the video; 
to estimate the number of images experienced; and to provide distress ratings on a „0‟ („not 
at all distressing‟) to „100‟ („extremely distressing‟) visual analogue scales for both thoughts 
and images experienced.  
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2.6.11 Daily Diary [unpublished] 
The Daily Diary consisted of an adapted Intrusions Questionnaire for each day, subdivided 
into three sections for completion at differing time-points: estimations of the frequency of 
intrusions during the daily ten-minute task; during the first half of the day (until midday); 
and intrusions occurring in the second half of the day (afternoon and evening). Additional 
items rated on a 0-100 visual analogue scale assessed the distress associated with images 
occurring during each of these time-frames (0 = „not at all‟ to 100 = „very much‟).  
 
2.6.12 Concerns about Accidents Questionnaire [CAQ; unpublished] 
The CAQ was used to identify specific themes in participants‟ thoughts following exposure 
to the trauma film, and was adapted from an earlier version of the „Diagnostic Questionnaire 
for the Rumination Condition‟ developed by Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers (2009). Participants 
were given a list of commonly occurring thoughts whilst watching the video and were asked 
to rate on a 10-point scale the extent to which each item applied to them (ranging from „Does 
not apply at all‟ to „Applies very much‟). Responses were then used to provide those 
participants in the rumination condition with sentences directly relating to the themes 
indicated to be of increased personal relevance, in order to increase the likelihood of task 
adherence. Each of the 14-items corresponded to 14 distinct „rumination‟ themes, for 
example: „perceived danger‟; „relating video to own life‟; „guilt‟ (see also section 2.7.4.1 
Experimental (rumination condition) below). Internal consistency was therefore not 
calculable given that each of the items were intended to represent distinct themes, rather than 
any cluster of items aiming to measure an underlying construct. 
 
2.6.13 Manipulation Checks 
Visual analogue scales (VAS) were used as manipulation checks at relevant points in the 
procedure. Two items were given following exposure to the trauma film: on the Attention 
VAS, participants rated their ability to focus their attention on the video (0 = „not at all able‟ 
to 100 = „completely able‟); on the Unpleasantness VAS, participants were asked to rate how 
unpleasant they found the video footage (0 = „not at all unpleasant‟ to 100 = „extremely 
unpleasant‟).  
 
A single item, the Task VAS, was administered to both rumination and control conditions 
following the experimental manipulation in Session 1. Participants were asked to rate the 
proportion of time they had spent dwelling on accidents during the task (0 = „none of the 
time‟ to 100 = „all of the time‟).  
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At the beginning of Session 2, participants completed the Manipulation Check Questionnaire 
(MCQ). The MCQ consisted of five items: the first assessed participants‟ ability to carry out 
the daily tasks over the week; 3-items assessed the care taken over diary completion; and one 
item assessed the proportion of time spent dwelling on accidents during the daily tasks. All 
items were rated on a 0-100 scale (0 = „never‟ to 100 = „always‟). Participants in the 
rumination condition completed an additional sixth item, assessing the personal relevance of 
the rumination sentences given to them (0 = „never‟ to 100 = „always‟).  
 
2.7 Materials and Tasks 
2.7.1 Trauma video 
The trauma video used in this study depicted real life footage of road traffic accidents 
(including dead bodies, injured people and the administration of medical treatment by 
paramedics). The film had been adapted from the original German video developed by Steil 
(1997), to include footage shot in the UK. It has been widely used in previous studies both in 
its original and current format (cf. Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009; Ehlers et al., 2010). The 
video lasted 17 minutes 30 seconds and was presented to participants on a 93 x 70cm TV 
screen. Participants were seated approximately 2m from the screen.  
 
2.7.2 Physiological apparatus and recording 
Heart-rate response as an index of physiological arousal was selected due to evidence that 
this measure is particularly sensitive in distinguishing between trauma survivors with and 
without PTSD (Pole, 2007); as such it was hoped this increased sensitivity would be most 
appropriate for use within a non-clinical sample, where any changes in arousal may be less 
obvious.  
 
Heart-rate and respiratory responses were recorded continuously using the Varioport bio-
signal recording device (Vitaport system, Becker Meditec). Electrocardiogram (ECG) 
electrodes were placed on the manubrium sterni and the left and right lower ribcage to 
measure heart-rate, and recorded with a sampling rate of 256 Hz. A continuous measure of 
respiration was obtained using a Pneumotrace II transducer which was attached around the 
participant‟s upper chest: this allowed for possible respiration artifacts (e.g. sighs or coughs) 
to be identified. All apparatus had been used previously in other studies, in conjunction with 
the picture task (Ehlers et al., 2010; Suendermann et al., 2010). Heart-rate data in which 
there were indications of problematic recording were excluded from analysis, e.g. too poor 
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quality to analyze; irregular heart-rate; too frequent breathing artifacts or extra systoles. A 
software package was developed to analyze the physiological data (Stott, 2012).  
 
2.7.3 MP3 players 
All participants were given a Sweex MP300 2GB Clipz MP3 player to complete the daily 
ten-minute rumination/ distraction induction between sessions. Pre-recorded tasks relevant to 
each participant‟s experimental allocation were uploaded onto the MP3 player during the 
first session. This ensured tasks could administered in a standardized format at home during 
the week. A manipulation check (codeword) was built into the end of each day‟s recording to 
heighten task compliance. Participants were asked to record all codewords in the Daily 
Diary. 
 
2.7.4 Post-video processing manipulation 
Participants were randomly allocated to either an experimental (rumination) or control 
(distraction) post-video processing manipulation, using a simple randomization procedure 
stratified by gender. Both conditions required participants to undertake a ten-minute thinking 
exercise in Session 1 and each day over the proceeding week, following audio pre-recorded 
task instructions. For task completion in Session 1, audio instructions were played via the 
TV whilst the screen remained blank. For task completion between sessions, participants 
were asked to follow each day‟s pre-recorded instructions on their MP3 player. Task content 
varied between conditions as outlined below.  
 
2.7.4.1 Experimental (rumination) condition 
 
This condition aimed to induce rumination about the video. Participants were told that they 
would hear a series of sentences and/or questions presented over the subsequent ten-minute 
period. They were instructed to dwell on each sentence and its implications; to think it 
through as much as possible in their mind; and to allow their thoughts to drift to related 
thoughts or issues. If participants found themselves dwelling on totally unrelated topics, they 
were asked to try to bring their attention back to the last sentence given. In Session 1, each 
participant was presented with sentences and questions from their highest scoring theme on 
the CAQ. Questions from each participant‟s three highest scoring themes were uploaded 
onto MP3 players for the week; each theme repeated once over the week (participants in this 
condition therefore listened to Theme A, B, C, A, B, C on Days 1-6 respectively). It was 




Ruminative sentences used in a previous rumination induction study (Zetsche, Ehring & 
Ehlers, 2009) were selected for administration. All sentences were designed to include the 
characteristic dimensions of ruminative thinking: unproductiveness and circularity 
(„particularly „why?‟ or „what if‟ questions), catastrophizing, repetitiveness and abstractness 
(cf. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Michael et al., 2007; Watkins, 2008). All items presented to 
participants had been previously rated as highly representative in form and content of those 
ruminative thoughts reported by RTA survivors with PTSD, by eight therapists specialized 
in the cognitive-behavioral treatment of PTSD (Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009).  
 
Fourteen rumination themes with a total of 72 sentences were audio-recorded, with a 
possible three to seven sentences within each theme. Themes included, among others: 
„relating video to own life‟ (e.g. „What if an accident like that happened to my loved ones?‟); 
„anger about reckless driving‟ (e.g. „Why do people have to drive that recklessly?‟); and „the 
perspective of a victim‟ (e.g. „How much pain must have the injured people have 
experienced!‟). Depending on the theme, each sentence was presented at 1 min 25 sec to 3 
min 20 sec intervals within the ten-minute task. 
 
 
2.7.4.2 Control (distraction) condition 
 
The control condition aimed to distract participants from thinking about the video to ensure 
rumination did not occur, and was designed to parallel the concentration and verbal activity 
required by the rumination group. Participants were informed that the tasks constituted a 
series of thought-training exercises. Tasks were presented in the form of „word games‟, with 
three brief exercises comprising each ten-minute task. Exercises included, among others: 
listing a series of words starting with the same target letter (e.g. Target Letters: „G‟, „S‟, „P‟); 
word-association tasks (e.g. „cat‟ – mouse; birthday – party); guesses at target acronyms 
presented (e.g. Target Acronyms: „BAM‟, „TFL‟); sentence completion using target words 
presented (e.g. Target Words = tent, dog, drink = „The dog was having a drink next to the 
tent‟).  
 
As with the rumination group, participants were instructed to focus their attention on the 
audio-instructions given and to complete all tasks in their head. If they found their attention 
wandering, subjects were asked to pick up the task again as soon as possible, returning to the 
last item presented. To ensure motivation was maintained, participants were reassured that 
 45 
the tasks were designed to be hard, and where applicable, that there were no right or wrong 
answers.  
 
Each ten-minute task constituted three „word game‟ exercises. 18 content-distinct exercises 
were therefore developed to cover Days 1-6, each lasting 3 minutes 20 seconds. All 
participants in the control condition received the same combination of three tasks in Session 
1 and each day over the week (Day 1 (exercises 1, 2, 3); Day 2 (exercises 4, 5, 6); and so 
on). The control task given in Session 1 was the same as administered on Day 6.  
 
2.7.5 Picture-viewing task 
All participants were required to undertake a picture-viewing task in Session 2. The task had 
been used in its current format in previous research with a clinical sample of trauma 
survivors (Ehlers et al., 2010; Suendermann et al., 2010). Pictures included in the task had 
been drawn from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 
2005) and from the pictures used by Elsesser, Sartory & Tackenberg (2004), and others had 
been piloted on 39 health volunteers to determine appropriate categorization (Ehlers et al., 
2010). During presentation of the pictures, participants‟ heart-rate was monitored 
continuously.  
 
In total, a series of 38 pictures were presented in a pseudorandom order. These comprised: 
14 „trauma-related‟ pictures, relating specifically to RTAs (e.g. collision of car and 
motorbike; crashed bicycle); 12 „generally threatening‟ pictures (e.g. spider on shoulder; 
skulls piled up); and 12 „neutral‟ pictures (e.g. ice cream kiosk; business meeting). 
Consecutive presentation of pictures from the same category was avoided to minimize 
habituation effects. Each picture was presented for 6 seconds on a laptop (screen size 15.4”) 
situated approximately 0.5 m away from the participant. Intervals between picture 
presentation varied randomly between 9 - 13 seconds. 
 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the task was to measure bodily responses to 
pictures. They were therefore asked to consider each picture carefully, and to move as little 







One week prior to the first testing session, participants were emailed a trait questionnaire 
package, including the PTQ-T, RSQ, STAI-T and PSWQ. They were asked to bring the 
completed questionnaires with them to the first session.  
 
On arrival at Session 1, participants were given the opportunity to ask further questions 
about the study and informed consent was sought. Participants were attached to equipment 
measuring heart-rate and respiratory responses for the duration of the session. For this 
purpose, participants were asked to move and to talk as little as possible throughout testing. 
Markers were used to delineate periods of particular interest for heart-rate analyses; for 
example, the researcher pressed a marker immediately before and after the trauma video, and 
either side of baseline measurements. A psychoactive screen was completed by participants 
to assess any caffeine, alcohol or drug consumption prior to the session, in case of adverse 
effects on the physiological data.  
 
Participants completed state mood measures assessing current symptoms of low mood and 
anxiety (CES-D and STAI-S). As part of an associated study, a battery of 
neuropsychological tests was administered at this point (including the WTAR, Hayling and 
Brixton, Letter-Number Sequencing and a Random Number Generation task). Assessment 
lasted approximately 20-30 minutes, with some individual variation. 
 
Following these tests, an initial baseline heart-rate measurement (Baseline 1) was taken over 
a 3-minute period and baseline measures of mood were given (PANAS-X 1; SAM valence 
and arousal 1). Participants were then asked to concentrate their attention on the trauma 
video, being explicitly informed that the film depicted real footage from RTAs. Following 
exposure to the video, participants completed an immediate brief measure of mood (SAM 
valence and arousal 2) prior to a two-minute break, serving as a spontaneous rumination 
phase. After this interval, participants were asked to complete the IMQ (retrospectively 
reporting the number of intrusions experienced during the two-minutes); the PTQ-S 
(indicating degree of naturally-occurring rumination during this period); and repeated mood 
scales (PANAS-X 2; SAM valence and arousal 3). Manipulation checks assessing the 
perceived unpleasantness of the video (Unpleasantness VAS) and degree to which 
participants had been able to concentrate on the footage (Attention VAS) were also given. 
The CAQ was also administered in order to assess the themes of naturally-occurring 
thoughts during the video.  
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Participants then completed two brief tasks relevant to the associated study: a 2-minute 
rumination task, in which participants were asked to dwell on the video content, and a 2-
minute rumination cessation task, in which participants were asked to turn their attention to 
an alternative stimulus. A five-minute break followed, in which each participant was 
engaged in conversation with the researcher. The break provided an opportunity for the 
researcher to prepare the relevant MP3 materials for the extended week-long manipulation, 
as well as serving a means to ensure any rumination prompted by these tasks was sufficiently 
halted.  
 
A second baseline heart-rate measurement was taken (Baseline 2). All participants 
completed further mood measures (PANAS-X 3; SAM valence and arousal 4) prior to the 
experimental manipulation. Participants were allocated to either the „rumination‟ or „control‟ 
condition, using a simple randomization procedure stratified by gender. They were not 
informed of their allocated condition at this time. Both rumination and control tasks lasted 
ten minutes in total. Instructions specific to each task were given.  
 
For the rumination task, participants were informed they would hear a series of sentences 
about accidents, presented at predetermined intervals (see details of tasks above). 
Participants were asked to dwell on each sentence for as long as possible, thinking it through 
fully in their mind. To increase the likelihood of rumination, the sets of sentences presented 
corresponded to each participant‟s highest scoring theme on the CAQ. It was hoped this 
would make the rumination induction as personally relevant as possible. In the control task, 
participants were presented with a series of verbal tasks to complete (see details of tasks 
administered above). Participants were informed they were to complete a series of thought-
training exercises, similar in style to the battery of neuropsychological tasks completed at the 
beginning of the session. They were asked to complete these exercises in their head, to 
parallel the verbal activity of the rumination group. All participants in the control condition 
received the same tasks for completion.  
 
Immediately after the experimental manipulation, participants completed a further brief 
measure of mood (SAM valence and arousal 5) prior to a second two-minute spontaneous 
rumination phase. Following this brief break, participants completed the IMQ (2), PTQ-S 
(2), PANAS-X (4) and SAM valence and arousal (6). Manipulation checks assessing degree 
of task adherence was also given.  
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Instructions regarding the extended week-long task, how to operate the MP3 players, and 
completion of Daily Diary were given. Completion of the task in-session as well as over the 
week ensured understanding of these „homework‟ exercises.  
 
Participants returned for Session 2 exactly one week later, and their data from the week and 
all equipment was collected. Repeat CES-D and STAI-S questionnaires were administered to 
assess any change in low mood or anxiety over the week. Participants were again attached to 
equipment measuring heart-rate and respiratory responses, before completing the picture-
task.  
 
At the end of the second session, participants received £40 payment for their inclusion in the 
study. A full debrief of the aims of the study was offered, and participants were informed of 
their prior allocation to the experimental or control condition. All participants were given the 
opportunity to discuss the trauma video or task content if they wished. No participant 
reported distress or adverse effects from exposure to the video.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that this project was conceptualised and developed in conjunction 
with an associated study, brief details of which have been outlined above. Particular 
consideration and attention was given to minimising potential contamination effects between 
studies - and task demand - within the stages of procedural design. In particular, the 
neuropsychological assessment required by the associated study was incorporated at the 
beginning of the initial testing session - and prior to exposure to the trauma analogue - in 
order to prevent disruption to the current study‟s key aims. The additional 2-minute 
rumination task and 2-minute cessation task administered after the trauma film were 
considered brief enough to minimize the likelihood of disruption between exposure to the 
trauma analogue and the main experimental tasks of this study. The inclusion of a 5-minute 
break was also incorporated into the overall study design in order to ensure participants had 
indeed ceased any rumination engendered by these brief tasks, and repeat baseline measures 
pertaining to this study (as outlined above) served as additional manipulation checks. As 
such, although the risk of these extra tasks impacting on the current study is acknowledged, 







2.9 Ethical Consideration 
 
This project was given ethical approval by Kings College London Research Ethics 
Committee (ref: PNM/10/11-47). The letter confirming ethical approval is included in 
Appendix B. 
 
2.10 Statistical Analyses  
 
All analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 17.0 (SPSS 
Institute, Chicago, IL, USA). In order to assess normality of data distributions, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was considered alongside visual inspection, and data transformed 
where appropriate using log or square root transformations. As parametric tests are robust to 
some degree of deviation from the standard distribution (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000), in 
cases of small deviations from normality, parametric statistics were preferred due to the 
increased power over their non-parametric counterparts. In cases where transformation failed 
to adequately reduce skewness, non-parametric analysis was used. Homogeneity of variance 
was considered using Levene‟s test. Box‟s M was used to assess that assumptions regarding 
homogeneity of inter-correlation had not been violated, when mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) models had been applied, with an alpha significance of 0.01 due to the highly 
sensitive nature of this test (Pallant, 2010). Where sphericity assumptions within mixed 
ANOVAs had been violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for repeated measures is 
reported. 
 
Given that gender differences had been indicated in previous studies (Zetsche, Ehring & 
Ehlers, 2009), further exploratory analyses was run incorporating sex as an additional 
between-group factor for all of the main hypotheses.  
 
Where chance between-group differences at baseline were indicated, Pearson‟s or 
Spearman‟s rank correlation co-efficient were used to examine the extent of the association 
with the dependent variable; only if significant were these added to analyses as covariates. 
This was to reduce the chance of Type 1 error resulting from unnecessary additional multiple 
comparisons.  
 
With respect to the heart-rate data, R-intervals were converted into heart-rate (in beats per 
minute) and analyzed using a program developed by Richard Stott (Stott, 2012). An a-priori 
significance level of α < 0.05 (two-tailed) was used for all statistical tests.  
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Effect sizes for analysis of variance models were computed using partial eta squared (η²) as 
recommended by Rosenthal & Rosnow (1991). Effect sizes for t-tests and non-parametric 
tests were reported using Cohen‟s d by which effects are classified as small (d = 0.2), 







































3.1 Demographics and baseline measurements 
 
Despite randomization to experimental and control conditions, chance between-group 
differences on certain demographic variables were observed (cf. age and previous clinical 
experience in a medical setting). The impact of these variables was further investigated in 
examination of the main hypotheses. There were no differences observed between groups on 
trait measures of rumination and anxiety, or baseline state measures of depression and 
anxiety. Table 1 highlights the sample characteristics by condition, and provides the results 
of the between-group statistical analysis.  
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
  Group   
  Ruminators Controls Statistical Analysis 
  M (SD) or N (%) M (SD) or N (%)  
Age  25.23 (5.80) 22.46 (4.14) t (80) = -2.50,  







χ ₂ (1, n = 82) = 0.00, 
p = 1.00 






χ ₂ (1, n = 82) = 0.09, 




<5 times/ month 







χ ₂ (2, n = 82) = 2.09, 
p =0.35  
Previous clinical 





 25 (61.0%) 
7 (17.1%) 
 34 (82.9%) 
χ ₂ (1, n = 82) =, 




 3.83 (4.88) 4.80 (5.37) t (80) = 0.86,  
p = 0.39 
Trait Rumination 
(PTQ-T) 
 22.63 (9.91) 24.20 (10.89) t (80) = 0. 68,  
p = 0.50 
Trait Rumination 
(RSQ) 
 19.29 (5.08) 19.75 (5.86) t (80) = 0.38,  
p = 0.71 
Trait Anxiety 
(STAI-T) 
 38.85 (8.53) 40.76 (10.47) t (80) = 0.91,  
p = 0.37 
Trait Worry 
(PSWQ) 
 44.53 (12.84) 45.61 (12.50) t (80) = 0.39,  
p = 0.70 
Depression 
(CES-D 1) 
 8.71 (7.33) 10.59 (7.31) t (80) = 1.16,  
p = 0.25 
Anxiety  
(STAI-S 1) 
 37.20 (9.01) 41.09 (9.50) t (79) = 1.89,  
p = 0.06 
PTQ = Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire; RSQ = Response Style Questionnaire; STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory – Trait version; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies - 




3.2 Manipulation checks 
 
3.2.1 Video ratings of attention and unpleasantness  
On average, participants reported high levels of attention during presentation of the trauma 
film (M = 83.05, SD = 11.56, range = 50-100) on a 0-100 scale (Attention VAS). There was 
no significant difference between mean ratings of attention for rumination (M = 84.88, SD = 
10.87) and control (M = 81.22, SD = 12.08) conditions (t (80) = -1.44, p = .15, d = 0.32). 
 
On average, participants rated the trauma video as moderately unpleasant (M = 65.98, SD = 
19.6, range = 10 - 100) on a 0-100 scale (Unpleasantness VAS); by chance there was a 
significantly statistical difference observed between groups with the experimental group, on 
average, rating the video as more highly unpleasant than the controls (M = 70.73, SD = 
18.22; M = 61.22 and SD = 20.02 respectively; t (80) = -2.25, p = .02, d = 0.50). This initial 
unpleasantness rating was therefore controlled for in all relevant subsequent analysis of the 
main hypotheses. 
 
3.2.2 Effect of video on mood 
In order to assess the effect of the trauma film on mood, PANAS-X ratings were obtained 
pre- and post- video (Table 2). A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted. Exposure to the trauma video did indicate a significant effect of 
„time‟, with increases in participants‟ ratings of fear (F (1, 80) = 7.47, p = .01, η² = .09) and 
sadness (F (1, 80) = 131.91, p  <.01, η² = .62), and a decrease in reported joviality (F (1, 80) 
= 282.28, p = .00, η² = .78). There was no main effect of „condition‟ for fear (F (1, 80) = 
0.01, p = .93, η² = .09), sadness (F (1, 80) = 0.07, p = .79, η² = .00) or joviality (F (1, 80) = 
2.76, p = .10, η² = .03). There was no significant „time x condition‟ interaction found for fear 
(F (1, 80) = 1.83, p = .18, η² = .02), sadness (F (1, 80) = 0.09, p = .76, η² = .00), or joviality 
(F (1, 80) = 0.02, p = .88, η² = .00), indicating that participants in both conditions 
experienced similar increases in negative affect and a decrease in positive affect.  
 
Similar findings were replicated on the SAM-scales for valence, with a main effect for „time‟ 
both immediately following the video (F (1, 80) = 238.7, p < .01, η² = .75), and after the two-
minute spontaneous rumination phase (F (1, 80) = 173.7, p < .01, η² = .69). Again, no 
significant main effect of „condition‟ (immediately post-video: F (1, 80) = 2.28, p = .14, η² = 
.03; post-spontaneous rumination phase: F (1, 80) = 1.01, p = .34, η² = .01) or „time x 
condition‟ interactions were found (immediately post-video: F (1, 80) = 0.92, p = .34, η² = 
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.01; post-spontaneous rumination phase: F (1, 80) = 3.38, p = .07, η² = .04), indicating both 
groups to have experienced a similar decrease in positive mood. 
 
 
Table 2: Effect of video on dependent variables: means and standard deviations by condition 
   Group  
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M = mean, SD = standard deviation 
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3.2.3 Effect of video on heart-rate response 
Heart-rate responses to the trauma video were assessed to provide an objective measure of 
physiological arousal, prior to the experimental manipulation. The overall mean heart-rate 
response during i) the pre-video baseline and ii) presentation of the video were used. Mean 
baseline heart-rates did not differ significantly between the control (M = 68.44, SD = 11.89) 
and rumination (M = 65.65, SD = 10.59) groups (t (79) = 1.11, p = .27, d = 0.25). 
Unexpectedly, a main effect of „time‟ was not found although trend level significance was 
indicated (F (1, 78) = 3.05, p = .08, η² = .04). No significant main effect for „condition‟ (F 
(1, 78) = 1.35, p = .25, η² = .02) or „time x condition‟ interactions (F (1, 78) = 0.08, p = .78, 
η² = .00) suggested to be true for both groups.  
 
Further consideration of heart-rate response to the video suggested habituation effects. When 
the heart-rate data over the first half of the video only were compared against the 
corresponding baseline measurement, a significant increase in physiological arousal was 
observed („time‟: F (1, 79) = 6.27, p = .01, η² = .07) regardless of group („condition‟: F (1, 
79) = 1.01, p = .32, η² = .01; „time x condition‟: F (1, 79) = 0.81, p = .37, η² = .01). Mean 
heart-rate over the second half of the video indicated no main effect of „time‟ (F (1, 79) = 
0.70, p = .40, η² = .01), „condition‟ (F (1, 79) = 0.79, p = .38, η² = .01), or „time x condition‟ 
interactions (F (1, 79) = 0.03, p = .86, η² = .00). The fact that the increase in physiological 
arousal disappeared when the video as a whole was considered suggests that participants 
may have become desensitized to the footage presented as time progressed. 
 
Self-reported arousal on the SAM-scale indicated a main effect of „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 6.60, p 
= .01, η² = .08) with participants reporting a subjective increase in physiological arousal 
immediately post-video. As expected, no main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 80) = 1.37, p = 
.25, η² = .02) or „time x condition‟ interaction (F (1, 80) = 0.32, p = .58, η² = .00) was 
observed.  
 
3.2.4 Effect of video on the two-minute spontaneous rumination phase 
On average, participants reported low to moderate levels of naturally occurring rumination in 
the two-minute spontaneous rumination phase following the trauma film on the PTQ-S (M = 
23.80, SD = 14.30, range = 0 - 56). There was no significant difference between mean 
ratings of rumination for control (M = 22.78, SD =14.85) and rumination (M = 24.83, SD = 
13.83) conditions (t (80) = - 0.65, p = .52, d = -0.14). Additionally, there was no significant 
difference between the number of images experienced by the rumination (M = 3.83, SD = 
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3.39) vs. control group (M = 4.9, SD = 7.52; t (80) = -5.33, p = .60, d = -0.18) in this two-
minute period following the video. 
 
On the PANAS-X serenity scale, comparing pre-video and post-spontaneous rumination 
phase scores, there was a significant main effect of „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 3.84, p = .05, η² = .05) 
indicating an unexpected increase in serenity reported by participants. No significant main 
effect for „condition‟ (F (1, 80) = 0.06, p = .80, η² = .00) or „time x condition‟ interaction (F 
(1, 80) = 0.47, p = .50, η² = .01) was observed. Similarly, despite the increase in self-
reported arousal on the SAM-scale immediately post-video, a significant decrease in self-
reported arousal was found in a comparison of the pre-video to post-spontaneous rumination 
phase scores („time‟: F (1, 80) = 7.39, p = .01, η² = 0.09). Again, there were no significant 
main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 80) = 0.77, p = .38, η² = .01) or „time x condition‟ 
interactions (F (1, 80) = 0.90, p = .35, η² = .01).  
 
Following the objective (HR response) and subjective (SAM-arousal score) increase in 
arousal observed during, and immediately following, exposure to the trauma video, the 
findings above suggest a subsequent decrease in arousal to have occurred during the two-
minute naturalistic monitoring period, for both groups of participants. 
 
3.2.5 Experimental manipulation in Session 1 
A manipulation check (Task VAS) assessing the proportion of time participants spent 
dwelling on events in the video footage was administered immediately following the 
experimental manipulation. As expected, participants in the rumination condition (M = 
58.66, SD = 24.47, range = 0 - 90) reported spending a significantly higher proportion of 
time dwelling on the video or related topics than the control condition (M = 5.49, SD = 8.35, 
range = 0 – 30; t (49.1) = -13.17, p < .01, d = 2.91). 
 
3.2.6 Experimental manipulation: Extended week-long task 
The manipulation check questionnaire (MCQ) was given at the start of Session 2 to assess to 
task compliance over the week. On average, participants reported high task compliance: this 
can be seen in Table 3 below. In particular, both groups reported being able to carry out the 
daily tasks over the week as instructed (M = 90.30, SD = 11.20) with no difference between 
rumination (M = 91.59, SD = 10.27) and control (M = 89.02, SD = 12.05) conditions on an 
Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Test (U = 745, z = -0.94, p = .35). As expected, 
participants in the rumination condition (M = 54.88, SD = 25.70) reported greater in-task 
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dwelling than controls (M = 23.29, SD = 21.73) on a 0-100 scale (U = 300.5, z = -5.04, p < 
.01, d = 1.33). However, despite the administration of individually-tailored rumination 




Table 3: Results of MCQ by group 
  Group   
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3.3 Tests of Main Hypotheses 
 
3.3.1 Effect of the experimental manipulation on mood 
 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the rumination condition will report greater increases in 
low mood and anxiety at Session 2 than participants in the control condition. 
 
Participants completed the STAI-S and CES-D at the start of both testing sessions, to give an 
indication of any change in affect occurring over the week. One participant failed to 
complete the STAI-S at session 2 (rumination condition) and as such this data is missing 
from analysis. Means and standard deviations of scores obtained are shown for both groups 
below (Table 4). A mixed between-within subject ANOVA was conducted to assess the 
impact of the experimental manipulation (rumination task vs. control distraction task) over 
the week on mood questionnaire scores.  
 
Table 4: Means and standard distribution of CES-D and STAI-S scores 
   Group  






































* = missing data from n=1 
 
On the STAI-S, neither a main effect for „time‟ (F (1, 79) = 0.01, p = .92, η² = .00) nor for 
„condition‟ was found (F (1, 79) = 1.07, p = .30, η² = 0.01). However, a significant „time x 
condition‟ interaction was observed (F (1, 79) = 5.66, p = .02, η² = .07; see Figure 3). Further 
post-hoc consideration of rumination and control groups separately using paired t-tests 
indicated that the increase in STAI-S scores observed in ruminators reached trend-level 
significance (t (39) = -1.80, p = .08, d = -0.28); no sigificant difference in scores was 
observed in control participants over the week (t (40) = 1.58, p = .12, d = 0.26). 
 
On the CES-D, no main effect for „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 0.29, p = .59, η² = .00) or „condition‟ (F 
(1, 80) = 0.14, p = .71, η² = .00) was found. A trend level significance emerged for a „time x 
condition‟ interaction (F (1, 80) = 3.45, p = .06, η² = 0.04; Figure 4); however consideration 
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of rumination and control groups separately did not indicate these differences to be 
significant (ruminators: t (40) = -1.55, p = .13, d = -0.24; controls: t (40) = 1.04, p = .31, d = 
0.17). 
 




Figure 4: Interaction condition x time on CES-D scores at Session 1 and 2 
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Additional analysis was run to assess the impact of baseline differences observed between 
groups (age; previous medical experience; initial unpleasantness rating of the video). Bi-
variate correlations tested the association between age and affect change, and unpleasantness 
ratings and affect change. As „age‟ and „unpleasantness‟ were not normally distributed, 
Spearman‟s correlation co-efficient was used. No significant association was found between 
age and change in STAI-S scores (rѕ = .20, p = .08); age and change in CES-D scores (rѕ = 
.05, p = .63); unpleasantness and change in STAI-S scores (rѕ = .17, p = .12); or 
unpleasantness and change in CES-D scores (rѕ = .17, p = .13). A point bi-serial correlation 
examining the relationship between previous medical experience and change in affect scores 
found no significant association (STAI-S scores: rpb = -.19, p = .10; CES-D scores: rpb = -.21, 
p = .06). As such, further exploratory analysis incorporating these factors as covariates was 
not conducted.  
 
Gender differences were considered and sex was added as an additional between-group 
variable. No main effect of „sex‟ (CES-D: F (1, 78) = 0.93, p = .34, η² = .01; STAI-S: (1, 77) 
= 1.65, p = .20, η² = .02), „condition‟ (CES-D: F (1, 78) = 0.15, p = .70, η² = .00; STAI-S: (1, 
77) = 1.10, p = .30, η² = .01) or „sex x condition‟ interaction was found (CES-D: F (1, 78) = 





















Hypothesis 2: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, 
participants in the rumination condition will report a greater increase in negative 
affect and a greater decrease in positive affect than participants in the control 
condition. 
 
In order to assess the effect of the in-session manipulation on mood, PANAS-X ratings of 
fear, sadness, joviality and serenity were obtained pre- and post- manipulation for both 
groups. Data were log transformed where necessary to better meet assumptions of normality 
and mixed between-within subjects ANOVAs were conducted for each scale. Descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 5 below. 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of manipulation on affect ratings  
   Group  






PANAS-X Fear Pre- manipulation 
 














PANAS-X Sadness Pre-manipulation 
 














PANAS-X Joviality Pre-manipulation 
 














PANAS-X Serenity Pre-manipulation 
 














SAM valence Pre-manipulation 
 
Immediately 
   post-manipulation 
 
























No significant main effects for „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 0.63, p = .43, η² = .01) nor „condition‟ (F 
(1, 80) = 1.59, p = .21, η² = .02) were found on fear ratings on the PANAS-X. A significant 
„condition x time‟ interaction did emerge (F (1, 80) = 5.71, p = .02, η² = .07). Further 
exploration of this interaction, considering rumination and control participants separately, 
indicated the increase in fear reported by ruminators to reach trend-level significance (paired 
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samples t-test: t (40) = -1.82, p = .08, d = -0.29). No difference pre- and post- manipulation 
was observed in the control group (t (40) = 1.64, p = .11, d = 0.25). 
 
Sadness ratings on the PANAS-X indicated neither a significant main effect of „condition‟ (F 
(1, 80) = 0.02, p = .88, η² = .00) nor a significant „time x condition‟ interaction (F (1, 80) = 
3.23, p = .08, η² = .04). However, there was a significant main effect of „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 
4.25, p = .04, η² = .05), suggesting both groups to have experienced similar increases in 
sadness.  
 
For the joviality subscale of the PANAS-X, no main effect of „condition‟ emerged (F (1, 80) 
= 1.37, p = .25, η² = .02) but a significant main effect of „time‟ was found (F (1, 80) = 24.15, 
p < .01, η² = .23), with a significant decrease in joviality observed for both groups. This was 
qualified by a significant „time x condition‟ interaction (F (1, 80) = 11.87, p < .01, η² = .13), 
indicating ruminators to display a greater drop in positive mood than controls following the 
experimental induction.  
 
Unexpectedly, the SAM measure of valence did not replicate these findings. There was no 
significant main effect for „time‟ either immediately following the manipulation (F (1, 80) = 
1.32, p = .25, η² = .02) or post-spontaneous rumination period (F (1, 80) = 0.17, p = .68, η² 
=.00); no main effect of „condition‟ (post-manipulation: F (1, 80) = 1.28, p = .26, η² = .02; 
post-spontaneous rumination period: F (1, 80) = 1.94, p = .17, η² = .02); and no „time x 
condition‟ interactions (post-manipulation: F (1, 80) = 0.01, p = .93, η² = .00; post-
spontaneous rumination induction period: F (1, 80) = 0.69, p = .41, η² = .01).  
 
Serenity ratings on the PANAS-X indicated neither a significant main effect of „condition‟ 
(F (1, 80) = 0.07, p = .79, η² = .00) nor a significant „time x condition‟ interaction (F (1, 80) 
= 2.41, p = .12, η² = .03). However, there was a significant main effect of „time‟ (F (1, 80) = 
108.79, p < .01, η² = .58) suggesting both groups to have experienced similar decreases in 
serenity.  
 
Consideration of gender as an additional between-group variable did not alter the results 
with respect to fear, joviality or serenity ratings on the PANAS-X, or SAM-valence ratings 
(all Fs < 2.87; p > .05). However, a specific gender difference emerged with respect to 
ratings of sadness on the PANAS-X. A main effect of „sex‟ was indicated (F (1, 78) = 4.31, p 
= .04, η² = .05), with no main effect of „condition‟ or „condition x sex‟ interaction (F (1, 78) 
= 0.40, p = .53, η² = .01). When incorporated in analysis as an additional between-group 
variable, the previously observed main effect for „time‟ disappeared (F (1, 78) = 1.60, p = 
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.21, η² = .02). Further exploratory analysis indicated a main effect of „time‟ to occur for 
female participants only (F (1, 62) = 4.29, p = .04, η² = .07), with no increase in sadness 
reported by male participants (F (1, 16) = 0.13, p = .72, η² = .01). 
 
Additional analyses explored the impact of between-group differences at baseline (age, 
previous medical experience and unpleasantness ratings). No significant correlations were 
indicated in a series of bivariate and biserial correlations conducted (all r = -.21 to r = .13; p 
> .05) and therefore these factors were not added as covariates when examining the impact 






























3.3.2 Effect of the experimental manipulation on intrusive images 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the rumination condition will experience a greater 
number of intrusive images over the week than participants in the control condition. 
 
The total means and standard deviations of the intrusive images reported for both conditions 
over Days 1-6 are shown in Table 6 below. The total number of intrusive images 
experienced by both groups over the week was also considered. Two participants (n = 2, 
both controls) had missing data on one day each. Total intrusions over the week were 
calculated if participants had more than 75% complete diary data for intrusions. All 
participants fulfilled this criterion. 
 
Table 6: Intrusive images experienced by day 
  Images experienced by day 


















































































* = missing data from n=1 
 
Data were log transformed to better meet normality assumptions and to address outliers, and 
an independent t-test was conducted to compare the difference in total means across 
condition. Data met the assumption for homogeneity of variance as evident from a non-
significant Levene‟s test (F (80) = 3.07, p = .08). Analysis indicated that the total number of 
intrusive images reported by the rumination condition (M = 16.78, SD = 26.70) was not 
significantly greater than that experienced by controls (M = 14.35, SD = 18.22; t (80) = -
1.13, p = .26, d = 0.11). No significant difference existed between average ratings of image 
distress over the week between ruminators (M =14.3, SD = 18.4) or controls (M = 10.9, SD 
= 13.6; t (78) = -0.61, p = .55, d = 0.21). 
 
An analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) was also conducted to compare the groups whilst 
controlling for the number of spontaneously occurring images arising immediately after the 
video and trait rumination (as evidenced on PTQ-T scores). The independence of the 
covariates on the independent variable („condition‟) had previously been established (images 
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post-video: t (80) = -5.33, p = .60, d = -0.18; trait rumination: t (80) = 0. 68, p = .50, d = -
0.15). There remained no effect for „condition‟ when post-video images (F (1, 79) = 0.99, p 
= .32, η² = .01) or trait rumination (F (1, 79) = 1.63, p = .21, η² = .02) were controlled for in 
analyses, although the covariates did predict total number of images reported over the 
week‟s extended manipulation (post-video images: F (1, 79) = 19.29, p < .01, η² = .20; trait 
rumination: F (1, 79) = 6.18, p = .02, η² = .07). Bivariate correlations indicated that trait 
rumination did not account for the number of post-video images experienced (Pearson‟s 
correlation co-efficient: r = .04, p = .74). However a significant association between 
unpleasantness ratings of the video and number of post-video images did emerge (r = .23, p 
= .01). 
 
Diary data was also considered by day, in order to assess for any differences emerging 
between groups at differing time points over the week. A mixed between-within subjects 6 x 
2 ANOVA was used to compare differences by day between each condition. The 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction has been reported to address the violation of the assumption 
of sphericity on Mauchly‟s Test of Sphericity (p = <0.01). There was no significant main 
effect for „condition‟ (F (1, 78) = 0.56, p = .46, η² = .01) nor a significant „time x condition‟ 
interaction (F (4.17, 325.57) = 0.38, p = .83, η² = .01), indicating that participants in the 
rumination condition did not experience a greater number of images over the week than 
control participants. However, a significant main effect for „time‟ emerged (F (4.17, 325.57) 
= 10.67, p <.01, η² = .12). Within-subject contrasts indicated significant linear (F (1, 78) = 
32.77, p < .01, η² = .30) and quadratic progressions (F (1, 78) = 8.34, p = .01, η² = .10) for 
„time‟, suggesting both ruminators and controls to have experienced a decline in number of 
images experienced as the week progressed, with a slight increase in images towards the end 








Consideration of gender effects indicated no significant main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 76) 
= 0.07, p = .79, η² = .00) or „sex x condition‟ interaction (F (1, 76) = 0.41, p = .53, η² = .01). 
However, a significant main effect of „sex‟ was observed (F (1, 76) = 6.85, p = .01, η² = .08), 
which was qualified by a significant „sex x time‟ interaction (F (4.16, 316.07) = 3.13, p = 
.01, η² = .04). Further exploratory analysis indicated that male participants had reported 
significantly fewer images than female participants (Figure 6 below). Factors that might 
explain this gender difference were explored, including differences in initial emotional or 
physiological responses to the video. There was no difference between male and females 
with respect to change in heart-rate response during presentation of the video (F (1, 79) = 
3.47, p = .07, η² = .04); unpleasantness ratings of the video (t (80) = -1.47, p = .15, d = -
0.36); attention paid to the video (t (80) = 0.12, p = .91, d = 0.03); or SAM-scale valence 
ratings of the video (F (1, 80) = 0.19, p = .66, η² = .00).
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Figure 6: Control and rumination conditions: Mean number of images reported by day  
 
 
Additional analysis explored the impact of between-group differences at baseline. A 
bivariate correlation indicated no significant associations between age and number of images 
experienced each day (all: rѕ = -.12 to -.02; p >.05). Similarly, a point bi-serial correlation 
indicated no significant associated between prior medical experience and number of images 
(all: rpb = .03 to .13; p >.05). As such these factors were not added as covariates to analyses.  
 
A significant association was indicated between initial unpleasantness ratings of the video 
and number of images over the week (all rѕ = .17 to .32; p<.05). When added to the mixed-
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model as a covariate, a main effect for „unpleasantness‟ was indicated (F (1, 77) = 8.53, p = 
.01, η² = .10). There remained no effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.01, p = .95, η² = .00) or 
significant „time x condition‟ interaction (F (4.19, 323.35) = 0.63, p = .68, η² = .01). 
However, the main effect of „time‟ previously observed became non-significant (F (4.19, 
323.35) = 0.91, p = .46, η² = .01) indicating that when unpleasantness ratings were controlled 

































Hypothesis 4: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, 
participants in the rumination condition will report a greater number of intrusive 
images than the control condition. 
 
All participants were asked to report the number of intrusive images experienced in the two-
minute spontaneous rumination phase following the rumination/control task (Table 7). Data 
was missing for one participant (in the control condition) who failed to provide an image 
estimate. Log transformation was used to meet assumptions of normality, and data met the 
assumption for homogeneity of variance as evident from a non-significant Levene‟s test (F 
(79) = 3.20, p = .07). An independent t-test compared the number of intrusive images 
experienced by the rumination (M = 3.22, SD = 5.13) and control (M = 1.83, SD = 3.41) 
groups post-manipulation. The results of the independent t-test indicated there to be no 
significant difference between the groups (t (76.3) = -1.16, p = .11, d = 0.32). A significant 
difference did exist between average ratings of image distress, with ruminators (M = 23.66, 
SD = 27.75) reporting greater image distress than control participant (M = 9.50, SD = 15.01; 
t (79) = -2.31, p = .02, d = 0.63). 
 
Table 7: Intrusive images experienced by condition 
  Group  















*= missing data from n=1 
 
An analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA) was also conducted to compare the groups whilst 
controlling for the number of spontaneously occurring images arising immediately after the 
video. There remained no main effect for „condition‟ when number of images post-video was 
added as a covariate (F (1, 78) = 2.60, p = .11, η² = .03), although the covariate did predict 
number of images reported in the post-manipulation spontaneous rumination phase (F (1, 78) 
= 14.83, p < .01, η² = .16).  
 
These results were not altered by the addition of gender as a further between-group variable, 
with no significant main effect of „sex‟ (F (1, 76) = 1.94, p = .17, η² = 0.03), „condition‟ (F 
(1, 76) = 1.22, p = .27, η² = .02) or interaction between „sex x condition‟ found (F (1, 76) = 
0.17, p = .68, η² = .00). 
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Additional analyses explored the impact of between-group differences at baseline. Bivariate 
correlations between age and number of images (rѕ = -.05, p = .65); unpleasantness and 
number of images (rѕ = .17, p = .14); or previous medical experience and number of images 
(rpb = .01, p = .92) did not indicate significant associations and therefore these factors were 

































Hypothesis 5: In the period immediately following the experimental induction, 
participants in the rumination condition will report greater spontaneously occurring 
rumination (on the PTQ-S) than participants in the control group. 
 
Participants were asked to report spontaneously occurring ruminative thinking in the two-
minute period immediately following termination of the experimental manipulation, on the 
PTQ-S. One participant (in the control condition) failed to complete the PTQ-S sufficiently 
for a total score to be computed. The square root transformation was applied to data to 
ensure the assumption of normality was met, and an independent t-test was conducted to 
compare this difference. Equality of variances was indicated by Levene‟s test (F (79) = 0.37, 
p = .54). Analysis indicated there to be no significant difference between participants in the 
experimental group (M = 15.37, SD = 13.97) and controls (M = 11.23, SD = 12.01) with 
respect to levels of ruminative thinking reported during the two-minute spontaneous 
rumination phase (t (79) = -1.35, p = .18, d = 0.32). 
 
Consideration of gender differences using an ANOVA indicated no significant main effect 
for „condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.54, p = .47, η² = .01) or interaction between „sex x condition‟ 
(F (1, 77) = 0.52, p = .47, η² = .01). However, a significant main effect for „sex‟ (F (1, 77) = 
5.03, p = .03, η² = .06) was observed, with female participants more likely to report 
experiences of naturally-occurring rumination following the manipulation than male 
participants (see Figure 7).  
 
      
Figure 7: PTQ-S scores post- manipulation by gender for rumination and control conditions  
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An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was also conducted to compare the groups whilst 
controlling for the levels of spontaneously occurring rumination immediately after the video 
and trait rumination (on the PTQ-T). There remained no main effect for „condition‟ (F (1, 
77) = 1.78, p = .19, η² = .02) when these covariates were added to analysis, although both 
post-video levels of state rumination (F (1, 77) = 12.39, p < .01, η² = .14) and trait scores (F 
(1, 77) = 4.98, p = .03, η² = .06) did predict tendency to ruminate post- manipulation. 
 
These results were not altered by the addition of gender as a further between-group variable, 
with no significant main effect of „sex‟ (F (1, 75) = 9.01, p = .26, η² = .92), „condition‟ (F (1, 
75) = 3.23, p = .47, η² = .87) or interaction between „sex x condition‟ found (F (1, 75) = 0.27, 
p = .61, η² = .00). 
 
Additional analyses explored the impact of between-group differences at baseline. Bivariate 
correlations between age and post-manipulation PTQ-S scores (rѕ = -.09, p = .43); 
unpleasantness and PTQ-S scores (rѕ = .15, p = .17); or previous medical experience and 
PTQ-S scores (rpb =. 13, p = .26) did not indicate significant associations and therefore these 





















3.3.3 Effect of experimental manipulation on heart-rate responses 
 
Hypothesis 6: Participants in the rumination condition will show a greater increase in 
physiological arousal (heart-rate response) during the experimental manipulation 
compared to baseline than controls. 
 
Heart-rate (HR) during the experimental manipulation was assessed to provide an objective 
measure of physiological arousal. Average heart-rate during i) the pre-manipulation baseline 
and ii) during the process of the experimental manipulation was used in analysis. Baseline 
mean heart-rates did not differ significantly between the control (M = 68.16, SD = 12.47) 
and rumination (M = 64.53, SD = 8.83) conditions (t (77) = 1.49, p = .14, d = 0.34). Table 8 
(below) highlights the descriptive characteristics for measurements of physiological arousal. 
 
Table 8: Effect of manipulation on levels of physiological arousal  
   Group  






Mean HR (bpm)* Baseline 
 
Experimental    













SAM arousal Baseline (pre- 
    manipulation) 
Immediately post- in- 
    session manipulation 




















*= missing data from n = 4  
 
Any change in heart-rate from measurement at baseline to during the experimental 
manipulation was assessed using a mixed between-within subjects ANOVA. Mean heart-
rates were used, as these have been indicated to be a more stable measurement of 
physiological arousal than consideration of peak heart-rate responses. In total, 4 participants 
had data missing from analysis: all were due to difficulties in extracting data due to „noisy‟ 
heart-rate signals (control group: n = 3; rumination group: n = 1).  
 
No main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 76) = 2.41, p = .13, η² = .03), „time‟ (F (1, 76) = 0.71, p 
= .40, η² = .01), or interaction between „time x condition‟ (F (1, 76) = 0.60, p = .44, η² = .01) 
was found, indicating there to be no significant change in heart-rate from baseline to 
manipulation within either group. These results did not change when initial heart-rate 
response to the video was included as a covariate to the mixed ANOVA. 
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Consideration of gender indicated there to remain no main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 74) = 
0.12, p = .73, η² = .00), or interaction between „sex x condition‟ (F (1, 74) = 2.84, p = .10, η² 
= .04). However, a main effect of „sex‟ was observed (F (1, 74) = 7.06, p = .01, η² = .09). 
Further exploratory analyses indicated female participants to have displayed greater mean 
heart-rates than male participants, both at baseline (female: M = 67.64, SD = 10.40; male: M 
= 61.16, SD = 11.49) and during the manipulation (female: M = 68.48, SD = 10.84; male: M 
= 59.99, SD = 12.41).  
 
The impact of between-group differences at baseline on heart-rate response was explored. 
Bivariate correlations did not indicate significant correlations (age and change in heart-rate: 
rs = -.15; p = .17; unpleasantness and change in heart-rate: rs = .13; p = .27; previous medical 
experience and change in heart-rate: rpb = -.03; p = .80) and as such these factors were not 
added as covariates to the mixed model. 
 
These findings were not consistent with the SAM self-report index of arousal. While the 
objective measure of arousal provided by heart-rate responses indicated no change from 
baseline to in-manipulation measurements, on the SAM self-report index a significant main 
effect of „time‟ was indicated, with both groups reporting a significant decline in arousal 
both immediately post-manipulation (F (1, 80) = 42.53, p < .01, η² = .35) and following the 
two-minute spontaneous rumination phase (F (1, 80) = 13.40, p < .01, η² = .14). No main 
effect of „condition‟ was found for ratings of arousal immediately post-manipulation (F (1, 
80) = 1.89, p = .17, η² = .02) or post-spontaneous rumination phase (F (1, 80) = 0.18, p = .67, 
η² = .00). However, significant „time x condition‟ interaction effects were observed (post- 
manipulation: F (1, 80) = 23.23, p < .01, η² = .23; post- spontaneous rumination phase: F (1, 
80) = 8.47, p = .01, η² = .10) indicating participants in the rumination group to report a 
greater decrease in scores than controls.  
 
Consideration of gender did not alter these findings. There was no significant main effects 
for „sex‟, „condition‟, „sex x condition‟ or „sex x condition x time‟ (all Fs < 2.01, p >.05). No 
significant correlations between baseline between-group differences (age, unpleasantness 
ratings or prior medical experience) with self-report measures of arousal were found (all rs = 






Hypothesis 7: Participants in the rumination condition will show greater physiological 
arousal (heart-rate response) to trauma-related pictures than controls. Participants 
in control and rumination conditions will not differ in heart-rate responses to neutral 
pictures. 
 
Descriptive statistics illustrating heart-rate responses (HRRs) to each of the picture types 
(trauma, general threat, neutral), over the six seconds immediately following picture onset, 
are shown in Table 9 (below). Heart-rate responses to trauma and neutral pictures only are 
depicted in Figure 8. One participant (rumination condition, n=1) was excluded from 
analysis due to an irregular heart-beat. 
 


























Figure 8: Mean HRR to trauma-related and neutral pictures over seconds 1-6 
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The existing evidence-base on heart-rate responses to pictorial stimuli indicates a typical 
two-stage pattern of responding, comprising an initial deceleration (or „orienting‟ effect) 
followed by subsequent acceleration in heart-rate (cf. Bradley et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1993). 
As such, data analysis was conducted accordingly, commensurate with the approach utilised 
by Bradley et al. (2001) in which the peak deceleration over seconds 1-3 and peak 
acceleration over seconds 4-6 were considered independently, in order to minimize potential 
biphasic effects. Peak deceleration and acceleration over the respective time-points were 
calculated for each picture individually, before being averaged across picture type (see Table 
10 below). Within-subjects repeated measures ANOVAs were used to consider these 
deceleration and subsequent acceleration effects.  
 
Table 10: Means and standard deviations of peak deceleration and acceleration by picture 
type 
  Group   
HRR Picture type Rumination* 
 
Control Total 
Mean peak deceleration  













Mean peak acceleration 

















Consideration of decelerative heart-rate responses over seconds 1-3 for trauma vs. neutral 
pictures only indicated no significant main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 79) = 0.70, p = .80, η² 
= .00), „picture type‟ (F (1, 79) = 0.34, p = .56, η² = .00) or „picture type x condition‟ 
interaction (F (1, 79) = 1.50, p = .22, η² = .02). These results remained unaltered with 
consideration of the general threat pictures (no main effect of „condition‟: F (1, 78) = 0.36, p 
= .55, η² = .01; „picture type‟: F (2, 156) = 2.34, p = .10, η² = .03; „picture type x condition‟ 
interaction: F (2, 156) = 1.30, p = .28, η² = .02). 
 
Consideration of gender indicated no main effect for „sex‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.24, p = .63, η² = 
.00), „condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.14, p = .71, η² = .00) or „sex x condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.09, p 
= .77, η² = .00) interactions. However, when gender was added as an additional between-
group variable, a trend level significance for „picture type x condition‟ interaction emerged 
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(F (1, 77) = 3.33, p = .07, η² = .04). Despite this, further exploratory analysis of male and 
female participants individually did not indicate significant main effects for „condition‟ 
(male: F (1, 16) = 0.17, p = .69, η² = .01; female: F (1, 61) = 0.01 p = .93, η² = .00), „picture 
type‟ (male: F (1, 16) = 0.53, p = .48, η² = .03; female: F (1, 61) = 1.36, p = .25, η² = .02) or 
„picture type x condition‟ interactions (male: F (1, 16) = 2.61, p = .13, η² = .14; female: F (1, 
61) = 0.18, p = .68, η² = .00). 
 
Additional analyses considered initial between group differences. Consideration of age (all 
Fs < 2.32, p > .05) and initial unpleasantness ratings of the video (all Fs < 1.15, p > .05) did 
not alter the results above.  
 
When previous medical experience was considered, a trend level of significance emerged for 
„picture type‟ (F (1, 78) = 2.94, p = .09, η² = .04). No main effect of „previous medical 
experience‟ (F (1, 78) = 1.05, p = .34, η² = .01), „condition‟ (F (1, 78) = 0.001, p = .98, η² = 
.00) or „picture type x condition‟ interactions (F (1, 78) = 2.64, p = .11, η² = .03) were 
observed. Further exploratory analyses of participants with and without previous medical 
experience separately indicated no significant main effects of „condition‟ (with previous 
medical experience: F (1, 12) = 1.92, p = .19, η² = .14; without: F (1, 65) = 0.33, p = .57, η² = 
.01), „picture type‟ (with previous medical experience: F (1, 12) = 2.45, p = .14, η² = .17; 
without: F (1, 65) = 0.02, p = .88, η² = .00), „condition x picture type‟ interaction (with 
previous medical experience: F (1, 12) = 0.70, p = .42, η² = .06; without: F (1, 65) = 1.99, p 




Examination of accelerative heart-rate responses over seconds 4-6 for trauma vs. neutral 
pictures only indicated no main effect of „condition‟ (F (1, 79) = 0.39, p = .54, η² = .01), 
„picture type‟ (F (1, 79) = 1.28, p = .26, η² = .02) or „picture type x condition‟ interaction (F 
(1, 79) = 1.86, p = .18, η² = .02). These results remained unaltered with consideration of the 
general threat pictures (no main effect of „condition‟: F (1, 78) = 0.51, p = .48, η² = .01; 
„picture type‟: F (2, 156) = 0.99, p = .37, η² = .01; „picture type x condition‟ interaction: F (2, 
156) = 0.99, p = .37, η² = .01). 
 
Gender effects within peak acceleration over the second phase were considered. No main 
effect for „sex‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.19, p = .66, η² = .00), „condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 0.06, p = .81, η² = 
.00) or „sex x condition‟ (F (1, 77) = 1.86, p = .18, η² = .02) interactions were observed. 
Similar to gender effects over the first phase, when added as an additional between-group 
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variable, a trend level significance for „picture type x condition‟ interaction emerged (F (1, 
77) = 3.10, p = .08, η² = .04). Despite this, further exploratory analysis of male and female 
participants individually did not indicate significant main effects for „condition‟ (male: F(1, 
15) = 4.30, p = .06, η² = .22; female: F (1, 61) =1.26, p = .27, η² = .02), „picture type‟ (male: 
F (1, 15) = 1.23, p = .28, η² = .08; female: F (1, 61) = 0.70, p = .41, η² = .01) or significant 
„condition x picture type‟ interactions (male: F (1, 15) = 1.10, p = .31, η² = .07; female: F (1, 
61) = 0.36, p = .55, η² = .01).  
 
Additional analyses considered initial between-group differences. Consideration of age (all 
Fs < 2.85 p > .05) and initial unpleasantness ratings of the video (all Fs < 1.61, p > .05) did 
not alter these results.  
 
When previous medical experience was added as a covariate to the model, no main effects of 
„condition‟ (F (1, 78) = 0.17, p = .68, η² = .00) or „previous medical experience‟ (F (1, 78) = 
0.50, p = .48, η² = .01) were found, however, a significant main effect of picture type (F (1, 
78) = 4.05, p = .05, η² = .05) and a trend level significance for „picture type x condition‟ 
interaction (F (1, 78) = 3.18, p = .08, η² = .04) emerged. Further exploratory analyses of 
participants with and without previous medical experience separately indicated no significant 
main effects of „condition‟ (with previous medical experience: F (1, 12) = 2.80, p = .12, η² = 
.19; without: F (1, 65) = 0.04, p = .84, η² = .00), „picture type‟ (with previous medical 
experience: F (1, 12) = 1.37, p = .27, η² = .10; without: F (1, 65) = 0.07, p = .79, η² = .00).  
 
However, a significant „condition x picture type‟ interaction did emerge for those 
participants who did not have previous medical experience only (F (1, 65) = 3.99, p = .05, η² 
= .06; without: F (1, 12) = 0.04, p = .85, η² = .00). Overall, this finding suggests that within 
participants without prior medical experience, ruminators experienced a significantly greater 
increase in heart-rate on presentation of the trauma pictures than to neutral pictures. Control 
participants conversely demonstrated lower peak acceleration to trauma pictures than to 
neutral pictures. This is indicated in Figure 9 below.  
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4.1 Summary of findings 
 
The aim of the present study was to experimentally investigate the effects of rumination on 
selected symptoms characteristic of PTSD: namely mood, intrusive memories and 
physiological arousal. Consideration of the results outlined above indicates that, overall, the 
main hypotheses of this study were not supported. Firstly, rumination did not appear to 
engender significantly greater increases in low mood or anxiety over the course of a week-
long manipulation, compared to a control task (although a non-significant trend towards 
increased anxiety was noted in rumination participants). In line with this, no difference 
between the groups was found with respect to increases in fear or sadness ratings - or 
decreases in positive mood ratings - following the in-session manipulation (again, however, 
trend-level increases in fear were observed for participants in the rumination condition only). 
Secondly, ruminators did not report a greater number of intrusive image experiences than 
controls, either over the week‟s manipulation or following the in-session task. However, 
interestingly, trait rumination emerged as a better predictor of image frequency than did 
condition allocation. Thirdly, hypotheses regarding the impact of rumination on 
physiological arousal received mixed support: whilst ruminators did not exhibit greater mean 
heart-rates than controls during the experimental manipulation, participants in the rumination 
condition did exhibit greater acceleration in heart-rate response on presentation of trauma-
relevant cues (when previous medical experience was controlled for). The above findings, 
and their implications, are reviewed in greater detail below.   
 
4.1.1 Manipulation Checks 
Consideration of the manipulation checks indicated that the trauma-film was rated as 
moderately unpleasant by participants, with high levels of reported attention to video 
content. Pre- and post-video ratings of affect highlighted it to have been successful in 
inducing both fear and sadness (consistent with previous experimental studies, e.g. Zetsche 
Ehring & Ehlers, 2009); to have led to decreased positive affect; and to have promoted trend-
level increases in heart-rate - significant on consideration of the first-half of the video - in 
addition to subjective increases in physiological arousal. Although all ratings of negative 
mood and arousal increased from pre- to immediately post-video, participants reported a 
subjective decline in arousal during the subsequent spontaneous rumination phase, perhaps 
indicating this two-minute break to have had a calming effect. Nonetheless, the video gave 
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rise to both spontaneous intrusive image experiences (with an average of 4.4 images arising) 
and prompted low to moderate levels of spontaneously occurring rumination. As would be 
expected from randomization, these affective, physiological and cognitive changes were 
experienced to similar degrees by participants across both conditions. In sum, the fact that 
the video was successful in their generation can be taken as evidence for its appropriateness 
as an analogue stressor.  
 
Checks of adherence to the experimental manipulation confirmed that participants in the 
rumination condition did engage in significantly higher levels of in-task dwelling (on the 
video and related topics) than control participants. As such, it appeared that the two post-
event processing conditions were successful in generating differential mental processes. 
Similarly, consideration of faithfulness to task completion over the week-long extended 
manipulation (MCQ) indicated participants to report high task compliance. 
 
Participants in rumination and control conditions displayed similar levels of tendency toward 
repetitive thinking at baseline, as evidenced by two measures of trait rumination (PTQ-T and 
RSQ) in addition to a measure of trait anxiety (STAI-T) and worry (PSWQ). Overall 
therefore, any subsequent differences emerging between the groups on the dependent 
variables were unlikely to be attributable to trait differences.  
 
4.1.2 Impact of rumination on negative affect 
Findings for the first hypothesis were not supported: unexpectedly, participants in the 
rumination condition did not report significantly greater increases in low mood or anxiety 
(on CES-D or STAI-S scores respectively) over the week than did control participants. 
However, a non-significant trend towards increased levels of anxiety on the STAI-S for 
ruminators only did emerge. The absence of an effect of rumination on low mood is at odds 
with consistent findings in the literature suggesting rumination to play a role in the 
emergence and maintenance of depressive symptoms, including depression arising following 
a traumatic event (cf. Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). However, interestingly, the 
tendency towards increased anxiety in ruminators over the week does lend support to 
previous findings indicating a specific role of rumination upon anxious mood (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000); a key symptom of PTSD. While rumination has historically been most 
commonly associated and examined with respect to the depressive disorders - and worry 
primarily associated with anxiety - the differential role of rumination to that of worry within 
anxiety augmentation has been highlighted (Fresco et al., 2002). Additionally, evidence from 
the social anxiety field has indicated a specific role for post-event rumination in disorder 
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maintenance, through the post-hoc repeated rehearsal (and often subsequent negative 
evaluation) of past social events (Clark & Wells, 1995; Perini, Abbott & Rapee, 2006). It 
appears conceivable that post-event rumination may, through a similar vein, play a direct and 
active role in the maintenance of anxious mood within PTSD; although given the non-
significant trend observed here, this is speculated with caution.  
 
Findings for the second hypothesis, with regards to the brief in-session manipulation, were 
similarly unsupported. Whilst rumination led to increases in fear and sadness, as well as a 
decline in joviality and serenity, a differential effect of condition was not demonstrated. A 
possible exception to this was observed on fear ratings, in which rumination appeared to 
engender non-significant trend-level increases in fear, with no change in fear ratings reported 
by distraction controls (consistent with trend-level increases in anxiety over the week). 
Unexpectedly, both groups reported an escalation in sadness, as well as associated reductions 
in joviality and serenity following task completion. Exploration of gender effects indicated 
the increases in sadness-ratings to be specific to female participants only; male participants 
reported no alteration in pre- to post- manipulation ratings with regards to this mood state.  
 
As such, the hypothesized greater detrimental effect of rumination over distraction on mood 
state pre- to post- manipulation was only partially supported, and is at odds with the findings 
of previous studies, where rumination has been consistently implicated in the maintenance of 
negative mood (Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, 2009; Ehring, Szeimies, Schaffrick, 2009). 
Additionally, consideration of the SAM-valence scale indicated no change pre- to post- 
manipulation for either group; it is possible this measure was not sufficiently sensitive to 
pick up on these mood-state specific changes. The increase in sadness and decrease in 
positive mood reported by controls may in part reflect the impact of the selected distraction 
task on mood (such as through perceived cognitive demand/ task performance), rather than 
being a failure of the rumination task as such; this consideration will be further explored 
within the limitations section below. 
  
The finding that rumination led to a tendency towards increased fear specifically has not 
been previously indicated. Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers (2009)‟s experimental study was the 
first to consider specific mood-state change (that is, fear or sadness rather than „negative 
affect‟ more broadly): the authors found post-video rumination to maintain feelings of 
sadness specifically - and not fear - a finding attributed to the nature of the analogue stressor 
used. However, given that the same footage was utilized within this study (and only trend-
level significance in fear increases observed), it is difficult to reconcile these contradictory 
findings and as such, the potential association between rumination and heightened fear 
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should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the preliminary indication that rumination 
may have given rise to a resurgence of feelings of fear, perhaps suggests the thinking-process 
to have prompted internal reminders of the trauma-film (consistent with cognitive models of 
PTSD, e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Fear-networking models of emotion (e.g. Foa et al., 1989) 
propose that the characteristic fear response in PTSD arises from the easy/ chronic activation 
of the association network laid down during trauma. It appears conceivable that rumination 
may therefore serve as one such internal trigger by which this emotion is reactivated, 
although on the basis of this study‟s results, this possibility warrants further investigation. 
 
4.1.3 Impact of rumination on intrusive experiences 
Contrary to the third hypothesis, participants in the rumination condition did not report 
greater numbers of intrusive images over the course of an extended week-long experimental 
manipulation than participants in the control condition, even when daily differences between 
the groups were considered. Similarly, image-distress ratings did not differ between the 
conditions, indicating phenomenological equivalence within the emotive quality of intrusive 
memories. While contrary to expectations, this is consistent with findings from two previous 
experimental studies in which an effect of rumination on intrusive memories was not found 
(Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009; Ehring, Szeimes & Schaffrick, 2009), and suggests that the 
methodological adaptation of extending the rumination induction did not further elucidate 
any such association.  
 
This finding was partially consistent with results emerging in relation to the fourth 
hypothesis, which sought to compare differences in image-experience immediately following 
the in-session rumination/ distraction induction (and as such, more directly paralleled the 
format of previous experimental manipulations described in the literature). Perhaps not 
unexpectedly, given the absence of condition effects over the week, no difference was 
observed between rumination and control participants with regards to either intrusive image 
frequency or distress. Similarly, ruminators did not report greater levels of spontaneously-
occurring rumination during the two-minute rest period following the experimental 
manipulation, indicating that induced rumination did not engender the continuation of further 
spontaneous ruminative thought as hypothesised. However, a difference between the groups 
emerged regarding levels of image distress following the in-session manipulation, with 
ruminators reporting significantly greater distress arising with their imagery experiences than 
control participants. This appears consistent with indications from the literature that the 
specificity (including image-related distress) is a greater predictor of PTSD severity than 
frequency of intrusions (Michael, Ehlers & Halligan, 2005), and may, in part, explain the 
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trend-level increases in fear ratings generated by the rumination task. As outlined above, 
however, the distress associated with intrusive imagery experiences did not appear to 
continue over the week, with no difference emerging between the groups. 
 
Consideration of daily image frequency over the week indicated an overall decline in 
intrusions as the week progressed, perhaps reflecting increased temporal distance from the 
video. A slight re-escalation towards the end of the week may have arisen as a function of 
the imminence of the second testing session, consequently prompting reminders of the 
original footage. In contrast to the apparent stability of intrusive memories in PTSD 
(potentially as a result of the specific quality of the intrusion; see van der Kolk & Fisler, 
1995), the temporal decline in intrusions may reflect the differential nature of intrusive 
memories within a healthy, non-clinical sample, in which participants do not have personal, 
first-hand experience of the events being witnessed. Additionally, it was noted that male 
participants in both conditions reported significantly fewer image experiences over the week 
than female participants.  
 
Exploratory analysis highlighted that the initial number of intrusive images experienced 
post-video better predicted total number of images over the week than did allocation to the 
rumination condition. Similarly, trait rumination was shown to predict total intrusive images 
irrespective of condition, although unsurprisingly, it was not associated with initial post-
video imagery experiences. Instead, perceived unpleasantness of the trauma-film did predict 
post-video intrusions. This is consistent with suggestions from the literature that intrusions 
may develop on a continuum of „stressfulness‟ (Holmes & Bourne, 2008), with stimuli 
perceived as high stress - or highly unpleasant - giving rise to a greater number of intrusions. 
These findings are perhaps indicative of the involvement of differing mechanisms within 
intrusive imagery development (where the perceived aversiveness of the event is perhaps 
key) as opposed to imagery maintenance over the week (influenced by trait factors and 
degree of initial intrusive experiences).  
 
In line with this, additional analyses highlighted that when unpleasantness ratings of the 
video were controlled for, the previously observed decline in images over the week 
disappeared. A potential explanation for this might be that participants reporting low 
unpleasantness scores would necessarily have had less of a decline due to the lower numbers 
of images initially experienced at baseline (post-video). Conversely, participants rating the 
video as highly unpleasant, who as such reported greater intrusive experiences at baseline, 
would therefore present greater opportunity for this decline in imagery to occur. This would 
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explain why, when the effect of unpleasantness was partialed out through its addition as a 
covariate to analysis, the previously observed decline in images disappeared.  
 
In sum therefore, individuals‟ natural tendency towards rumination appeared to overshadow 
any impact of the allocated tasks with regards the maintenance of intrusive imagery. This is 
in line with indications from previous analogue studies in which degree of state rumination 
(rather than condition) was positively associated with number of intrusive memories 
(Halligan, Clark & Ehlers, 2002; Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009), and is commensurate with 
results from prospective clinical studies where rumination has been shown to predict 
symptom severity (e.g. Ehring, Ehlers & Glucksman, 2008; Michael et al., 2007). Similarly, 
trait rumination and naturalistic post-video levels of state rumination predicted spontaneous 
post-manipulation ruminative experiences, rather than this emerging as an effect of 
condition. 
 
4.1.4 Impact of rumination on physiological arousal 
Hypotheses concerning the impact of rumination on heart-rate (as an objective measure of 
physiological arousal) did not appear to be fully supported. Participants in the rumination 
group did not exhibit greater mean heart-rates during the course of the experimental 
manipulation (as indexed by increases from baseline) than participants in the control 
condition. Previous studies have reported mixed findings as to the impact of rumination on 
heart-rate response: while Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick (2009) found rumination to 
maintain raised heart-rate response to a trauma analogue, Ehring, Fuchs & Kläsener, (2009) 
did not replicate this result. Our findings suggest that the internal cues provided by 
rumination were insufficient to induce increased physiological arousal, perhaps consistent 
with the non-significant (but trend-level) self-reported increases in fear (on the PANAS-X) 
from the rumination group. Additionally, contrary to expectations, the self-report SAM-
arousal measure suggested participants in both conditions to report a subjective decline in 
arousal over the ten-minute period. Again, given that allocation to experimentally-induced 
rumination may not account for what people actually do (when compared to their inherent 
tendencies) or, similarly, may not accurately reflect „naturalistic‟ rumination, caution is 
needed in interpreting these findings as evidence that an increased arousal state does not 
occur as a result of ruminative internal processes. 
 
As an adjunct, female participants were observed to demonstrate higher mean heart-rates 
than male participants during the experimental inductions. This is consistent with a body a 
literature that has indicated gender differences in cardiac response, with healthy female 
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participants typically displaying greater heart-rate complexity (Antelmi et al., 2004; Ryan et 
al., 1994). However, given that this was true both at baseline and during the manipulation, 
this observation was not further considered in analyses, as it did not pertain directly to the 
exploration of the aims of this study. 
 
Finally, all participants displayed the characteristic „orienting‟ deceleration in heart-rate 
response on presentation of pictorial stimuli, as would be expected from a non-clinical 
sample (Bradley et al., 2001). Although participants in the rumination condition did not 
display more marked initial heart-rate decelerations to trauma-relevant than neutral pictures, 
as previously highlighted in the literature (for example, Bradley et al., 2001), potential 
differences in heart-rate acceleration were noted when baseline between-group differences 
were considered.  
 
Specifically, ruminators without prior exposure to medical settings demonstrated greater 
heart-rate acceleration on presentation of trauma-related (but not neutral) stimuli than did 
control participants. This perhaps suggests that the extended rumination induction primed 
participants towards heightened reactivity over the week, and this finding may be interpreted 
as preliminary indications as to the role of rumination in stimulus generalization. Whilst not 
previously considered within an analogue population; this finding is nonetheless consistent 
with results from the clinical literature, which has indicated PTSD populations to show 
increased accelerations in heart-rate to trauma-relevant cues only (rather than generally-
threatening or emotionally-distressing pictures more generally; Elsesser, Sartory & 
Tackenberg, 2004; Ehlers et al., 2010). Unexpectedly, participants in the control condition 
demonstrated greater heart-rate acceleration to neutral pictures, with significantly less 
acceleration to trauma-related stimuli.  
 
Interestingly, regarding the subgroup of participants with prior medical experience, no 
difference in heart-rate response to trauma or neutral pictures - or between participants in the 
rumination and control conditions - was observed. This may suggest those participants with 
previous exposure to medical settings to have displayed a degree of desensitization to such 
stimuli, perhaps reflecting the likelihood of these individuals having had first-hand 
experience of scenes of equally (or a more aversive) nature, within a medical setting. 
 
4.1.5 Consideration of gender effects 
While gender differences have not been routinely considered in the literature, Zetsche, 
Ehring & Ehlers (2009) did observe male participants in the rumination condition to report 
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significantly greater numbers of intrusive memories than reported by female participants. 
Interpreted with some caution by the authors, this was potentially attributable to task 
compliance, although a qualitative distinction between male and female processing styles 
was also considered. Although an effect of gender was also observed in this study, it was 
consistent across both conditions, with male participants reporting fewer intrusive images 
over the week than female participants. Similarly, although no differences between the 
genders emerged with respect to number of images reported following the in-session 
manipulation, male participants did report a lesser degree of spontaneous state rumination 
than female participants during this period. Male participants were also less likely to report 
increases in sadness following the experimental manipulation.  
 
Exploratory analysis indicated these differences were not attributable to male participants 
having experienced less of an initial emotional response to the video than female participants 
(as evidenced by comparable unpleasantness ratings, valence ratings and physiological 
responses to the trauma-film), or having paid less attention to the footage. In sum, as these 
gender effects occurred across both conditions, it may be the case that male participants were 
less likely to either notice, and/or attend to, such processes arising (perhaps as a function of 
limited distress); or were perhaps less willing to report intrusive experiences as they 
occurred. However, given the lower number of male participants in this study (n = 18; 22%) 
compared to female participants (n = 64; 78%) - primarily attributable to lower male 
response rates during initial stages of the recruitment process - the gender comparisons 
undertaken here are likely to be underpowered, and as such any potential differences 
between the groups on these variables may not have been adequately detected. The 
likelihood of each of these factors can therefore only be speculated, and no firm conclusions 
regarding gender differences can be drawn on the basis of this data.  
 
4.2 Limitations of the present study 
 
Whilst these results offer partial support to the hypothesized role of rumination in PTSD 
symptom maintenance (most notably perhaps with regards the potential influence of trait 
factors), a number of limitations are worthy of consideration. Firstly, the general constraints 
of the trauma-film paradigm should be noted. Due to ethical considerations, a non-clinical 
sample was necessarily used to induce symptom replication: as such, the generalisability of 
any findings to a PTSD population should be approached with caution. Similarly, although 
the analogue and diary paradigm is now a relatively well-accepted methodology within 
experimental trauma research (Holmes & Bourne, 2008); the extent to which induced 
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rumination or distraction can adequately parallel the „real-life‟ phenomena remains to be 
established. Nonetheless, this study sought to respond to this concern by making adaptations 
to previous methodological designs and by extending the manipulation of interest to a one-
week period.  
 
Secondly, despite efforts to consider the effect sizes of previous research in calculating 
power for the current study - and its comparable sample size (n = 83) to other experimental 
designs in the area (e.g. Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick, 2009; Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 
2009) - the non-significant trends observed on certain mood variables potentially suggest the 
study to have been underpowered. In line with this, results were not equally supportive for 
all dependent variables, nor uniformly consistent on consideration of the one-off vs. week-
long experimental manipulations. An extended rumination period did not lead to changes in 
low mood as hypothesised; nor clear effects of condition found with other mood states 
following the first task induction. In a similar vein, no experimental effect was found 
regarding numbers of intrusive images at either time point. However, the trends observed for 
increased anxious mood over the week, and the increase in fear in-session (when compared 
to the effects of distraction), may indicate further investigation to be of value. Whether this 
reflects a differential impact of rumination on specific symptomatology; is attributable to the 
inherent qualities of the experimental tasks completed; or suggests the observed trends to be 
erroneous, remains unclear. As such, these findings do need to be interpreted with caution 
and replicated within future research using a larger sample size - and with greater equity 
within numbers of male and female participants - before firm conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Thirdly, the nature of the individual rumination and distraction tasks themselves deserve 
consideration. While rumination appeared to engender mood change in the expected 
direction during the in-session manipulation, the difference between the groups was not 
significant: of note, it was observed that the distraction task also unexpectedly induced 
sadness and a significant decline in positive affect. Given that this distraction induction 
comprised a series of cognitive exercises, conceptualised with the need to provide equitable 
attentional and verbal demand to that required by the rumination task - and that this was the 
first occasion on which participants were completing the induction - it is possible that task 
demand prompted feelings of performance anxiety and subjective evaluation, despite explicit 
instructions that there were in fact no correct responses.  
 
Similarly, any explanation for an absence of findings with regards certain dependent 
variables should necessarily consider the degree of task compliance. While manipulation 
checks indicated task adherence to be high (both over the week and in-session), and therefore 
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theoretically indicating the type of processing undertaken by each group to be qualitatively 
different; in reality, this is largely reliant on self-report, and does not necessarily account for 
degree of task engagement - particularly over a prolonged period, in which similar tasks 
were asked to be completed each day. With regards the latter, it was observed that 
ruminators rated their allocated themes over the week as low in personal relevance overall, in 
spite of attempts to match ascribed cues to those idiosyncratic spontaneous thoughts arising 
during and immediately after the video. It has been suggested that the ease with which 
intrusive memories are triggered might be dependent on degree of personal distress 
(Michael, 2000); as such, the low perceived personal relevance of the rumination cues might 
in part account for an absence of an effect on this variable.  
 
4.3 Theoretical implications 
 
Overall therefore, the primary hypotheses regarding the role of induced state rumination 
upon the affective states and intrusive experiences characteristic of PTSD symptomatology 
were not generally supported (with the exception of certain non-significant trends). Some 
support for the differential impact of rumination on physiological arousal was observed with 
regards accelerative heart-rate response to trauma reminders. However, of particular interest 
perhaps, are the findings suggestive that trait rumination was associated with intrusive 
imagery experiences over the week (when no between-group effects were observed). As 
such, the current research provides preliminary evidence for the greater contribution of trait 
factors regarding a ruminatory thinking-style in symptom maintenance over induced state 
rumination, within the context of an analogue design. This is consistent with correlational 
evidence emerging from analogue studies of a clearer association between degree of state 
rumination and intrusive experiences (e.g. Zetsche, Ehring & Ehlers, 2009). To date, the role 
of trait rumination upon PTSD symptomology has received less attention in the analogue 
study literature. However, it appears logical that trait levels may better predict the likelihood 
with which individuals go onto engage in prolonged periods of state rumination, over and 
above the degree which can be reliably induced within the context of a laboratory setting.  
 
As such, these elements arguably lend further support to the proposition that rumination 
serves as an active mechanism through which PTSD symptoms are maintained, consistent 
with the cognitive model outlined by Ehlers & Clark (2000). It is of note that this remains 
one of the few models of PTSD to specifically identify rumination as a key maintaining 
process. Within this, rumination is conceptualised as a cognitive strategy used by individuals 
in order to control their symptoms. Specifically, the model proposes that rumination may a) 
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serve to strengthen negative appraisals of the trauma via repeated rehearsal, b) promote 
cognitive and experiential avoidance via its abstract style (e.g. „what if…?‟ questions), rather 
than enabling processing of the actual trauma experience (consistent with evidence 
suggesting rumination to result in overgeneral memory recall; e.g. McNally et al., 1995), c) 
directly increase feelings of dysphoria, nervous tension and hopelessness, and finally, d) 
provide internal retrieval cues that increase intrusive memory experiences. Whilst this 
project did not seek to examine the interaction between rumination and idiosyncratic 
negative appraisals of the trauma-event, this study‟s findings may be seen to offer tentative 
support to the role of rumination in maintaining intrusive imagery experiences – when trait 
factors over and above induced rumination were taken into account. Commensurate with the 
model, this study‟s findings also suggest rumination to engender physiological 
responsiveness to trauma-relevant cues (alongside a possible tendency towards anxiety/ 
fear). However, given the absence of hypothesized between-group effects for intrusive 
memories, it is possible that an alternative interpretation of these findings - consistent with 
the cognitive avoidance hypothesis of rumination - is that attempts to avoid reminders of the 
trauma nevertheless unintentionally impact upon anxious mood state.  
 
Tentative indications that rumination may have led to a specific re-activation of fear 
(typically the primary emotion experienced during trauma) and image-specific distress, may 
be consistent with models suggesting rumination as instrumental in evoking internal retrieval 
cues (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Whilst a fear response was not supported by an objective 
measure of physiological arousal during the experimental manipulation, the heightened 
reactivity to trauma-cues displayed by ruminators only a week later (in participants without 
medical experience) was consistent with theories indicating fear to generalize to related cues, 
and may additionally reflect the tendency towards heightened anxiety of ruminators over the 
week (e.g. fear-network theory, Foa et al. 1989; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
 
4.4 Clinical Implications 
 
The key finding that trait rumination served as a predictor of intrusive memory maintenance 
holds important potential implications for clinical practice. In particular, trait measures may 
serve to inform greater specificity within post-trauma screening and assessment procedures:  
an evaluation of the degree to which an individual is predisposed to (or „at risk‟ of) engaging 
in this maladaptive cognitive process may help identify those at greater risk of symptom 
persistence and chronic PTSD. Questionnaire measures provide an easily administrable and 
time-efficient assessment route, if further research within clinical samples were to implicate 
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trait rumination specifically in disorder severity and chronicity. In turn, the potential exists to 
consider earlier, tailored interventions aimed at addressing rumination as a maintenance 
factor. Additionally, indications from this study that rumination heightened physiological 
reactivity to reminders of trauma (alongside evidence from the literature that PTSD patients 
show increased reactivity to trauma-cues; Ehlers et al., 2010) may suggest an additional role 
for psychophysiological screening post-trauma. This may enable identification of those 
individuals at greatest risk of persistent physiological arousal (consistent with DSM-IV 
criteria for PTSD). It is evident that further research is needed in order to clarify the role of 
the above variables in symptom persistence, and subsequently the potential clinical utility of 
any such screening tools. 
 
With regards intervention, current guidelines for clinical treatment of PTSD recommend 
Trauma-Focused CBT (TF-CBT) as the gold standard (NICE Guideline 26; 2005), an 
approach based predominantly on the Ehlers & Clark (2000) cognitive model. In particular, 
TF-CBT has been indicated to lead to improvements in symptoms of PTSD, depression and 
anxiety; to have high acceptability with patients; and for treatment gains to be maintained at 
6-month follow-up (Ehlers et al., 2005). Within treatment, a dominant focus is given to 
modifying the negative appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae, often exercised in 
conjunction with the imaginal reliving process; to the elaboration and correction, if 
necessary, of the trauma memory; to the discrimination of environmental triggers; and to the 
identification and modification of dysfunctional behaviours and coping strategies. As such, 
the current cognitive treatment protocol does indicate rumination as a potential factor to be 
addressed, were idiosyncratic assessment and formulation to highlight it as a dysfunctional 
coping strategy. Nonetheless, our partial theoretical knowledge regarding the exact 
mechanisms by which rumination exacerbates symptom presentation potentially serves as a 
limiting factor for therapeutic intervention.  
 
Yet regardless of the manner by which rumination might maintain symptoms, the gradually 
accumulating evidence-base - from both the clinical and experimental arenas - to suggest its 
implication advocates for the increased prominence of rumination intervention within 
existing PTSD treatment protocols. Within the depression field, prospective and cross-
sectional studies have consistently highlighted the role of rumination in disorder duration, 
severity and relapse (Just & Alloy, 1997; Fava, 1999; Judd et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000), as well as its association with decreased responsiveness to cognitive-behavioural 
intervention for depression (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). Consequently, these findings have led 
to the development and evaluation of greater rumination-focused approaches than 
championed by traditional Beckian CBT. Pending further replication of findings to indicate 
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the role of rumination in PTSD-disorder maintenance specifically, future developments 
within clinical interventions for trauma may serve to benefit from the greater functional-
analytic and process-oriented approaches emerging to address other psychiatric disorders - 
such as depression - in which rumination has been highlighted as key.  
 
One such example is that of rumination-focused cognitive behavioural therapy (RF-CBT; 
Watkins et al., 2007), developed to address the core residual symptoms of depression. RF-
CBT not only incorporates the specific functional-analytic approach to depression favoured 
by behavioural activation (BA), but also outlines a number of imagery-based and 
experiential exercises to facilitate a shift in thinking-style. In particular, specific functional 
analysis of rumination seeks to highlight the helpful (concrete and specific) versus unhelpful 
(abstract and evaluative) ways of thinking about problems; associated problematic patterns 
of behaviour (such as procrastination) and potential counter-rumination behaviours (such as 
effective task engagement). Treatment seeks to help patients to recognize triggers for 
rumination; to develop alternative strategies; and encourages self-compassion. As such, the 
approach advocates a greater emphasis on modifying the process of thinking rather than the 
specific thought content. While there is some preliminary evidence to suggest its utility 
within depression (Watkins et al., 2007), no studies have yet sought to evaluate its potential 
relevance to the PTSD field.  
 
As noted within the Ehlers & Clark (2000) model, beliefs regarding the value of rumination 
may additionally serve to maintain its selection as a strategy (for example, via attempts to 
„make sense‟ of the traumatic event). In line with this, the function of rumination has 
received greater attention within the metacognitive therapy approach (MCT; Wells, 2000), in 
which the co-existing positive and negative beliefs about the process of rumination held by 
the individual are examined and addressed (e.g. positive belief: „I must remember everything 
that happened in order to prevent it happening again‟; negative belief: „If I keep thinking 
about the trauma I‟ll go crazy‟). As such, the individual continues to believe the rumination 
strategy to be highly necessary, yet remains simultaneously distressed by engagement in the 
process. Originally developed in the context of worry (Wells, 2000), the authors have 
recently trialed the MCT approach for the treatment of chronic PTSD (Wells & Sembi, 
2004). Contrary to the CBT model of PTSD treatment (Ehlers et al., 2005), MCT does not 
draw on the processes of exposure, imaginal reliving, or challenging beliefs about the trauma 
in order to alleviate distress. Instead, its focus relates primarily to the modification of the 
maladaptive processes of worry, rumination and attention in order that functional emotional 
processing can subsequently take place. Despite the relatively small sample size used, an 
open trial of MCT for chronic PTSD nonetheless provided preliminary evidence for the 
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approach, with significant treatment gains regarding levels of PTSD, anxiety and depression 
immediately post-treatment maintained at 3- and 6-month follow-up (Wells et al., 2008). 
 
Finally, transdiagnostic ideas from mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal, 
Williams & Teasdale, 2002) and acceptance commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999) approaches, for example, conceptualise the engagement and entanglement 
with thought-content typical of rumination as detrimental to mood state (Ramel et al., 2004). 
By becoming aware of this „ruminative mode‟ at an early stage and in a non-judgmental 
way, it is proposed that individuals can learn to de-centre from such patterns, preventing a 
resurgence in depressive mood (Rae & Williams, 2010). Within the trauma field, these ideas 
have gained greater momentum in recent years, particularly perhaps with regards the concept 
of willingness to experience emotional distress as a result of suffering (in the PTSD context: 
trauma). If rumination is conceptualised as a form of cognitive and indeed experiential 
avoidance, then the acceptance of experience and resulting emotional states, mindful 
detachment from ruminative thought, self-acceptance, and compassion may also be useful 
principles and skills on which to base PTSD treatment (Follette, Palm & Pearson, 2006). 
Empirical support for ACT and MBCT approaches within the PTSD domain remains limited 
(Batten & Hayes, 2005; Orsillo & Batten, 2005). 
 
The emerging third-wave treatment approaches, in which rumination has played a more focal 
role, can therefore be broadly clustered into three approaches: approaches in which the 
process and function of thinking (rather than content) is addressed (e.g. RF-CBT); 
approaches in which detachment to this process is explicitly emphasised (e.g. MBCT or 
ACT) and approaches in which the beliefs about the process of rumination are modified (e.g. 
MCT). Certainly, despite differing theoretical and clinical emphases, the therapeutic 
approaches outlined above are not necessarily incompatible with the current treatment 
protocol for PTSD, and as such might be usefully incorporated into current clinical practice. 
Of course, the utility and efficacy of adapting such protocols to address post-event 
rumination as occurs within PTSD specifically remains to be established, given the relative 







4.5 Directions of future research 
 
In conclusion, the findings presented here can be tentatively interpreted as adding to the 
accumulating evidence-base with regards to the role of rumination in maintaining PTSD 
symptoms. First and foremost, given the mixed results for the effects of state rumination on 
differential dependent variables, the replication of findings utilizing this extended 
methodology within analogue populations is indicated. In particular, future experimental 
studies should perhaps seek to address a key limitation observed within the present study, 
notably finding a more successful way of increasing the personal relevance of the rumination 
cues presented to engender state rumination. One option might be to encourage participants 
to directly relate the cues to their own life, with explicit instructions to ruminate on the 
likelihood and/or potential consequences of such an event happening to them. Of note, due to 
the constraints of this project, only selected PTSD symptoms were selected for examination: 
the impact of rumination on behavioural avoidance and other related safety-behaviours were 
not considered, and may provide useful additions to our understanding of other forms of 
symptom maintenance in the future.  
 
Whilst examination of the factors that might lead individuals to select rumination as a 
strategy in the first place are outside the remit and scope afforded by this project (a range of 
pre-morbid trait tendencies, or metacognitive appraisals, for example), it would be useful for 
further research to consider these in greater depth. Given the preliminary indications from 
this study regarding the impact of trait rumination on intrusive images, a greater focus should 
arguably be given to examining the impact of trait rumination over and above the effects of 
state rumination that can be induced within such a paradigm. Additionally, as posed by both 
the Ehlers & Clark (2000) model and the metacognitive approach (Wells, 2000; Wells & 
Sembi, 2004), future research should seek to further understand the role of beliefs about the 
use of rumination, both in analogue and clinical samples. The prospective clinical studies 
that have sought to examine this have indicated a mixed evidence-base; while Michael et al. 
(2007) did not find negative metacognitive assumptions to be predictive of PTSD severity at 
6-month follow-up; preliminary support for the role of metacognitions in PTSD (Wells, 
2000) and treatment efficacy (Wells et al., 2008) is emerging.  
 
Finally, greater examination of PTSD-specific state rumination (and trait factors) using 
clinical samples will allow for the generalisability of findings emerging from the trauma-
analogue paradigm to be assessed, with an ultimate aim of informing PTSD interventions in 
which a rumination-focus is more centrally defined. Clinical trials evaluating the efficacy of 
process-oriented approaches, particularly with regards the applicability of acceptance-based 
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models, including mindfulness, to address PTSD-specific rumination are needed in the future 
- especially given indications from other fields (depression; anxiety) as to their utility in 
redressing repetitive thought processes. This study sought to serve as a preliminary and 
exploratory step towards this future goal, via the provision of further evidence for the role of 
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The literature indicates a substantial evidence-base for the association between childhood 
cognitive difficulties and psychiatric presentations: despite this, it has been suggested that a 
neurodevelopmental perspective is not routinely considered within mainstream Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health (CAMHS) services (Humphreys, 2006). Consultation with a 
CAMHS service in South-East London indicated concerns from psychologists that current 
practice with regard to neuropsychological assessment remained unknown and unmonitored, 
despite the weight of evidence supporting the role of cognitive factors within emotional and 
behavioural presentations.  
 
As such, this study was conceptualised in two parts: firstly, a retrospective case-note review 
sought to examine the characteristics of referrals accepted for cognitive assessment over a 
one-year period; secondly,  the understanding and perceived utility of neuropsychological 
assessment by the wider multidisciplinary team was explored via a series of interviews with 
care co-ordinators. Results describe the quantitative aspects of referral characteristics 
(including the number of assessments conducted; key demographics; primary reason for 
referral; and choice of cognitive assessment), in addition to qualitative analysis of the key 
themes emerging from care co-ordinator interviews. A wide range of understanding and a 
diversity of perspectives on the utility of cognitive assessment are illustrated, examined and 
summarised. Finally, implications for the service are discussed, including potential barriers 
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The relationship between developmental learning difficulties and childhood behavioural 
and/or psychiatric disorders has long been recognised in the literature. Although it is now 
well established that children with global developmental intellectual disability are at greater 
risk of childhood mental health difficulties (Rutter et al., 1970; Emerson, 2003), increased 
attention has been given to the fact that specific cognitive difficulties can also be associated 
with behavioural and emotional disorders. It has been estimated that approximately 45% of 
children and adolescents attending mental health services have a specific reading or 
communication disorder, compared to just 5% of children in the population as a whole 
(Cohen et al., 1998). Prevalence rates for learning difficulties within these clinical contexts 
indicate a clear role for cognitive assessment, and it seems evident that identifying any 
developmental delay, including specific learning difficulties, constitutes an essential 
component of formulating how best to meet a child‟s needs as part of service delivery.  
 
1.2 Specific Learning Difficulties and Childhood Psychiatric Disorders 
 
Within the literature examining this association, particular attention has been paid to the 
domains of specific reading disability (cf. Rutter, Tizard & Whitmore, 1970; Frisk, 1999; 
Willcutt & Pennington, 2000); language impairment (cf. Cohen et al., 1993, 1998); and 
deficits in executive functioning (Crawford, Kaplan & Dewey, 2006). The evidence for 
cognitive and psychiatric co-morbidity within each of these areas is therefore considered 
below, highlighting the importance of cognitive assessment within child mental health 
services. 
 
1.2.1 Reading disability  
Willcutt & Pennington (2000) describe reading disability as a developmental disorder 
„characterised by specific impairments in single word reading, reading fluency and reading 
comprehension‟. It has been estimated to occur in 3-10% of children within community 
samples (Wadsworth et al., 1992); with children with specific reading disability 
demonstrating more frequent emotional and behavioural difficulties compared to controls 
(Beitchman & Young, 1997). Prevalence is notably increased when externalising behaviours 
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(including aggression, oppositional or conduct disordered behaviour) are considered within 
clinical samples (Rutter et al., 1970; Frith et al., 1991). Reading disability has often been 
used as a representation of specific learning problems within the literature, due largely to the 
value placed on reading ability within society, and as it underpins and is fundamental to 
teaching within schools (Hinshaw, 1992). 
 
Much of the research noting the association between specific learning and behavioural 
difficulties has posited theories on direction of causality. Hinshaw‟s (1992) review outlines 
differing perspectives: specific learning disability as a causal factor in behavioural 
difficulties, for example, perhaps due to the child‟s frustration, demoralisation, and 
decreased self-esteem at perceived academic failure (termed the „failure hypothesis‟ by 
Grande, 1988); or vice versa, with behavioural problems seen as contributing to specific 
learning difficulties and subsequent underachievement. Prospective studies have indicated 
evidence in favour of a third variable, such as inattention or hyperactivity, mediating this 
relationship. 
 
The Dunedin study, for example, found hyperactivity to negatively correlate with verbal and 
performance IQ and reading level, when other dimensions including externalising 
behaviours were controlled for (McGee et al., 2006). Further evidence for this association 
comes from Willcutt & Pennington (2000), who found that although increased rates of 
externalising behaviours did exist within a reading disability group when compared to a 
group without the disability, this relationship disappeared when the authors controlled for 
ADHD (of which inattention and hyperactivity are diagnostic features). The co-occurrence 
of ADHD and reading disability has been well established in the literature, with overlap 
between the  disorders estimated to range from 35 – 50% (Dykman & Ackermann, 1991; 
Hinshaw, 1992), suggesting that characteristic features of ADHD may play a mediating role 
in the relationship between specific learning problems (such as reading) and presenting 
behavioural difficulties.  
 
Reading disability has also been shown to be associated with increased rates of internalising 
disorders, such as anxiety and depression (Willcutt & Pennington, 2000). Interestingly, 
unlike with the externalising behaviours, this association did not disappear when the authors 
controlled for ADHD, indicating differing underlying mechanisms for impact on broader 
psychiatric presentation. Instead, a significant relationship was found between reading 
disorder and somatic complaints: for example, it was suggested that some children may 
develop physical symptoms in response to the stress of academic work. Clinically therefore, 
the importance of specific reading disability identification is key in formulating the genesis 
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and maintenance of a child‟s emotional difficulties, whether these present within an 
internalising or externalising framework.  
 
1.2.2 Language Impairment  
Language impairments have been commonly observed among children referred for 
psychiatric services (Cohen et al. 1993; 2000), as well as within epidemiological samples 
(Beitchman et al., 1986) and community speech and language clinics (Cantwell & Baker, 
1991). Cohen et al. (2000) found that 63% of 7 – 14 year old outpatients within psychiatric 
services reach criteria for language impairment. Furthermore, it has been highlighted that 
many children‟s language difficulties may remain hidden until routine screening takes place. 
Cohen et al. (1993) considered those children referred solely for behavioural or emotional 
problems, and found there to be previously unsuspected language impairment in 33% of the 
4-12 year olds referred. The authors suggested that the lack of detection might in part be due 
to less severe (and therefore less apparent) problems with expression than in those children 
for whom difficulties are identified.  
 
Additionally, Cohen et al. (1998) found that children in whom language impairment had 
previously been identified were also those likely to demonstrate lower levels of academic 
attainment, with relatively milder difficulties observed in the „unsuspected‟ group. This is 
perhaps an indication that milder difficulties in achievement masked language difficulties 
within this group. This is likely to be highly relevant within a CAMHS context, as if 
undetected, even mild difficulties with respect to receptive or expressive communication 
may be misinterpreted, for example as deliberate inattention or misbehaviour (Cohen et al., 
1998). Identifying impairment therefore allows for difficulties to be more accurately 
understood, and addressed in context. Distinguishing between specific impairments in a 
child‟s presentation may have important implications for appropriate treatment strategies, 
such as adapting communication style dependent on receptive vs. expressive difficulties. 
This might also serve an important role in aiding more helpful parental attributions, by 
allowing the parent to recognise a biological basis for their child‟s difficulties and to 
disentangle receptive communication impairment and deliberate ignoring.  
 
In addition, language impairment has long since been associated with a myriad of cognitive 
deficits (Johnston, 1988). Evidence from speech and language clinics indicates that children 
with language impairment also commonly exhibit difficulties in reading, spelling, and 
mathematics, as well as in visual-motor integration skills (Cohen et al., 1998; Beitchman et 
al., 1996). Furthermore, language impairment has been associated with reading disability, for 
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example, via the associated core deficits in phonological processing (processing speech 
sounds) (Wagner & Torgesen, 1987) and executive functioning difficulties (Cohen et al., 
1998). Finally, it has been argued that verbal mediation may play a key role in a child‟s 
behavioural self-regulation (Hinshaw, 1992). Consequently the child with expressive/ 
receptive difficulties is at greater risk of experiencing frustration at negative interactions 
with parents, teachers and peers, potentially leading to compounded behavioural difficulties 
and impacted learning experiences. 
 
1.2.3 Executive Dysfunction  
Executive functioning refers to a set of abilities including planning, inhibition, set shifting 
and working memory (Sergeant, Geurts & Oosterlaan, 2002). It has been argued that 
working memory may be a central contributing factor underlying many specific learning 
difficulties: spatial working memory has been found to be associated with arithmetic 
disability, for example, while both verbal and spatial working memory are linked to reading 
disability (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993). Working memory has also been shown to be 
involved in the regulation of affect and behaviour (Barkley, 1996), and it has been posited 
that this may be an explanatory mechanism with regards to the strikingly high co-morbidity 
of learning difficulties and psychiatric presentations (Cohen et al., 1998).  
 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), in which children consistently show 
cognitive deficits in executive functioning, has been described as one of the most common 
disorders of childhood (Crawford, Kaplan & Dewey, 2006). As outlined above, ADHD is the 
most frequent psychiatric diagnosis observed in both reading disability (Hinshaw, 1992) and 
language impairment (Cohen et al., 2000); and is also commonly seen within specific 
arithmetic disability samples (Humphrey, 2006). Furthermore, Hinshaw (1992) notes that 
hyperactivity and inattention have the most significant association with academic 
underachievement. For these reasons, it is evident that cognitive assessment represents an 
essential tool within CAMHS services, allowing for the identification of underlying 
associated deficits as described (alongside providing an opportunity for gathering 
information from behavioural observations), in order to aid all parties‟ understanding of the 
presenting behavioural difficulties; to support diagnostic process; and to inform appropriate 




1.3 Clinical implications for CAMHS  
 
Consideration of the above domains highlights the extensive co-existence of emotional, 
behavioural and cognitive/ learning difficulties. Consequently, some authors have argued 
that identifying and distinguishing between different co-morbidities serves only to make 
irrelevant distinctions that lack validity. Gilger & Kaplan (2001) note that co-morbidity is 
„the rule rather than the exception‟, proposing an alternative conceptual framework to reflect 
these commonalities, termed „atypical brain development‟. Yet regardless of the way in 
which this overlap is conceptualised, it is evident that the need for early detection of 
cognitive impairment across a range of domains (language, reading, or working memory for 
example) is indicated.  
 
Evidence suggests that a combination of: i) strategies pertaining directly to learning 
difficulties, and ii) psychotherapy / parental work as traditionally offered within CAMHS, is 
likely to produce significantly better outcomes than either approach in isolation (Hechtman 
et al., 1996). Assessment of cognitive strengths and weaknesses might allow for therapy - a 
predominantly verbal modality - to be appropriately modified; for example, less reliance on 
linguistic material and increased use of visual aids where necessary. If, for instance, working 
memory is impaired, the clinician may consider conducting shorter sessions, or incorporating 
several - relatively briefer - tasks within each. As such, the intervention becomes 
increasingly idiosyncratic and appropriate. In turn, this would allow for frustration around 
miscommunication or poor performance to be alleviated, and a „successful‟ intervention 
experience to be provided: perhaps counteracting previous experiences of failure, and 
redressing low self-esteem. Cognitive assessment clearly has a critical role to play within 
CAMHS.  
 
Despite this, it has been argued that the neuropsychological perspective is not routinely 
considered within child services, and it has been noted that many children are discovered to 
have unidentified learning difficulties only some time after the point of their referral to 
CAMHS (Humphrey, 2006). The potential downfalls associated with such an approach were 
outlined by Humphrey (2006) through consideration of the case study of „Jay‟, a young boy 
seen within CAMHS to address behavioural difficulties at school and home. Jay and his 
family had been offered psychotherapy and behavioural management intermittently for two 
years before a full neuropsychological assessment was eventually suggested, and a diagnosis 
of dyslexia made. The subsequent intervention was able to integrate strategies in helping Jay 
better manage his dyslexia, alongside psychotherapy to address the associated emotional 
impact (such as low self-esteem and frustration around specific cognitive tasks). This holistic 
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approach to treatment allowed for the underlying cause of Jay‟s behaviour to be formulated 
and addressed appropriately, and provided parents, teachers and clinicians alike with a fuller 
biopsychosocial understanding of his difficulties.  
 
To further investigate this issue of under-detection within CAMHS, Humphrey (2006) 
outlines the internal audit undertaken within her own CAMHS Tier 3 outpatient service in 
Cambridge, in which Jay was seen. Consideration of neuropsychological assessment 
referrals, and clinicians‟ views, revealed a number of potential barriers to referral and 
therefore to effective service provision. In particular, it was noted that some referring 
clinicians viewed the assessment of learning difficulties as being the domain of educational 
psychologists rather than CAMHS‟ psychologists. Similarly, beliefs were identified among 
referring clinicians that learning difficulties were not associated with emotional and/or 
behavioural difficulties - or if they were, that they could be treated separately. Many 
referrers thought that clinical psychologists did not see cognitive assessment as an integral 
part of their clinical work, impacted in part by historical controversies around the validity of 
„generating IQ scores in a vacuum‟ (Humphrey, 2006). As a result of these findings, the 
Cambridge service was able to address some of these issues: psychologists were encouraged 
to take on greater responsibility for suggesting cognitive assessment within multi-
disciplinary team meetings; and a referral form was introduced, which encouraged clinicians 
to consider how they might use the results of a cognitive assessment in the context of their 
ongoing therapeutic work with the child. As such, it was hoped to foster a sense of 
interrelatedness regarding cognitive assessment and the therapeutic process.  
 
The following service project was similarly conceptualised as an initial investigation into 
referral patterns within a Tier 3 CAMHS service in South-East London, particularly with 
respect to potential biases in/ barriers to referral. It was intended that consideration of these 
issues would facilitate the delivery of increasingly effective service provision in the future. 
 
1.4 Background to Service 
 
This project took place within a local Tier 3 CAMHS service in South East London. The 
CAMHS service comprised two generic multidisciplinary mental health teams covering the 
East and West of the borough, and one specialist neurodevelopmental (NDT) team, which 
aimed to meet the needs of children with specific neurodevelopmental disorders. Each team 
included one clinical psychologist, plus any trainee clinical psychologists they were 
currently supervising on placement. In addition, specific clinics were run for the assessment, 
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diagnosis and preliminary management of ADHD and Social Communication Disorders 
(Autism Spectrum Disorders). Clinics were run independently to, and alongside, the work of 
the three CAMHS teams with distinct referral pathways; however psychology input was 
provided to each clinic by the three team psychologists. 
 
It was reported that there was not a system currently in place for recording or monitoring 
requests to psychologists for neuropsychological assessment across any of the three teams or 
clinics. As such, psychologists within the service were unclear of the number of assessments 
being undertaken within any defined period; whether or not these were generally appropriate 
referrals; and therefore whether the resources of psychology were being utilised optimally. 
Additionally, the efficacy of assessments in identifying previously unsuspected difficulties 
was unclear, and the perceived utility of this from the perspective of care co-ordinators 
unknown. The rationale for examining current practice was understood as helping to 
contribute to the development of clearer guidelines for referral (thereby formalising the 
referral pathway), as well as to provide a baseline for future audit.  
 
1.5 Project Aims 
 
Given the, this project was conceptualised with several overall aims. In particular, it was 
considered important to investigate the type of referrals currently being accepted by 
psychologists across different teams, given the lack of existing criteria. It was hoped that this 
information would contribute to the development of clear referral criteria, or guidelines, for 
the teams, thus enabling greater consistency and equity of access for cognitive assessment 
across the service. To achieve this, the project was designed in two parts: 
 
Part 1:- A case note review of accepted referrals for neuropsychology assessment within a 
one-year period 
 
As the following factors were unknown within the identified teams, the first part of the 
project aimed to: 
 
a) Establish the number of neuropsychological assessments carried out 
b) Examine the characteristics of these referrals 





Part 2:- Interviews with care co-ordinators 
 
It was also thought that consideration of the wider team perspective (outside of clinical 
psychology) would be helpful in determining current attitudes towards neuropsychological 
assessment, as demonstrated by Humphrey (2006). Therefore, the second part of the project 
aimed to:    
 
a) Investigate the current understanding within teams regarding the purpose of 
cognitive assessment and how this fitted in with their work 
b) Consider any perceived barriers to cognitive assessment 
c) Consider care co-ordinators‟ ideas for service improvement and to promote further 











































The first part of this study was a retrospective review of the accepted referrals for 
neuropsychological assessment within selected CAMHS teams in the service (East, West and 
NDT). A within-subject design was used to establish the number of assessments that had 
been conducted in total within a predefined one-year period (January 2009 - January 2010), 
as well as the characteristics of these referrals.  
 
2.1.2 Participants 
Clinical psychologists based within the identified teams were asked to provide their reports 
for all neuropsychological assessments carried out within the specified period, including 
those conducted by any trainees under their supervision. Therefore the identified sample 
consisted of any child who had undergone a cognitive assessment within this period.  
 
2.1.3 Materials 
The assessment reports of the team psychologists were used to gather data regarding referral 
characteristics. Where relevant data was missing from reports (and was deemed necessary) 
this was obtained by consulting clients‟ electronic records (ePJS).  
 
2.1.4 Procedure 
Approval for this study was granted by the Audit committee (Appendix A). All 
psychologists provided copies of reports for the cognitive assessments they had carried out 
between January 2009 and January 2010. Assessments undertaken as part of specified 
clinics, for example the ADHD Clinic and Communication Disorders Clinic, were excluded 
from the case-note review as these proceeded via a separate referral route. However, an 
overall count of the number of cognitive assessments conducted in these was obtained.  
 
In particular, the retrospective case-note review considered the total number of referrals 
accepted for assessment, and the characteristics of these referrals including: demographic 
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variables; reason for referral; neuropsychological tests administered; and outcome of 





2.2.1 Clinics vs. Teams 
Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of total cognitive assessments conducted within the 
defined one-year period by selected teams within the service. Altogether, 64 assessments 
were carried out over the year (January 2009- January 2010) by the three CAMHS teams and 
two identified developmental clinics. Unsurprisingly, the combined team assessments 
comprised the majority of these requests for assessment (54%); followed by the ADHD 
clinic (41%); and the Communications clinic (5%). 
 
 











Within this, the number of assessments carried out by each of the three CAMHS teams 
outside of clinic was examined (Figure 2). It was these team assessments that formed the 

















Figure 2: Number of assessments per team 
 
 
2.2.2 Key demographics of accepted team referrals 
 
(a) Age 
The mean age of children at time of assessment was 9 years old. However, it was clear that 
there was a broad age-range for referrals, spanning from 4years 6 months to 15 years 11 
months, and with a mode of 14yrs. 
 
(b) Ethnicity 
Figure 3 below provides a breakdown of ethnicity with regards to referrals accepted for 
neuropsychological assessment. Ethnicity was defined using the classification selected by 





Figure 3: Ethnicity data stored on EPJS for all accepted referrals 
 
 
From the data above, it appeared that children from White British and Black British ethnic 
groups were most likely to have received a neuropsychological assessment. A comparison of 
our data with ethnicity data from the local borough was undertaken, to evaluate whether this 
accurately represented the ethnicity of children within the borough as a whole. Whilst White 
British was found to be the dominant ethnic group within the borough (67%), the majority of 
assessments were carried out were with children from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 




White  67 
Black British/ Caribbean/ African 23 
Asian 4 
Figure 4: Census data (2001) for local borough (adult and child) 
 
2.2.3 Primary reason for referral 
The principal reason for referral was extracted from each neuropsychological report, and 
collapsed into wider categories for ease of representation (Figure 5). This data suggests that 
cognitive assessment was often used diagnostically, on occasions where care co-ordinators 
suspected a global learning disability (23%) or ADHD (31%) to be present, but also within a 
broader context; for example, the care co-ordinator seeking to obtain a wider perspective on 
 142 
the child‟s difficulties (20%). Reason for referral is explored more comprehensively in Part 2 




 Figure 5: Primary reason for referral 
 
 
2.2.4 Neuropsychological tests administered 
The neuropsychological test batteries selected for administration were also examined (Figure 
6).  
 
The WISC-IV and WPPSI-II were most commonly administered as stand-alone assessments, 
accounting for 60% of the total conducted. Examination of the remainder indicated that the 
WISC-IV/ WPSSI-II were used in cojunction with more specific tests, as deemed 
appropriate by the clinician. The most common combination was the WISC-IV and the 
NEPSY-II (for assessment of social communication difficulties). Those tests less frequently 
administered included tests of attainment; for example the WIAT-II (on 4 occasions; 12%) 
and BPVS-II (on one occasion; 3%).  
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Figure 6: Neuropsychological tests administered 
 
2.2.5 Outcomes: Generalized learning disability 
It was previously noted that one of the more common reasons for referral was a query around 
the presence of global learning disability. Alongside the reported Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) or 
General Ability Index (GAI), the psychologists‟ conclusions within the report were 
considered in examining the proportion of cases where a generalised learning disability was 
indicated (Figure 7).  
 
FSIQ/ GAI Frequency Proportion of total  
FSIQ indicates no generalised learning disability 24 69% 
 
FSIQ indicates „mild learning disability‟ range 5 14% 
 




FSIQ indicates learning disability unspecified 1 3% 
 
Scores too discrepant to calculate FSIQ/GAI 4 11% 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of cases where generalized learning disability indicated 
 
 
Therefore, on the basis of FSIQ or GAI alone, the majority of assessments undertaken did 
not suggest evidence of a generalised learning disability. Of assessments in which a possible 
global learning disability was indicated (21%), the „mild learning disability‟ range was more 




2.2.6 Outcomes: Further neuropsychological assessment recommended 
Further neuropsychological assessment was recommended for more than half (57%) of 
children tested, with disorder-specific investigation often the primary rationale for follow-up. 
Further consideration reagrding the presence of specific learning needs was requested in only 
11% of cases. These findings are illustrated in Figure 8 (below). 
 
 





A case-note review of the team referrals accepted for neuropsychological assessment 
highlighted several characteristics of the current referral pattern. An initial count of the 
number of assessments carried out by clinical psychologists in the service indicated that the 
majority of these assessments took place in the context of the specific teams (54%), as would 
reasonably be expected. However, given that psychology input to clinics such as the ADHD 
and Social Communications Disorders clinic comprised a much smaller proportion of 
psychologists‟ clinical work (one session per week), it was perhaps surprising that in reality, 
assessments undertaken within these clinics accounted for such a large proportion of the 
total. Additionally of note, due to ongoing maternity leave across the service, the total 
number of assessments conducted in this period - and reported here - is likely to be an 
underrepresentation of previous capacity.  
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Consideration of key demographic features indicated that children undergoing assessment 
were of a wide range of ages (spanning from 4 to 15 years old) and ethnicities. The most 
common age at which a cognitive assessment was conducted was 14 years old; perhaps 
reflecting a time when difficulties with learning become increasingly apparent, within the 
context of the mid- secondary school years (for example, with the prospect of GCSE 
examinations). This relatively late detection is evidently problematic with regards to an early 
intervention model of working, and may reflect increasingly hard to manage behavioural 
difficulties in the classroom at this time. Equally, the wide range of ages at which 
assessments were undertaken may also simply reflect underlying diversity in reason for 
referral at different developmental stages. Consideration of ethnicity within this sample (in 
conjunction with the local census data) demonstrates that the children offered 
neuropsychological assessment were predominantly from BME backgrounds. While this 
would seemingly indicate the accessibility of neuropsychological services for diverse groups 
within the local population, it remains unclear whether this relative over-representation is 
attributable to greater BME presence in the CAMHS service as a whole, or alternatively is 
specific to referral for cognitive assessment.  
 
Reason for referral was also considered. The three primary reasons for referral identified 
were: suspected learning disability, suspected ADHD, and the care co-ordinator wanting to 
obtain a wider picture of the child‟s difficulties. Suspected diagnosis on the part of the care 
co-ordinator appeared to constitute a primary reason for neuropsychological assessment 
requests (for example. queried generalised learning disability or ADHD). Given the literature 
and noted association with specific learning/ cognitive difficulties, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that ADHD symptomatology was frequently cited as a dominant reason for referral. 
However, it is interesting that suspected ADHD was identified as the most common reason 
for assessment requests within teams (in 31% cases), despite the existence of a specific 
ADHD clinic. This may simply reflect the high frequency with which inattention/ 
hyperactivity correlates with behavioural and emotional problems. On discussion with the 
team, it was felt this may also reflect in part the long waiting times that existed for being 
seen within the ADHD clinic, with many care co-ordinators opting to obtain a 
neuropsychological assessment in the context of team working rather than making a separate 
referral and having a substantial delay. It would have been useful to make a comparison 
between the average number of weeks waited for assessment as part of the ADHD clinic vs. 
outside of clinic, however this data was not available due to the lack of a recording system 
for requests for assessment. This may be an interesting and useful factor for future 
exploration. Overall, consideration of the number of assessments conducted for which 
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ADHD was the primary referring reason, highlights the importance of neuropsychological 
assessment in aiding this diagnosis. 
 
In the majority of cases, a generalised learning disability was not indicated (69%). The 
presence of a generalised learning disability was considered on the basis of overall FSIQ or 
GAI scores and the psychologist‟s conclusions within the report. Where a learning disability 
was indicated, the majority of children fell within the „mild learning disability‟ range; this is 
suggestive that neuropsychological assessment is more commonly undertaken with children 
for whom the presenting impairment is unclear. As well described in the literature, 
presenting difficulties may have taken an alternative form, manifesting as behavioural 
difficulties at home or within school. This may reflect the other common reason for referral, 
that is, care co-ordinators appreciating the need for a broader perspective on the child‟s 
difficulties (and perhaps feeling unsure of how to proceed). None of the children assessed 
within this sample fell into the „severe learning disability‟ range. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the availability of specialist LD CAMHS teams in the area, as well as the 
specificity of tests administered (floor effects on the WISC-IV, for example, rendering them 
redundant within certain populations). In the case of the NDT team – where children are 
referred if such difficulties are clearly evident – the lack of assessments in this bracket may 
be a reflection of clinicians‟ judgment that neuropsychological assessment would prove 
unhelpful, unreliable or inappropriate in this population: either the care co-ordinator‟s, on 
making the referral; or the psychologist‟s, on acceptance of the referral. Unfortunately 
however, we are not able to draw any firm conclusions on the basis of this data set.   
 
Within this sample, the WISC-IV and WPSSI-II were most commonly used in isolation, and 
less frequently in conjunction with more specific neuropsychological tests (e.g. tests of 
reading or mathematics ability, such as the WIAT-II; language assessment, such as the 
BPVS-III; or executive functioning, such as the D-KEFS). This perhaps illustrates that a 
broad estimate of the child‟s cognitive functioning was the outcome most often sought by 
psychologists. Whilst a good starting point, this may be an area for further monitoring in the 
future: indications from the literature suggest specific learning difficulties to be strongly 
associated with behavioural and emotional presenting difficulties; yet within current modes 
of assessment these would be unlikely to be consistently detected. The perceived division of 
the roles of educational vs. clinical psychologists may be an influencing factor in the 
approach to cognitive assessment taken by CAMHS clinical psychologists; that is, a view 
that assessment of specific learning needs was the domain of education. Alternatively, test 
selection may equally be reflective of time constraints placed on the administering clinician, 
meaning that where additional (and increasingly specific) assessment is not explicitly 
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indicated – or highlighted as a principle reason for referral – it is unlikely to be undertaken. 
The high proportion of assessments recommending further assessment in some capacity 
(57%) supports the hypothesis that cognitive testing was often viewed as an initial starting 
point, with further assessment of specific learning needs recommended in 11% of cases. 
 
A key limitation within this investigation was our consideration only of those referrals 
accepted for neuropsychological assessment, due to the absence of an established system in 
monitoring all incoming referrals. As such, factors such as the proportion of referrals 
declined - and reason for decline - within this period remain unknown. It is important to 
consider, therefore, that the referral characteristics identified in this sample may also reflect 
clinician bias in the acceptance of these referrals. Nonetheless, this case-note review was 
conceptualised as representing an important initial step towards identifying the nature of 
current practice within teams, in order to promote consistency where necessary, and 
therefore greater equity of access in the future.  
 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of issues relating to referral and the 
perception of neuropsychology within referring disciplines, interviews were conducted with 
care co-ordinators across the teams. In particular, the aim was to investigate care co-
ordinators‟ understanding of neuropsychological assessment, and their perception of how 
this could be integrated with their work; their past experience of referral; as well as any 





























The second part of this study involved a qualitative investigation of referring clinicians‟ 
views of cognitive assessment. A semi-structured interview was conducted with those care 
co-ordinators who volunteered to take part (Appendix B).  
 
3.1.2 Participants 
Care co-ordinators within the identified teams were approached and provided with 
information about the study. They were also given the opportunity to ask any questions they 
had regarding participation. Background information and details of the investigation were 
presented in multi-disciplinary team meetings in order to promote interest, and in total, 15 
care co-ordinators from a range of clinical backgrounds (including psychiatry, 
psychotherapy, social work and nursing) were interviewed.  
 
3.1.3 Materials 
A semi-structured interview was designed for the study, incorporating questions relating to 
the findings of Humphrey‟s (2006) service investigation (see Appendix B). The interview 
sought to explore each clinician‟s understanding of the purpose of cognitive assessment; to 
examine understanding of the relationship between learning/ cognitive difficulties and 
emotional or behavioural difficulties; and to enable discussion around past experiences of 
referral in the service, as well as providing an opportunity for suggestions for improvement 
in the future. 
 
3.1.4 Procedure 
Individual interviews were arranged with all consenting care co-ordinators. Interviews lasted 
between 15 – 30 minutes, and were recorded in writing by the investigator. Interviews were 
not audio-recorded, the rationale here being that this decision would encourage participation 
and acknowledge sensitivity to issues of confidentiality within the team. On completion of 
all interviews, basic thematic analysis was undertaken. This followed the procedure outlined 
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by Braun & Clarke (2006), whereby the investigator first becomes familiar with each 
interview through the process of transcribing, reading and re-reading, before generating 
initial codes for potential themes. Once preliminary codes have been identified, all scripts 
are reviewed in consideration of broader emerging themes. Inter-rater agreement of final 
themes was considered. The supervising Clinical Psychologist also read and independently 
coded all anonymised interviews; a selected sample of transcripts were then chosen for 
comparison and in-depth theme discussion, revealing high inter-rater agreement. In cases 
where a different term/ label had been used to describe a theme, this discussion allowed for 




3.2.1 Care co-ordinator team and background  
Fifteen care co-ordinators were interviewed: seven were based in East Team, seven in the 
West Team, with one care co-ordinator split between the West and Neurodevelopmental 
(NDT) teams. This was thought to be an accurate representation, the NDT being a 
significantly smaller team. 
 
Figure 9 represents the range of professional backgrounds of the care co-ordinators 
interviewed. It can be seen that psychotherapy and therapeutic social work was the most 
common background experience of the interviewees. 
 
 
Figure 9: Background of care co-ordinators (self-identified) 
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3.2.2 Qualitative aspects of the interview 
The interview transcript can be found in Appendix B. Care co-ordinators‟ responses to each 
question were coded using thematic analysis and the themes are represented visually in 
Figures 10 and 11. Figure 10 highlights themes pertaining to questions assessing care co-
ordinators‟ understanding of cognitive assessment (including beliefs around cultural 
difference and its validity) and of the association between learning difficulties and 
emotional/ behavioural problems (including application to clinical intervention). Figure 11 
highlights themes relating to care co-ordinators direct experiences of referral within the 
service. Although it is not possible to discuss all themes arising, key examples from each of 














































(a) Understanding of cognitive assessment 
 
ABILITY/ LEARNING 
The majority of the care co-ordinators interviewed conceptualised cognitive assessment as 
useful in ascertaining a child‟s current level of functioning with regards their overall ability 
to understand the world. For example:  
 
“…To help clarify the child or young person‟s overall intellectual functioning, and to get 
information on their understanding of language as well” (care co-ordinator 10) 
 
Identification of specific learning needs and the importance of screening for these was also 
highlighted as a key purpose: 
  
“If difficulties are displayed in school, due to difficulties in learning and this is not picked up 
[cognitive assessment would be needed]” (care co-ordinator 4). 
 
“To kind of assess cognitive ability – screening for any learning difficulties and thinking 
about strengths and weaknesses in individuals in terms of intelligence, something to do with 
verbal and non-verbal aspects of someone‟s profile, and…memory” (care co-ordinator 5). 
 
PART OF WIDER COMPLEX DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT 
Many care co-ordinators raised the idea of cognitive assessment being used as one potential 
assessment component when the presenting problems were complex. Although not every 
response highlighting complexity focused on diagnosis, the idea of cognitive assessment 
aiding the diagnostic process was commonly expressed. For example: 
 
“When I‟m a bit confused about their presentation: if it‟s emotional or learning ability. Kids 
with possible ASD as well I‟d ask for a cognitive assessment, because often there is 
confusion about whether it is a learning or a communication disorder. It‟s been helpful in 
pulling out what‟s been going on in those kids in the past” (care co-ordinator 6). 
 
Differential diagnosis of specific psychiatric disorders featured within many responses, 
particularly ADHD: 
 
“It‟s crucial in terms of ADHD assessment, provides an alternative explanation for 
fidgetiness and loss of concentration, for example” (care co-ordinator 4). 
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“[Cognitive assessment can be useful] in the context of another assessment e.g. an ADHD 
assessment” (care co-ordinator 15). 
 
This may be a reflection of the high ADHD prevalence rates within CAMHS services, or 
perhaps an awareness and acknowledgement of the psychologist‟s role with regards to 
cognitive assessment within the stand-alone ADHD clinic. 
 
INFORM INTERVENTION 
A number of care co-ordinators indicated that cognitive assessment had been useful in the 
past with regard to making informed choices about appropriate intervention. The following 
examples were typical of the responses comprising this theme: 
 
“…when ADHD/ behavioural problems are secondary to learning problems, you might be 
considering the wrong treatment if learning problems are unrecognised” (care co-ordinator 
10). 
 
“…to help find the best intervention e.g. extra help at school, or if trying to do CBT, it may 
not be the best way to go” (care co-ordinator 8). 
 
 “I ask for them when I want to find out someone‟s baseline for a talking intervention…” 
(care co-ordinator 6). 
 
Three particular aspects of informed intervention were raised: cognitive assessment as 
critical in detection of learning needs; helping to guide care-planning decisions; or via the 




Although the majority of care co-ordinators displayed a high level of knowledge regarding 
the utility of cognitive assessment, differing degrees of uncertainty were highlighted within a 
couple of interviews. One care co-ordinator stated: 
 
“I don‟t know, I‟ve never referred anybody. No-one has ever explained it to me, the 
terminology is not very clear” (care co-ordinator 9). 
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Uncertainty regarding purpose, in this case, clearly served as a barrier to referral. In another 
instance, there existed some recognition of the purpose/ value of assessment but a lack of 
clarity regarding the role of cognitive assessment within different disorders: 
 
“I‟ve had two children I‟m working with that have had it done outside of CAMHS. Both have 
a diagnosis of dyslexia. My understanding is limited – but for those kids it was assessments 
of learning… They were behind in terms of their learning. I know it‟s done for ADHD 
assessments, but for these kids not sure if it was done as part of dyslexia or what” (care co-
ordinator 3). 
 
Within a few interviews, uncertainty was also highlighted regarding the impact of a child‟s 
cultural background on cognitive assessment: 
 
“It would be helpful to know how it impacts” (care co-ordinator 3). 
 
“I don‟t know the latest but back in the day there were concerns that they were culturally 
biased…I don‟t know if the population the scores are drawn from are normed. There was a 
lot of controversy; but this was when I was at university” (care co-ordinator 8). 
 
“I don‟t know - it‟s a good question.  I expect this is something that the psychologists think 
about when assessing” (care co-ordinator 4). 
 
Degrees of uncertainty ranged from not knowing at all whether cultural background was an 
issue (e.g. care co-ordinators 3 and 4); to having some ideas from previous experience but 
being unclear about current practice (care co-ordinator 8). Consideration of all interviews 
indicated that lack of familiarity regarding cultural constraints was not, however, seen as a 
barrier to referral. As highlighted by care co-ordinator 4 (above), this may reflect a belief 
that the responsibility for considering these issues lay with the perceived expertise of the 
psychologist, and therefore that the decision regarding the (un)suitability of assessment did 
not fall in their domain.  
 
RELATIONAL 
A few care co-ordinators highlighted the relational aspects of the testing environment and 
the impact of these on the assessment, particularly raised in response to cultural differences. 




“Even a cognitive assessment has a relational aspect. Even the way a child feels and 
connects with the psychologist. I knew they had to neutralise the tests but they can‟t entirely. 
For example, a traumatised/displaced child will not be used to working one-to-one. You can 
just try to minimise that as far as possible, and as long as it is acknowledged, I don‟t think it 
invalidates it” (care co-ordinator 2). 
 
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF LEARNING/ BIAS 
When asked about any beliefs they held regarding how a child‟s cultural background might 
impact on cognitive assessment, the most common theme arising was that of the cultural 
Western bias implicit in the assessment batteries, and conjointly, the differing values that 
cultures might place on education, learning and assessment. 
 
“There was a question around IQ tests- may be more biased towards some cultures, 
dominant to the English culture more than other cultures” (care co-ordinator 7). 
 
“Maybe different cultures have different ideas about learning etc and what gets in the way” 
(care co-ordinator 5). 
 
“I guess it does impact in all manner of aspects. For example, I worked with a travelling 
family with a long history of disengagement with education, poor reading and writing… The 
reading and writing skills aren‟t valued at home” (care co-ordinator 11). 
 
As the quotes above illustrate, many care co-ordinators displayed good knowledge of various 
aspects of the limitations of cognitive assessment. However, as observed within the theme of 
„uncertainty‟, differing cultural background was not expressed as a reason against 
assessment. Care co-ordinator 12 expressed this sentiment best: 
 
“It cannot not be Eurocentric. I don‟t think it‟s a reason to throw the baby out with the 









(b) Understanding of relationship between learning difficulties and emotional or 
behavioural difficulties 
 
INTEGRAL vs. SEPARATE 
Care co-ordinators were asked about the extent to which they thought learning difficulties 
could be associated with emotional or behavioural difficulties in a child, and the impact of 
this belief on their therapeutic work explored. The majority of responses indicated care co-
ordinators to perceive a connection between the two via different mechanisms (e.g. 
communication, frustration, self-esteem: see below). At either end, there were responses 
indicating beliefs that learning, emotional and behavioural problems were fundamentally 
linked („integral‟) vs. distinct entities („separate‟).  
 
Seven out of the fifteen care co-ordinators explicitly outlined the interlinked nature of these 
difficulties. For example: 
 
 “I think there is a definite association, I think it depends on the child and family, the school, 
the context” (care co-ordinator 7). 
 
“Dramatically [linked], right through from aetiology to precipitation to maintenance to 
therapeutic engagement, to acceptance with self and in society (school maybe). It is 
fundamentally linked. They might also not have other diagnoses if they didn‟t have learning 
difficulties” (care co-ordinator 14). 
 
“No, totally linked. How can you separate them?” (care co-ordinator 15). 
 
In contrast, one care co-ordinator saw certain difficulties as separable from emotional or 
behavioural difficulties, stating: 
 
“It depends whether you classify ASD as a learning disability. ASD would be a major factor, 
other learning difficulties I‟m not sure how much. I don‟t think other learning difficulties 
impact on personality or the ability to grow and develop” (care co-ordinator 1). 
 
Similarly, although there was the odd exception, the majority of care co-ordinators 
subscribed to the view that a child‟s learning difficulties were best supported at least as part 
of the therapeutic interventions delivered (integral stance): 
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“I don‟t think you can separate them off, as a psychotherapist you have to be aware of this. 
If you have a very gifted child, you need to be aware of that, as you could be easily dismissed 
by not respecting that. Same for learning disabilities: there‟s no point in making 
interpretations that the child can‟t understand. I try to work with the whole child, not bits” 
(care co-ordinator 2). 
 
“As part of the work, and integrated into the package of work… I don‟t like the idea of any 
aspect of therapy not being integrated with other treatment” (care co-ordinator 14). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a more separatist view was held: 
 
“I think it would be more the schools‟ role because we‟re not trained in that particular 
area” (care co-ordinator 9). 
 
The integral vs. separate standpoint taken by the individuals interviewed was heavily 
associated with the related theme of agency responsibility, and who was best placed to 
support the child‟s difficulties. 
 
AGENCIES 
Differing degrees of agency responsibility were identified. Some care co-ordinators felt there 
to be a clear division between the role of CAMHS and schools (as highlighted by care co-
ordinator 9, above). Others highlighted the need for multi-agency joined up working, but 
with different agencies taking on primary responsibility for different areas: 
 
“If see learning difficulties, or school difficulties, [intervention] needs to be separate but 
joined up” (care co-ordinator 13).   
 
“I think you have to take it into account… But offering the right support in the school 
environment is separate. And I think it is difficult sometimes to get the school to recognise 
that therapy is not always the answer” (care co-ordinator 4). 
 
One care co-ordinator highlighted the importance of the parental role in supporting 
intervention: 
 
“It‟s important to pay attention to parents‟ cognitive abilities as well… you‟re asking 




The importance of communication in the association between learning and emotional 
behavioural difficulties was frequently raised, particularly in relation to how this might 
impact on the therapeutic work conducted. For example: 
 
“…there‟s quite a lot of communication issues and you might need to be able to assess what 
their levels of expressive and receptive communication are… It‟s not that it‟s not possible to 
work with a child with lower… expressive language but it does help to know what that level 
is” (care co-ordinator 2). 
 
ADAPTING THERAPY 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of communication was often associated with adaptations that might 
be necessary within therapy: 
 
“…You might need to take a behavioural approach rather than cognitive, sometimes” (care 
co-ordinator 5). 
 
“Within formal Family Therapy, I think we often don‟t take enough account of learning 
difficulties, with the team behind the screen. Feedback should be put into simple comments 
to make it understandable, and perhaps face-to face with eye contact” (care co-ordinator 
10). 
 
“…if they may have a specific difficulty such as dyslexia, you may not want to give them 
diaries for example” (care co-ordinator 11). 
 
SELF ESTEEM and FRUSTRATION 
In the exploration of the relationship between learning and emotional/ behavioural 
difficulties, the themes of self-esteem and frustration frequently emerged as potential 
mediating factors. Care co-ordinator 10 surmised this: 
 
 “It can lead to frustration, manifesting in anger. It can be associated with bullying, low self-
esteem, poor achievement; school refusal can follow and children can get in a deeper hole in 






(c) Care co-ordinators‟ experience of the service 
 
Care co-ordinators were asked to consider their last experience of referral. Figure 12 (below) 
highlights the range of referral frequency. The most common timeframe for last referral 
made was between 3-6 months.  
 
 




When asked to consider the last referral they had made for cognitive assessment and what 
they had wanted from it, a key theme arising was that of diagnostic clarification, with many 
care co-ordinators seeking to separate out differential diagnosis: 
 
“He was being assessed for ADHD, had some symptoms. It was very unclear if he had 
ADHD; wondered if he had learning difficulties, as the problems were mainly at school” 
(care co-ordinator 4). 
 
Care co-ordinators were also asked how, following the assessment, they had used the results 
in their therapeutic work with the child. Again, diagnosis featured heavily: 
 
“Only [used] to inform diagnosis” (care co-ordinator 4). 
 
“I didn‟t follow up the work. It got the diagnosis – if it had happened at the beginning of my 
work, it might have informed my work a bit more” (care co-ordinator 13). 
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Others talked about the helpfulness of diagnosis for other agencies, such as school and 
parents: 
 
“It often concludes the diagnostic process which can put a whole series of things in process - 
parents can access benefits, other organisations can get involved. It often finishes off a big 
piece of work, with parents switching from seeking answers to seeking solutions: it allows 
them to start doing something” (care co-ordinator 13). 
 
AGENCIES vs. INDIVIDUAL UTILITY 
A division between the primary utility of the assessment for other agencies compared to the 
usefulness for the care co-ordinator themselves in their work with the child was clear within 
the interviews. As highlighted by care co-ordinator 13 above, greater emphasis was often 
given to care-planning aspects of the work, and presumed value to other agencies of the 
assessment: 
 
“It was useful for me to have an overall point of view, but I suspect it‟s most useful for 
schools or the education field rather than me” (care co-ordinator 5). 
 
Others highlighted assessment as useful in aiding their intervention with respect to parental 
interventions: 
 
“I need to talk to mum about how she manages his behaviour, e.g. when she explains things 
to him, that she might need to show him as well as tell him” (care co-ordinator 8). 
 
Interestingly, despite many care co-ordinators demonstrating good understanding of the 
potential adaptations to be made in a therapeutic intervention in other parts of the interview, 
when asked about their past experiences of utilising the results in their work with the child, 
none made reference to adapting their own style of interaction, and only one referenced a 
change in therapeutic approach: 
 
“The assessment showed particular difficulties with language. We made the decision not to 
give access to Stress Busters due to his difficulties with language…” (care co-ordinator 10).  
  
The role of clinical psychologists in CAMHS vs. educational psychologists (EP‟s) in schools 
also featured heavily, with the tension between education and CAMHS highlighted: 
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 “I really think Educational Psychology is the weak link, I do remember a time when they 
were much more proactive. Schools and EP‟s used to do much more than they do now, we‟re 
having to pick up the slack” (care co-ordinator 10). 
 
In part, this tension appeared to reflect the underlying resource issues felt by the service, 
leading to a lack of clarity and potential barrier to referral within CAMHS: 
 
“Sometimes there is an inconsistent response: e.g. being told that the EP‟s should do this” 
(care co-ordinator 4). 
 
RESOURCES 
A lack of resources within psychology was consistently raised as a barrier to referral: 
 
“I can think of one child now on my caseload where it would be helpful, but I know services 
are stretched so trying to get educational psychologist involved” (care co-ordinator 3). 
 
“I often actively don‟t refer because I know [psychologist] is stretched to her limits” (care 
co-ordinator 7). 
 
“…the resource issue, it would be nice to have quite a lot of them tested. I do flag up the 
ones I think [but] I‟m screening and don‟t know if I‟m screening appropriately. The other 
issue is thinking how long we‟ll have to wait, although this hasn‟t been my experience” (care 
co-ordinator 6). 
 
As indicated by care co-ordinator 6 (above), many interviewees referred to wanting greater 
input from the psychologist within the assessment process. Care co-ordinators suggested that 
additional help with providing feedback to families and school, or the opportunity for a 
meeting with the psychologist to discuss the report would be helpful were resources not an 
issue: 
 
“Maybe a little more help, time or detail spent talking to psychology to get advice on what 
would be helpful for me in my role as care co-ordinator in how to support them a bit more. 
Or sometimes more feedback to families, if there are issues there” (care co-ordinator 5). 
 
“It hasn‟t been my experience to have met up with whoever‟s done the assessment and to 
talk over the report: this would be helpful” (care co-ordinator 12). 
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EXTRA INFORMATION  
Suggestions for improvement of the current service focused on the provision of additional 
information and structure, in order to provide clarity and consistency for care co-ordinators 
thinking of making a referral: 
 
“…sometimes cognitive assessments go from the front of my consciousness. Sometimes it is 
by chance that I take it to the meeting and [psychologist] suggests it. So maybe it would help 
to be really clear why cognitive assessments would be useful so the pre-referral bit is easier. 
Maybe „helpful hints‟ on when to think about cognitive assessment would be useful” (care 
co-ordinator 6). 
 
“I think it would be helpful for the psychologists to do a presentation at an academic slot to 
explain the usefulness of cognitive assessments, and when it is appropriate to have one or 
not” (care co-ordinator 8). 
 
With regards to reports and written feedback, the value of summaries and clear links to „real 
life‟ difficulties the child might be having was also raised: 
 
“Making clearer the connection for what the score means, to give a good understanding of 
the overall picture. So if a child has an unusual or spiky profile, to really make the links to 
say „this means…‟ ” (care co-ordinator 4). 
 
3.3 Discussion  
 
The interviews highlighted that the current cognitive assessment service offered by 
psychology was viewed favourably within the service, and that overall, a good understanding 
of the relevance of assessment existed amongst care co-ordinators. A number of 
manifestations of the association between cognitive and emotional/ behavioural difficulties 
were identified: difficulties within communication, frustration and low self-esteem, as well 
as additional diagnoses. The role of cognitive assessment as aiding diagnosis appeared to be 
given particular prominence. It was striking that despite potential adaptations to therapy and 
communication issues featuring strongly within care coordinators‟ theoretical understanding; 
these themes were less prevalent when past experience of utilising assessment results was 
considered directly. Whilst there is a clear role for diagnostic clarification within CAMHS, 
with particular utility for supporting agencies such as parents and schools, there appeared to 
be a discrepancy between theoretical understanding of how this information could inform 
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direct clinical work with the child and its application. This may reflect the lack of confidence 
mentioned by many care co-ordinators in knowing when assessment was most appropriate; 
interpreting results; and wanting greater psychology input at various stages of the process, 
such as individual consultation following the report. 
 
Therefore interviews also highlighted that differing degrees of uncertainty did exist: 
particularly when cognitive assessment would (and would not) be useful, and when 
appropriate to refer within CAMHS or to educational psychologists. Other potential barriers 
to referral, including child‟s cultural background and beliefs around cultural validity, did not 
appear to be influencing factors in the decision-making process. It appeared that care co-
ordinators were keen to address gaps in their understanding of when they should be 
considering assessment, and suggestions for improvement were focused on greater education 
opportunities (academic slots or „helpful hints‟ handouts) and greater opportunity for 
psychology consultation. Within the psychometric reports, care co-ordinators highlighted the 
need for clear summaries and links to „real life‟ difficulties. Consistency in response to 
referrals also appeared to be an important factor, as many care co-ordinators felt unclear 
which service (CAMHS vs. education) was best placed to meet their needs. As recognised by 
most interviewees, the biggest challenge facing the service was that of resources however, 
and balancing the need for greater psychology input with that of what the team psychologists 
would realistically be able to provide. This was perhaps reflected in the reported length of 
time since care co-ordinators made their last referrals, which showed 3-6 months to be the 
average timescale.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that as the interviews were conducted by a trainee who had 
previously been on placement with the service, on occasion there was some overlap between 
the assessments discussed within the interview and those conducted whilst on placement. 
However this did not appear to influence responses, and to maintain confidentiality between 
individual care co-ordinators and team psychologists it was felt that an external interviewer 















Consideration of both the case-note review and the interviews conducted as part of this study 
highlights the strengths of the service already being offered with regard to cognitive 
assessment. A fundamental challenge for the identified teams remains finding a balance 
between addressing need for cognitive assessment where appropriate whilst working within 
resourcing limitations, with a reduced number of psychologists. Part 1 of the study provides 
a baseline for future audit giving an initial indication of the number of assessments 
completed within a specified time-frame. The results highlighted that cognitive assessment 
was often used to provide an overall sense of a child‟s development (through delivery of the 
WISC and WPSSI), with less of a focus on identifying specific learning needs. Again, this 
may be an appropriate use of clinician time given demands on resources, although the 
literature perhaps suggests a greater emphasis on specificity. The case-note review serves as 
a first step towards ongoing monitoring of practice.  
 
The interviews conducted in Part 2 highlighted that the team were very aware of resourcing 
issues - and that this did sometimes serve as a barrier to referral - but also that cognitive 
assessment was greatly valued. In order to promote greater consistency within the referral 
process and to ensure greater equity of access (at a time when the service was particularly 
under-resourced due to maternity leave on 3 of the 6 psychology posts), a formal referral 
system was introduced during the implementation of this project (see Appendix C), based on 
the referral form developed by Humphrey (2006). It is hoped this would also allow 
psychologists to develop clear criteria for „appropriate‟ referrals, as well as to develop 
screening guidelines. Additionally, future service investigations would therefore be able to 
audit all referral for cognitive assessment including those declined, in order to continue 












Care co-ordinators made a number of suggestions for improvement during the interviews. 
 
 
 Psychology to raise profile of cognitive assessment within team so remains at forefront of care 
co-ordinators‟ minds. 
 An academic teaching slot to provide further information about cognitive assessment, and when 
it might be useful.  
  Provision of a „helpful hints‟ handout regarding when to refer for cognitive assessment. 
 Psychologists to consider the length of the report and provide clear, concise summaries which 
explain implications of results to real-life. 
 Psychologists to meet with care co-ordinators face –to–face prior to the assessment to identify 
needs and for a brief follow-up to clarify findings and how this might link to own therapeutic 
work, as well as considering usefulness for other agencies. 
 
Figure 13: Care co-ordinator recommendations 
 
4.2 Feedback to service 
 
The results of this investigation were presented at the monthly service-wide psychology 
meeting. The recommendations above were discussed and further ideas generated regarding 
how best to take this work forward. To address care co-ordinators‟ interest and need for the 
provision of extra information, it was felt that a teaching day on cognitive assessment would 
be valuable and easily achievable (potentially to be incorporated as part of the CAMHS 
teaching slots that are already in place). Additionally, psychologists were keen to allocate 
time within a psychology meeting to begin the generation of a list of criteria referral, with 
the dual aims of aiding clarity for other referring professions and promoting consistency 
within the referrals accepted. It was also hoped this would maintain the profile of cognitive 
assessment within the team. Other recommendations fed back to the service included the 
value of future audit, against the baseline established in Part 1 of this study. 
 
A potential extension of the research was also discussed for the future, with psychologists 
keen to consider parents‟ experiences of cognitive assessment, including their views on the 
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Appendix B: Interview with care co-ordinators 
 
The purpose of this interview is to ask a few questions about your experience of 
referring the children you work with for cognitive assessment. We are simply 
interested in your views and are not testing you – there are no right or wrong 
answers.  
 
Our aim is to make cognitive assessments more accessible in the service, and to 
improve the quality of the service offered whilst managing the demand. Therefore it 
is important for you to be as honest as possible in your answers. 
  
 
1. Team and CC background (Social Work, Psychotherapy, Psychiatry etc): 
 
2. What is your understanding of the purpose of a cognitive assessment? 
 
3. Do you think that a child’s learning difficulty could impact on the therapeutic 
work you do with them? Why/ why not? In what way? 
 
4. When was the last time you made a referral to a psychologist for cognitive 
assessment? 
 
a. Date (last month, 3 months, 6 months etc): 
b. Age of child: 
c. Reason for assessment: 
d. How did you anticipate the outcome of this would impact on your 
therapeutic work?  
e. How long did it take to get the assessment (timely)? 
f. How helpful did you find the assessment? Did it answer your 
question? 
g. How helpful was the report? Was it comprehensible? 
h. How did you use the results of this assessment in your work with the 
child? 
i. What suggestions for improvement would you make? 
 
 
5. Is there anything that currently stops/ would stop you from referring a child 
for a cognitive assessment? 
 
6. Do you have any views on how a child’s culture might impact on a cognitive 
assessment? 
 
7. To what extent to you think that learning difficulties can be associated with 
emotional or behavioural difficulties in a child? Why/ why not? 
 
8. To what extent do you think that a child’s learning difficulties are best 







Appendix C: Referral form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
